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RESUMO 
 
O conflito surge quando trocas entre objectivos incompatíveis têm de ser realizadas. 
Abordamos a questão de como a quantidade de conflito está relacionado com o tamanho 
dessas trocas. O modelo de dupla-mediação (Scholten & Sherman, 2006), um modelo de 
geração de conflito na formação de preferências, postula que a relação entre tamanho de troca 
e conflito é mediada por duas fontes de conflito em direcções opostas: O conflito originado 
pela preocupação com o sacrifício que decorre de escolhermos uma opção em detrimento de 
outra, que aumenta com o tamanho de troca, e o conflito originado pela preocupação com a 
argumentação que pode ser construída a favor de uma opção, que diminui com o tamanho de 
troca. O modelo também prevê como a relação entre tamanho de troca e conflito é afectada 
por terceiras variáveis do contexto de escolha. Embora Scholten e Sherman (2006) tivessem 
aplicado o modelo de dupla-mediação ao conflito na escolha sem risco, muitas das escolhas 
que fazemos pertencem ao domínio do risco (i.e., envolvem consequências incertas). A 
escolha arriscada tem sido intensamente estudada; porém, a maioria da investigação foca as 
escolhas que as pessoas fazem e não o conflito que sentem ao fazerem essas escolhas. Assim, 
o objectivo principal desta dissertação é estender a aplicação do modelo de dupla-mediação ao 
domínio da escolha arriscada. De modo a validar as assumpções fundamentais do modelo de 
dupla-mediação centramo-nos no conflito originado por decisões entre jogos, que implicam 
trocas elementares entre probabilidade e consequência monetária. Em cinco experimentos, 
estudamos os efeitos de variáveis situacionais e individuais no conflito decisional. As 
variáveis situacionais são o sinal das consequências (i.e., se as decisões envolvem ganhos ou 
perdas), o método de elicitação de preferências (i.e., se a tarefa consiste em escolher ou 
rejeitar uma opção), e o peso diferencial dos atributos (i.e., se o peso dos atributos é igual ou 
diferencial). No que respeita a esta última variável, manipulamos o peso dos atributos 
(aumentando a amplitude das diferenças monetárias entre os jogos e diminuindo a amplitude 
das diferenças de probabilidade entre os jogos) em cada condição de sinal das consequências. 
A variável individual é o estilo de pensamento do decisor (i.e., se o decisor tende a processar 
a informação de um modo mais racional ou experiencial). Como previsto, os resultados 
demonstram que estes factores contextuais afectam diferenciadamente o conflito originado 
pela preocupação com o sacrifício e o conflito originado pela preocupação com a 
argumentação, e consequentemente, a relação entre tamanho de troca e conflito. Validamos 
assim a aplicação do modelo de dupla-mediação à escolha arriscada e demonstramos que o 
modelo captura um processo de geração de conflito que é comum ao domínio de escolha com 
e sem risco. Discutimos as contribuições desta investigação para uma compreensão mais 
abrangente do conflito decisional e do processo de tomada de decisão. 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Conflict arises when tradeoffs must be made between incompatible goals and we 
address the question of how the amount of conflict is related to the size of these tradeoffs. The 
double-mediation model (Scholten & Sherman, 2006), a model of conflict generation in 
preference formation, posits that the relation between tradeoff size and conflict is mediated by 
two conflict sources in opposite directions: The conflict from concern about the sacrifice that 
is to be incurred in choosing one option instead of the other, which increases with tradeoff 
size, and the conflict from concern about the argumentation that can be made in favor of an 
option, which decreases with tradeoff size. The model also predicts how the relation between 
tradeoff size and conflict is affected by third variables in the choice context. While Scholten 
and Sherman (2006) applied the double-mediation model to conflict in riskless choice, many 
choices we make are in the risky domain (i.e., they involve uncertain outcomes). Risky choice 
has been extensively investigated; nevertheless, most analyses focus on the choices that 
people make, not on the conflict they experience in making those choices. Therefore, the main 
aim of this dissertation is to extend the application of the double-mediation model to the risky 
choice domain. To validate the substantive claims of the double-mediation model we focus on 
the conflict aroused by decisions between gambles implying elementary tradeoffs between 
probability and monetary outcome. In five experiments, we address the effects of situational 
and individual variables on decisional conflict. The situational variables are outcome sign 
(i.e., whether decisions involve gains or losses), preference elicitation method (i.e., whether 
the task is to choose or to reject an option), and differential attribute weight (i.e., whether the 
attributes are of equal or differential weight). In what concerns the latter variable, we 
manipulate the attribute weight (by increasing the outcome differences between the gambles 
and by decreasing the probability differences between the gambles) in each outcome sign 
condition. The individual variable is the decision maker‟s thinking style (i.e., whether 
decision makers tend to process information in a more rational or experiential way). As 
predicted, the results demonstrate that these contextual factors differentially affect the conflict 
from concern about sacrifice and the conflict from concern about argumentation, and 
consequently, the relation between tradeoff size and conflict. We thus validate the application 
of the double mediation model to risky choice and show that the model captures a process of 
conflict generation that is common to the domain of risky and riskless choice. We discuss the 
contributions of this research for a more complete understanding of decisional conflict and of 
the decision making process.  
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CHAPTER 1: CONFLICT IN DECISION MAKING 
Making decisions is part of our daily lives, and with decisions comes conflict. As aptly 
stated by Tversky and Shafir (1992, p. 358), the “experience of conflict is the price one pays 
for the freedom to choose.”  
When making a decision, people have to trade off the advantages and disadvantages of 
one option against the advantages and disadvantages of another option. As Luce, Payne, and 
Bettman (2001, p.86) stated, “the decision makers must accept less of one choice attribute in 
order to get more of another.” Suppose that you are applying for a job and that two job 
options are available. Job A offers a fixed (certain) salary of €1000, while job B offers a 
smaller base salary of €600 plus the possibility of receiving an extra €700 with a chance of 
60% (likelihood of achieving the proposed objectives). Note that this is equivalent to saying 
that Job A offers €1000 for sure, while job B offers the possibility of receiving €1300 with a 
60% chance or else €600. Which job would you prefer? In order to make this decision, 
probability must be traded off against salary; and, therefore, if job B is preferred over A, it 
means that you are willing to accept less security in order to have the chance of getting a 
greater salary. Because the decision maker does not always know how to make these 
tradeoffs, preference uncertainty or conflict arises. 
Now imagine that the decision is between job A, that offers €1000 for sure, and job C, 
that offers €1300 for sure. This decision is unambiguous. The job that offers the larger salary 
(C) is clearly superior because it is better on one dimension and it is not worse on any other. 
In short, job C is a dominating option. When one option dominates the other(s), no attributes 
have to be traded off, and therefore, no conflict arises (Scholten, 2002; Tversky & Shafir, 
1992). Because dominance implies that no conflict is aroused and because a decision must 
involve the consideration of at least two options that arouse some degree of conflict (Hansen, 
1976), it can be argued that situations like this are not in fact decisions. Therefore, conflict is 
present in every decision, whether important or trivial (Chatterjee & Heath, 1996), big or 
small (Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993), and dominance can be seen as the zero degree of 
a decision.  
Tradeoffs arouse conflict either in risky or riskless choices. In the riskless choice 
domain, where the outcomes of choice are certain, conflict arises from the tradeoff between 
the features of the options. For example, in a decision between a USB flash drive with a 
higher storage capacity but a higher price and another flash drive with a lower price but also a 
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lower storage capacity, price has to be traded off against storage capacity (i.e., price and 
storage capacity cannot be maximized at the same time), and conflict arises accordingly.  
The domain of decision making studied in this dissertation is that of risky choice, the 
most intensively investigated domain in the field of behavioral decision making. In risky 
choice, where outcomes of choice are uncertain, conflict arises from the tradeoff between 
probability and outcome, as in the decision between job A and job B given above. In 
elementary tradeoffs, people must decide between a smaller but more probable outcome and a 
larger but less probable outcome. An example is a decision between job A, that offers €1000 
for sure (i.e., with a 100% chance), and job D, that offers the possibility of obtaining €1550 
with a 70% chance, or else €0 (imagine the case of free lancers).2 Because probability and 
amount cannot be maximized at the same time conflict arises.  
Naturally, there are decisions that are more difficult and others that are easier (Beattie 
& Barlas, 2001). Moreover, the difficulty of the decision, or the conflict that the decision 
maker experiences, has an impact on choice behavior, for instance, on the time that it takes to 
make a decision, on response error (e.g., Fischer, Luce, & Jia, 2000b), and on the tendency to 
defer choice (e.g., Shafir et al., 1993). 
Furthermore, it is important to distinguish motivational difficulty, i.e., the difficulty 
aroused by incompatible goals, from cognitive difficulty, i.e., the difficulty generated, for 
instance, by the number of options, or by the number of attributes. In this research we focus 
on motivational difficulty rather than on cognitive difficulty. 
So, what makes a decision easy or difficult? Making a decision implies making a 
tradeoff; and because tradeoffs must be made, conflict arises. People experience conflict 
because they must evaluate how much of one attribute has to be traded off against another 
(Shafir et al., 1993). To put it in another way, conflict is related to the magnitude of the 
differences between the attributes of the options available, or in short, to the size of the 
tradeoff.  
Moreover, the size of the tradeoff increases as more of one attribute has to be traded 
off against more of another, or in other words, as the magnitude of the differences between 
the attributes increases. In order to illustrate how tradeoff size can vary, consider a decision 
between job A (receiving €100 with a 100% chance), job D (receiving €1550 with a 70%; 
chance), and job E (receiving €1950 with a 55% chance). To decide between any two jobs, the 
                                               
2 Although in job A the outcome is attached to a probability of 1 (100% chance), certainty is not required.  
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decision maker must trade off the advantage in amount of one job (e.g., A) against the 
advantage in probability of obtaining that outcome (amount) of the other job (e.g., D). Job D 
offers a larger but less probable outcome than A, and job E offers an even larger and less 
probable outcome than A. Thus, because of the larger attribute differences between the 
options, comparing A to E implies a larger tradeoff than comparing A to D or D to E. 
Therefore, the question of how the amount of conflict is related to the size of the tradeoffs 
(i.e., the magnitude of the advantages that options have relatively to one another) arises. 
Not only is conflict a fundamental aspect of choice, it also has, as mentioned earlier, 
implications for choice behavior. Moreover, the view taken in this dissertation is that an 
analysis of conflict can reveal processes that eventually result in choice behavior. Thus, for a 
more complete understanding of decision making it is important to examine the conflict that 
people experience when making a choice.  
Most research on risky choice focuses on the choices that people make, not on the 
conflict they experience in making those choices. The security-potential/aspiration theory 
(Lopes, 1987, 1995; Schneider & Lopes, 1986; Schneider, 1992) and the decision field theory 
(Busemeyer & Diederich, 2002; Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Diederich, 1997) are the only 
theories that address conflict in risky choice. The security-potential/aspiration theory 
describes when conflict occurs, while the decision field theory also predicts that conflict 
might affect choice. In this dissertation we take the former approach, but from a different 
theoretical perspective because our focus is on how conflict depends on tradeoff size, i.e., on 
how much the options differ in probability and outcome. We examine the process of decision 
making through the analysis of conflict, rather than through an analysis of the choices that are 
made. The double-mediation model, a model developed by Scholten and Sherman (2006) to 
address conflict in preferential choice, describes those processes and discloses them through 
the analysis of the relation between tradeoff size and conflict, and how that relation is 
moderated by contextual factors.  
The double-mediation model posits that the relation between tradeoff size and conflict 
is mediated by two sources of conflict, the concern about sacrifice (that is to be incurred in 
choosing one option instead of the other) and the concern about argumentation (that can be 
made for any decision), and moderated by third variables in the choice context (such as 
differential attribute importance). Up to now, the double-mediation model was only applied to 
riskless choice and it accurately predicted the process of conflict generation in this domain. 
Therefore, the main aim of this dissertation is to extend its application to the domain of risky 
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choice, by examining the arousal of conflict in the formation of preference between two 
single-outcome gambles, i.e., in elementary tradeoffs between outcome and probability.  
We examine how situational and individual variables impact the decisional conflict, 
specifically, how they affect the two conflict sources and moderate the relation between 
tradeoff size and conflict. That is, according to the double-mediation model, the concern 
about sacrifice and the concern about argumentation mediate the relation between tradeoff 
size and conflict in opposite directions; we investigate how the contextual factors affect the 
relative weight of these opposing processes. The situational variables are: Outcome sign, i.e., 
whether the decision outcomes are positive or negative (gains or losses); preference elicitation 
method, i.e., whether the task is to choose or to reject an option; and differential attribute 
weight, i.e., whether the attributes are of equal or differential weight. In what concerns the 
latter variable, we manipulate the attribute weight (by increasing the range of the outcome 
differences between the gambles and by decreasing the range of the probability differences 
between the gambles) in each outcome sign condition, i.e., in gains and in losses. The 
individual variable is the decision maker‟s thinking style, i.e., whether decision makers tend 
to process information in a more rational or experiential (or both) way. 
The thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 provides a concise presentation and 
discussion of relevant literature on risky choice, concluded by a detailed specification of the 
research objectives. Chapters 2 and 3 concern the empirical studies. We start with an 
overview of the studies that will be undertaken (Experiments 1 and 2 in chapter 2, and 
Experiments 3, 4, and 5 in chapter 3), then we turn to the studies themselves, and finally 
conclude with a summary of the main findings. It should be noted that each Experiment is 
preceded by an introduction section, in which we present and discuss specific evidence 
relating to the study and derivation of hypotheses. Chapter 4 is the general discussion.  
Risky Choice 
Many outcomes of choice are not certain, requiring analyses of choice under risk or 
uncertainty. Either in choice under risk or under uncertainty, people face outcomes that 
depend on uncertain events. They decide without knowing for sure what the outcomes of their 
decisions will be. This is in contrast with riskless choices, which involve certain outcomes.  
In choice under uncertainty the outcomes of choice are uncertain and the probabilities 
attached to these outcomes are not known and virtually unknowable, in choice under risk 
however, the outcomes are uncertain but the degree of uncertainty is known, or at least easily 
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estimable (Abelson & Levi, 1985).
3
 Examples of choice under uncertainty are stock 
investments and insurance investments. Examples of choice under risk are roulettes and 
lotteries. Many other decisions, such as whether or not to maintain one‟s current job or 
whether or not to buy a new car, entail some degree of risk because it is not possible to 
anticipate all the decision outcomes (Abelson & Levi, 1985) or to be certain of which 
outcomes will occur.  
In this dissertation we investigate conflict arousal in risky choices. In risky choice, the 
uncertainty is given by the probabilities with which the outcomes will occur (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1983), and in the simplest possible case, risky choice tasks involve a tradeoff 
between the magnitude of an outcome and the probability of obtaining that outcome. 
Indeed, typical experiments on risky choices involve elementary tradeoffs between 
gambles, where the outcomes can be positive or negative. In other words, they involve 
making a decision between a gamble that offers a higher probability of winning a smaller 
monetary amount, which is called the safer option, and a gamble that offers a lower 
probability of winning a larger monetary amount, which is called the riskier option, or, 
making a decision between a gamble that entails a higher probability of losing a smaller 
monetary amount (safer option) and a gamble that entails a lower probability of losing a larger 
monetary amount (riskier option). As Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1992, pp. 106-107) 
asserted, “not only do responses to gambles provide insight into basic psychological processes 
of judgment and choice but understanding decision making under uncertainty and risk has 
direct relevance for improving decisions in business and public policy.” 
An example of a typical risky choice involving positive outcomes would be a decision 
between gamble x (€600, 90%), i.e., which offers the possibility to gain €600 with a chance of 
90%, and gamble y (€835, 65%), i.e., which offers the possibility to gain €835 with a chance 
of 65%. An example of typical risky choice involving negative outcomes would be a decision 
between gamble x’ (-€600, 90%), i.e., which entails the possibility of losing €600 with a 
chance of 90%, and gamble y’ (-€835, 65%), i.e., which entails the possibility of losing €835 
with a chance of 65%. Whether a decision entails positive or negative outcomes, it implies 
that a tradeoff, between an additional monetary amount (gain or loss) of €235 and  an 
additional risk of 25%, must be made. Moreover, conflict arises because decision makers do 
not always know how to make these tradeoffs. In other words, in the former case, conflict 
                                               
3The distinction between risk (knowable probabilities) and uncertainty (unknowable probabilities) was firstly 
introduced by Knight (1921). 
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arises because probability of winning and amount to win cannot be maximized at the same 
time. Similarly, in the latter case, conflict arises because probability of losing and amount to 
lose cannot be minimized at the same time. 
In the present research we examine the arousal of conflict in risky choice by focusing 
on decisions between two single-outcome gambles, i.e., on elementary tradeoffs between 
monetary outcome and probability, both in decisions involving positive outcomes and in 
decisions involving negative outcomes.  
Conflict: Definition, Types, and Manifestations 
Definition of Conflict 
Conflict has no formal definition (Tversky & Shafir, 1992). The most generally held 
view, which is also the view that we adopt, is that conflict involves preference uncertainty 
(Chernev, 2001; Dhar, 1997a; Fischer, Jia, & Luce, 2000a; Fischer et al., 2000b; Luce, Jia, & 
Fischer, 2003; Shafir et al., 1993; Simonson, 1989; Simonson, Carmon, & O‟Curry, 1994; 
Simonson, Nowlis, & Simonson, 1993). When there is only one option, which has both 
positive and negative features, conflict refers to the uncertainty about how to evaluate (or rate) 
that option (Fischer et al., 2000a; Fischer et al., 2000b). When the decision involves multiple 
options, conflict refers to the uncertainty about which option is more valuable or about which 
is the best option (Fischer et al., 2000a; Fischer et al., 2000b). 
Types of Conflict 
Kurt Lewin (1935, 1951) distinguished three basic types of motivational conflicts: 
Approach-approach conflict (type I), approach-avoidance conflict (type II), and avoidance-
avoidance conflict (type III). Hovland and Sears (1938) later added a type IV conflict: The 
double approach-avoidance conflict.   
Type I, approach-approach conflict, arises from decisions between competing 
attractive options, i.e., positive, and thus, desirable options (Houston & Doan, 1996; Hovland 
& Sears 1938; Lewin, 1951). Type III, avoidance-avoidance conflict, arises from decisions 
between competing repulsive options, i.e., negative, and thus, undesirable options (Houston & 
Doan, 1996; Hovland & Sears 1938; Lewin, 1951). Type II, approach-avoidance conflict is a 
concurrent attraction and repulsion by an option that has both positive and negative valences, 
in which the gradient of avoidance is assumed to be steeper than the gradient of approach 
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(Lewin, 1951; see also Epstein, 1978).
4
 The fourth conflict type, double approach-avoidance 
conflict, consists of two type II situations. In this case, there will be a conflict between two 
options that are both attractive and repulsive, i.e., each option has both positive and negative 
valences.  
Furthermore, as Atthowe (1960) suggested, approach (or attraction) can be considered 
as the possibility of winning a monetary amount, and avoidance (or repulsion) as the 
possibility of losing a monetary amount. Therefore, in the domain of risky choice, a person 
experiences an approach-approach conflict when is faced with a decision between gambles 
involving positive outcomes (i.e., winning something), and an avoidance-avoidance conflict 
when the decision is between gambles involving negative outcomes (i.e., losing something). 
For instance, having to decide between receiving €85 for sure and receiving €100 when heads 
or €70 when tails involves an approach-approach conflict, whereas, having to decide between 
paying €85 for sure and paying €100 when heads or €70 when tails involves an avoidance-
avoidance conflict. An approach-avoidance conflict is experienced when a person has to 
decide whether to accept a gamble in which the outcome may be positive or negative, as for 
example, a gamble that offers the possibility of receiving €100 when heads or paying €60 
when tails. Finally, a double approach-avoidance conflict is experienced when a person must 
decide between gambles involving both positive and negative outcomes, as for instance, 
between receiving €100 when heads or paying €60 when tails and receiving €50 when heads 
or paying €10 when tails. 
In the present research we investigate conflict arousal in elementary tradeoffs between 
probability and outcome; specifically, in decisions between gambles involving only positive 
outcomes or only negative outcomes. For this reason, from now on we will focus on Lewin‟s 
distinction between approach-approach and avoidance-avoidance conflicts (types I and III). 
Lewin (1951) argued that as the psychological distance to an option decreases, the 
more a person is attracted or repelled by an option. In approach-approach conflicts, the closer 
a person is to one of the options, the stronger the attraction to that option and the weaker the 
attraction to the competing ones. Thus, approach-approach conflicts produce a stable 
equilibrium, in which a step closer to one of the options is a step toward conflict resolution by 
making one option seem more attractive than the competing one. In other words, as the 
                                               
4Epstein (1978) suggested a fifth type of conflict, the avoidance-approach conflict. As the approach-avoidance 
conflict, the avoidance-approach conflict arises from the simultaneous attraction and repulsion of an alternative, 
nevertheless, while in the former case the gradient of avoidance is assumed to be steeper than the gradient of 
approach, in the latter the reverse would occur. 
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decision maker approaches one of the options, the more that option becomes preferred. In 
avoidance-avoidance conflicts, the closer a person is to one of the options, the stronger the 
repellence by that option and the weaker the repellence by the competing ones. Therefore, 
avoidance-avoidance conflicts produce a stable equilibrium, in which a step closer to one of 
the options is a step away from the resolution of conflict by making that option seem more 
unattractive than the competing ones. In other words, as decision makers approach one of the 
options, the more they are repelled by that option, reversing the preference toward the 
competing option. This generates vacillation between the choice options, and thus, 
complicates the resolution of conflict.  
Conflict is an unpleasant state from which people try to escape. However, a decision is 
often necessary and escaping is impossible, leading to hesitancy, tension, vacillation, and 
blocking between the choice options. Although it is believed (e.g., Lewin, 1951; Miller, 1944; 
Houston, Sherman, & Baker, 1991) that this will occur in avoidance-avoidance conflicts, or in 
other words, that decision difficulty is limited to options with negative characteristics, we 
argue that any type of conflict is psychologically unpleasant, generating difficulty and thus 
conflict. Even in approach–approach conflicts, decision makers can be paralyzed by not 
knowing which option they prefer. Consider, for instance, a choice between to equally 
attractive vacation destinations, or between two equally attractive gambles; it is likely that 
these decisions will be difficult rather than straightforward. Nevertheless, we also argue that 
avoidance-avoidance conflicts are indeed the most difficult (Epstein & Smith, 1967). They are 
psychologically more unpleasant and create a greater level of hesitancy, tension, and 
vacillation, or complete blocking between the choice options, generating more difficult 
decisions and longer decision times than approach-approach conflicts, as demonstrated by 
several authors (Arkoff, 1957; Minor, Miller, & Ditrichs, 1968; Murray, 1975; Schill, 1966). 
Manifestations of Conflict 
Just as there is no formal definition of conflict, there is no standard procedure for 
measuring it either (Tversky & Shafir, 1992). Rather, many different behaviors and judgments 
are seen as manifestations of conflict, and thus, are used as conflict measures (see Scholten & 
Sherman, 2006): 
 Decision time – the time to reach a decision (Berlyne, 1957; Cartwright & 
Festinger, 1943; Diederich, 2003; Festinger, 1943a, 1943b; Fischer et al., 2000a; 
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Fischer et al., 2000b; Kiesler, 1966; Luce, 1998; Luce, Bettman, & Payne, 1997; 
Scholten & Sherman, 2006; Tyebjee, 1979); 
 Decision difficulty – the difficulty in reaching a decision (Chatterjee & Heath, 
1996; Scholten, 2002; Scholten & Sherman, 2006; Simonson, 1989); 
 Confidence – the confidence in the decision reached (Dhar, 1996; Festinger, 
1943a, 1943b; Russo, Meloy, & Medvec, 1998; Scholten & Sherman, 2006; 
Zakay, 1985; Zakay & Tsal, 1993);  
 Equality of preferences – the degree to which options are equally preferred 
(Scholten & Sherman, 2006; Tyebjee, 1979); 
 Equality of importance - the degree to which attributes are equally preferred 
(Scholten & Sherman, 2006; Simonson, 1989); 
 Decision inconsistency – the inconsistency between the decisions made on 
different occasions (Fischer et al., 2000a; Fischer et al., 2000b; Luce et al., 2003); 
 Choice deferral – the choice of the avoidant or no-choice option, i.e., of the option 
of not choosing any of the available options (Dhar, 1996, 1997a, 1997b; Dhar & 
Nowlis, 1999; Dhar & Simonson, 2003; Luce, 1998; Tversky & Shafir, 1992); 
 Number of thoughts – the number of thoughts or justifications made for and 
against each option (Dhar, 1997a; Simonson, 1989). 
The confidence measure is negatively related to conflict, and all other measures are 
positively related to conflict. The equality measures of conflict will reach their maximum 
when the attributes are equally important or when the options are equally preferred; that is, 
conflict will decrease as one attribute becomes more important than the other or as one option 
becomes more preferred than the other.  
In our studies, we excluded the „choice deferral‟ and „number of thoughts‟ 
manifestations as conflict measures. The choice deferral measure was excluded given that the 
double-mediation model assumes conflict aversion. That is, because decision makers are 
conflict averse, they tend to follow the path of least resistance when it is impossible to escape 
from conflict by simply not choosing. This implies that the double-mediation model applies, 
and as a consequence, the decision making processes that it describes can be detected, only 
when choice deferral is not an option. The number of thoughts, or justifications made for and 
against each option, was also not considered as a conflict measure for the reason that we 
suspect that it would affect conflict arousal. This assumption derives from Scholten and 
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Sherman‟s (2006) investigation of conflict in riskless choice, which revealed that asking the 
participants to justify their choices affected the relation between tradeoff size and conflict.  
We have seen that the experience of conflict, or preference uncertainty, can manifest 
itself in many different ways. Nevertheless, most formal models of decision making do not 
account for decisional conflict. Models of rational choice explicitly exclude conflict by 
assuming that the decision maker has certain preferences. 
Rational Choice Under Risk 
Rational theory of choice assumes that people choose by maximizing expected utility. 
They are never uncertain about which option to choose because they order the options from 
least preferred to most preferred and choose the option that is most preferred (e.g., Dhar, 
1997a). The preference order is given by the expected utility of each option. Utility is 
independent from the set of options under consideration, and conflict has no influence on 
choice (Tversky & Shafir, 1992). For instance, how long it takes to make a choice (a 
manifestation of conflict) does not have an influence on what choice is made.
5
 Moreover, 
choice is taken to disclose the choice process (utility maximization), whereas choice conflict 
is not. 
Expected utility is a generalization of expected value. The expected value of an option 
(EV) is obtained by multiplying the probability of each outcome (p) by its monetary value (x), 
and then by summing across all the possible outcomes (i): 
i
i
i pxEV  . 
For instance, consider the decision between gaining €600 for sure (option y) and 
gaining €1000 with a chance of 65% (option z). The expected value for option y is €600 * 1 = 
€600 and the expected value for option z is €1000 * .65 + €0 * .45 = €650. Thus, because z 
has a higher expected value, it should be preferred to y. However, researchers noticed that y is 
usually preferred to z, in other words, people generally prefer a sure outcome over a gamble (a 
risky option) of equal (or higher) expected value (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
6
 This 
phenomenon is called risk aversion.  
                                               
5In contrast, research demonstrates that decision time is inversely correlated with choice probability (Diederich 
& Busemeyer, 1999; Jamieson & Petrusic, 1977; Mosteller & Nogee, 1951; Petrusic & Jamieson, 1978).  
6 Of course that beyond a certain point, i.e., when the expected value of the gamble exceeds a certain value, 
people will definitely prefer the gamble over the sure outcome 
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Many analyses of risky choice draw on the psychophysical approach of Bernoulli 
(1954), who proposed that people maximize expected utility instead of expected value. People 
evaluate the options not in terms of their outcomes but rather in terms of final states of wealth, 
obtained by integrating the outcomes (x) with current wealth (w). Thus, instead of evaluating 
x, one evaluates w + x. Moreover, one assigns utilities to final states of wealth. As can be seen 
in Figure 1, the utility function is concave. This is the law of diminishing marginal utility: 
Utility increases with wealth, but at a decreasing rate, i.e., with each additional unit of wealth, 
utility increases less. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Example of a utility function. 
 
The concavity of the utility function entails risk aversion, according to which people 
can prefer option y (€600), with an expected value of €600, to option z (€1000, 65%), with an 
expected value of €650.  
Bernoulli‟s (1954) idea that people maximize expected utility is the basis of expected 
utility theory, in which the expectation of a gamble (an option) is given by a weighted mean, 
where the probability of occurrence of each possible outcome is multiplied by its utility, 
)( ixu , and the gamble with higher expected utility (EU) is chosen. Formally: 
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i xupEU  .  
For instance, suppose that when facing a choice between option y (€600) and option z 
(€1000, 65%), a decision maker assigns a utility of 75 to the gain of €600 and a utility of 100 
to the gain of €1000. The expected utility of option y will be 1 * 75 = 75 utiles, and the 
expected utility of option z will be .65 * 100 + 0 * .45 = 65 utiles; therefore, option y will be 
preferred. 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) developed the theory of games and economic 
behavior, an axiomatic treatment of expected utility maximization. They formalized expected 
utility theory as a rational decision criterion (Schoemaker, 1982) by developing a set of 
axioms that, if satisfied, define a rational choice under risk. If these axioms (rules) are 
followed, utilities can be derived and a preference order among options can be obtained by 
ordering the expected utilities of each option (Hastie & Dawes, 2001). Given this preference 
order, people are certain about what they want, meaning that conflict is removed from the 
analysis of risky choice. 
Axiomatizing Conflict Away  
Many different axiomatizations of expected utility theory have been advanced since 
von Neumann and Morgenstern‟s (1944) original attempt (Hastie & Dawes, 2001). We will 
focus on completeness and transitivity (e.g., Schoemaker, 1982), the two axioms that yield a 
preference order between the options. 
Completeness (or comparability) distinguishes three preference states: Either A is 
preferred to B (i.e., A   B), or B is preferred to A (i.e., B   A), or A and B are equally 
preferred (i.e., A ~ B). The former two cases are referred to as strict preference, whereas the 
latter case is referred to as indifference. Completeness means that choice reveals a preference 
among A and B. That is, A is chosen, when A is preferred to B (i.e., A   B), and B is chosen 
when B is preferred to A (i.e., B   A). Even in a state of indifference, choice will be 
consummated („choose any‟), meaning that there is no room for conflict in the choice between 
two options.  
The case for completeness as an axiom of rational choice is often made with the 
argument of “Buridan‟s ass”, a hungry ass who died of starvation when faced with a choice 
between two equidistant and equivalent (or equally attractive) haystacks because it was 
unable to establish a preference between equally preferred options. 
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Transitivity states that, if option A is preferred to B, and B is preferred to C, then A 
must be preferred to C (i.e., A   B, B   C, A   C). Transitivity means that choice reveals a 
consistent ordering of the options in the choice set. Indeed, if preferences were intransitive, 
that is, if the options were not consistently ordered (i.e., A   B   C   A) it would be 
impossible for choice to be consummated, because none of the options could come out as the 
best. 
While the case for transitivity as an axiom of rational choice could be made by 
confronting Burridan‟s ass with a choice between three options, it is usually made with the 
argument of “money pumps”. For instance, suppose that you are given A and that you are 
willing to pay some amount to exchange A for C (because C   A). Then, you are again 
willing to pay to exchange C for B (because B   C). Then, you are again willing to pay to 
exchange B for A (because A   B). Thus, the decision maker ends up with the same option A, 
but with less money in his pocket (e.g., Tversky, 1969). 
Completeness and transitivity ensure that people are not paralyzed by indecision, and 
that decisions are consistent. Over the last decades, many violations of the axioms have been 
documented. For instance, Tversky and Kahneman (1981), with the famous Asian disease 
problem, demonstrated that people often violate completeness by violating descriptive 
invariance (or extensionality), a more fundamental condition of rationality, according to 
which a decision does not depend on the description of the choice problem (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1983; Tversky & Kahneman, 1988). 
Consider the Asian disease choice problems (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 453):  
“Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease which is 
expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. 
-Problem 1: If program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved; if program B is adopted, there 
is a 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved and 2/3 probability that no one will be saved. Which 
program would you favor? 
-Problem 2: If program C is adopted 400 people will die; if program D is adopted there is a 
1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3 probability that 600 people will die. Which program 
would you favor?” 
An example of a rational choice would be preferring program A to B in problem 1, and 
program C to D in problem 2. This is because, although option A is positively framed (the 
outcomes are formulated in terms of number of persons saved) and option C is negatively 
14 
 
framed (the outcomes are formulated in terms of number of persons lost), both options present 
the exact same outcomes. Note that option A is equivalent to C, and that option B is equivalent 
to D. Thus, descriptive invariance and completeness are satisfied and preferences are 
consistent. However, the authors found that a great majority of people have inconsistent 
preferences, choosing program A in problem 1, but program D in problem 2. That is to say 
that, in the positive frame people prefer A over B, and that in the negative frame they prefer B 
over A. Therefore, different formulations of the same choice problem can lead to different 
preferences, violating descriptive invariance and completeness. This phenomenon is called a 
framing effect.  
People often disobey completeness by the violation of another form of invariance, 
procedural invariance. Here, preferences do not depend on the procedure that is used to elicit 
the preferences, i.e., different (but formally equivalent) preference elicitation methods should 
lead to the same preference order (e.g., Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988). Nevertheless, 
several authors have demonstrated that procedural invariance fails to hold, as we have seen 
discrepancies between choice and matching (e.g., Tversky et al., 1988), choice and pricing 
(e.g., Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971), and choice and rejection (e.g., Shafir, 1993). For instance, 
Shafir (1993) investigated procedural invariance across the choice and rejection preference 
elicitation methods (that is, when the task is to choose or to reject an option). To illustrate, 
consider the next example (Shafir, 1993, p. 549): 
“Imagine that you serve on the jury of an only-child sole-custody case following a relatively 
messy divorce. The facts of the case are complicated by ambiguous economic, social, and emotional 
considerations, and you decide to base your decision entirely on the following few observations. To 
which parent would you award sole custody of the child? / Which parent would you deny sole custody 
of the child? 
-Parent A: Average income, average health, average working hours, reasonable rapport with 
the child and relatively stable social life. 
-Parent B: Above-average income, very close relationship with the child, extremely active 
social life, lots of work-related travel and minor health problems.” 
Asking the participants to „award‟, i.e., to choose an option, is equivalent to asking to 
„deny‟, i.e., to reject an option, so that if one option is chosen than the other should be 
rejected. Therefore, rationality requires that if option B is preferred over A in the choice 
condition, option A should be preferred over B in the reject condition. In this case, procedural 
invariance and completeness are satisfied and preferences are consistent. Nevertheless, Shafir 
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(1993) found that option B, which is called the enriched option (because it has more positive 
and negative attributes), tended to be more chosen and also more rejected than option A, the 
impoverished one (which has fewer positive and negative attributes). That is, the same option 
(B) was preferred in both conditions, revealing that different preference elicitation methods 
led to inconsistent preferences, violating procedural invariance and completeness.   
Tversky (1969), followed by other authors such as Budescu and Weiss (1987), Leland 
(1994), and Lindman and Lyons (1978), demonstrated that the transitivity axiom can also be 
violated and that these violations are systematic and predictable. The author demonstrated that 
decision makers frequently choose by using a lexicographic semiorder which can give rise to 
intransitivities. As Tversky (1969, p. 32) stated, a lexicographic semiorder is when “a 
semiorder or a just noticeable difference structure is imposed on a lexicographic ordering.” In 
turn, in a lexicographic order (Abelson & Levi, 1985), the attributes are ordered according to 
their importance, the options are compared on the most important attribute, and the option 
with the higher or better value on that attribute is chosen. If two or more options remain 
(because they are equivalent on the most important attribute), the process is repeated with the 
second most important attribute. The process will continue until there is only one option left. 
Thus, the distinction between the two choice strategies is that, in the lexicographic semiorder, 
small differences between the options (or differences that are equal or lower to a certain 
value/minimum) are neglected, and thus, options are treated as equivalent, giving rise to 
intransitivities.  
To illustrate, consider Tversky‟s (1969, p. 33) risky choices between pairs of gambles, 
which are presented in Table 1. The author demonstrated that, when choosing between pairs 
of contiguous gambles (e.g., between a and b, or b and c), participants ignored the probability 
differences (because they were small) and preferred the gamble with the higher payoff, but, 
when choosing between more extreme pairs of gambles, in which the differences were larger 
(e.g., between a and e or b and e), they chose according to the probability attribute, meaning 
that they preferred the gamble with the higher probability of winning. For instance, 
participants preferred gamble a to b, b to c, c to d and d to e in the former case, but, for 
instance, gamble e to a or e to b in the latter. 
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Table 1 
Tversky’s Gambles 
Gamble 
Probability of 
winning 
Payoff        
(in $) 
Expected 
value (in $) 
a 7/24 5.00 1.46 
b 8/24 4.75 1.58 
c 9/24 4.50 1.69 
d 10/24 4.25 1.77 
e 11/24 4.00 1.83 
 
In sum, people often make inconsistent decisions, violating completeness and 
transitivity. If people obeyed completeness and transitivity, we could say they acted as if they 
were certain of their preferences. So do the above violations of completeness and transitivity 
imply that subjects were not certain of their preferences? Not necessarily, because decisions 
were made separately from one another: A positive frame separate from a negative frame, 
choice separate from rejection, separate dyadic choices instead of a single pentadic choice, 
and so on. It may be that subjects were certain of their preferences at each separate occasion, 
although their preferences were inconsistent across occasions. But then the question of how 
certain the subjects would be of their preferences if they were confronted with their own 
inconsistencies arises.  
Preference uncertainty has been exposed by research in which people are given the 
opportunity not to choose (e.g., Dhar, 1996, 1997a; Dhar & Nowlis, 1999; Dhar & Simonson, 
2003; Luce, 1998; Tversky & Shafir, 1992). When the possibility of not choosing one of the 
available options is offered (i.e., the no-choice option), the decision maker tends to select that 
option under conditions of preference uncertainty or conflict. For instance, Tversky and Shafir 
(1992) demonstrated that the no-choice option becomes the most popular option when conflict 
increases. To illustrate, consider a choice between A and C, and a choice between A, B and C, 
in which A and B are two equally attractive options and C is the no-choice option. If 
preferences are consistent as rationality implies, a decision maker who prefers A in the first 
case, could not prefer C in the latter case. Nevertheless, Tversky and Shafir (1992) 
demonstrated that participants indeed preferred A to C but C to A and B. Thus, when B came 
to establish a tradeoff with A, giving rise to conflict, the no-choice option went from less 
preferred than A to more preferred than A, in violation of completeness. 
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Violations of completeness and transitivity, along with other axioms of expected 
utility theory, have spurred the development of alternative theories of risky choice. The most 
prominent of these is prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). As we discuss next, 
prospect theory, like most other theories, accommodates inconsistent preferences on separate 
occasions, but not indecision at any given occasion. 
Prospect Theory 
According to prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1992), the decision process is composed of two phases, editing and evaluation. In the editing 
phase, the choice set prospects (options) are analyzed and a cognitive representation of the 
prospects is built. Several operations, which transform the prospects‟ probabilities and 
outcomes, are performed in order to simplify the subsequent phase.  
The most important editing operation is coding (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), 
according to which the outcomes are evaluated as changes of wealth instead of final states. 
These changes are relative to a neutral reference point, usually one‟s current wealth (status 
quo). Outcomes above the reference point are coded as gains and outcomes below the 
reference point are coded as losses. 
Another operation is simplification. One way to simplify an option is by rounding 
probabilities or outcomes (or both). Consider prospects y (€200, 51%) and z (€200, 49%). It 
seems that option y dominates (is superior to) option z. However, the difference between them 
is eliminated when they are both simplified to (€200, 50%). Many violations of expected 
utility theory can be explained by these operations. For instance, simplification can result in 
intransitive preferences because the small differences between the options are eliminated, as 
demonstrated by the counterexample discussed earlier. This elimination process is captured 
by Tversky‟s (1969) additive-difference model, in which people make direct comparisons 
between options, and small (subthreshold) differences are discarded. In the counterexample, 
these were the small probability differences in choices between contiguous gambles.  
The second phase, evaluation, consists of an evaluation of the edited prospects, where 
the prospect with the highest value is chosen. The value of a prospect, V, that yields an 
outcome x with probability p, and an outcome y with probability q, is given by: 
)()()()(),;,( zvqyvpqzpyV   . 
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That is, the value of the prospect V, can be obtained by multiplying the decision 
weight of each outcome, π(p), by its outcome value, v(x), and then by summing across the two 
possible outcomes. 
Value Function 
In expected utility theory, the utility function, u, is defined over final states of wealth. 
However, in prospect theory, the value function, v, is defined over changes of wealth relative 
to a neutral reference point, i.e., it is reference dependent. As mentioned earlier, the reference 
point is usually the decision maker‟s current wealth, and it can be influenced by expectations 
and formulations of the decision problem (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  
The norm of risk aversion is a major implication of expected utility theory. 
Nevertheless, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) verified that this holds only for choices among 
positive prospects. For choices among negative prospects, people tend to have a risk seeking 
tendency, i.e., they tend to prefer a gamble (the risky option) over a sure outcome with equal 
(or higher) expected value.
7
 For example, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) demonstrated that in 
choices between positive prospects a majority of participants prefer option y (€3000, 100%) to 
z (€4000, 80%), while in choices between negative prospects a majority of participants prefer 
option z’ (-€4000, 80%) to y’ (-€3000, 100%). This reverse preference pattern was called the 
reflection effect.  
Therefore, while the utility function follows the law of diminishing marginal utility, 
which entails risk aversion for both gains and losses, prospect theory‟s value function follows 
the law of diminishing sensitivity, which entails risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for 
losses. The law of diminishing sensitivity states that “people are more sensitive to changes 
near their status quo than to changes remote from the status quo” (Wakker, Kobberling, & 
Schwieren, 2007, p. 206). That is, people are more sensitive to a change from a gain of €40 to 
€50 than from €140 to €150, and conversely, to a change from a loss of -€40 to -€50 than 
from -€140 to -€150. For this reason, the value function is concave for gains producing risk 
averse preferences (as in expected utility theory), but convex for losses producing risk seeking 
preferences. 
The coding operation and the diminishing sensitivity principle explain the violation of 
completeness in the Asian disease problem. In the gain scenario, i.e., when the decision 
                                               
7Again, of course that beyond a certain point, i.e., when the expected value of the sure outcome exceeds a certain 
value, people will definitely prefer the sure outcome over the gamble. 
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problem is positively framed, option A is preferred to B because the outcomes are evaluated as 
gains, which produces risk averse preferences, as implied by the diminishing sensitivity 
principle. Conversely, in the loss scenario, i.e., when the decision problem is negatively 
framed, option D is preferred to C because the outcomes are evaluated as losses, which 
generates risk seeking preferences, as implied by the diminishing sensitivity principle. Thus, 
we have a violation of completeness. However, although preferences are inconsistent across 
frames, there is, according to prospect theory, no preference uncertainty within frames. 
Apart from reference dependence and diminishing sensitivity, the value function is 
characterized by loss aversion, which is that losses are more painful than equivalent gains are 
pleasant. Accordingly, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) propose an S-shaped value function, 
inflected at the neutral reference point, and steeper over losses than over gains. The value 
function is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Example of a value function. 
 
To exemplify the effect of loss aversion, consider a gamble that offers a 50% chance 
to win €60 and a 50% chance to lose -€60. Because a loss of €60 is more unpleasant than a 
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gain of €60 is pleasant, people usually prefer to maintain the status quo and not to play the 
gamble. As Kahneman and Tversky (1983, p. 342) stated, “the attractiveness of the possible 
gain is not nearly sufficient to compensate the aversiveness of the possible loss.” 
Probability Weighting Function 
According to the expectation rule, the value of an outcome is weighted by its 
occurrence probability (by an objective probability). However, in prospect theory, the stated 
probability is replaced by a decision weight, w(p), and as a result, the outcome value is 
multiplied by a decision weight instead of by an objective probability. 
As the value function, the weighting function is reference dependent and follows the 
law of diminishing sensitivity. Certainty and impossibility are the reference points; thus, 
probabilities are evaluated as deviations from 1 (certainty) or 0 (impossibility) at a decreasing 
rate of sensitivity (changes near the reference point have a greater impact). To illustrate, 
consider the Russian Roulette example, adapted from Kahneman and Tversky (1979): 
“Suppose you are compelled to play Russian Roulette, but are given the opportunity to 
purchase the removal of one bullet from the loaded gun” (p. 283). In which situation would 
you be willing to pay more? 
A: To reduce the number of bullets from 1 to 0.  
B: To reduce the number of bullets from 4 to 3. 
The majority of participants preferred option A over B, which shows that introducing 
possibility has a greater impact than increasing the degree of possibility (i.e., the possibility 
effect). Impossibility works as a reference point, from which the sensitivity to probabilities 
decreases. Therefore, a person is more sensitive to an increase from 0 to 1/6 than from 3/6 to 
4/6, and thus, a person is willing to pay more to reduce the probability of death from 1/6 to 0 
than from 4/6 to 3/6.  
Now consider a choice between two other options. In which situation would you be 
willing to pay more?  
B: To reduce the number of bullets from 4 to 3.  
C: To reduce the number of bullets from 6 to 5.  
In this case, the majority of participants preferred option C over B. This choice reveals 
that removing certainty has a greater impact than reducing the degree of certainty, or, in other 
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words, that certain outcomes are overweighted relatively to probable ones. This is called the 
certainty effect. Certainty functions as a reference point from which the sensitivity to 
probabilities decreases. Therefore, a person is more sensitive, and thus, is willing to pay more, 
to reduce the probability from 1 to 5/6 than from 4/6 to 3/6.  
Finally, consider the following choice. In which situation would you be willing to pay 
more?  
A: To reduce the number of bullets from 1 to 0.  
C: To reduce the number of bullets from 6 to 5.  
The majority of participants preferred option C over A, showing that removing 
certainty has a greater impact than introducing possibility, that is, probabilities are 
underweighted in relation to certain outcomes. This property of the weighting function was 
labeled as subcertainty: The decision maker assigns an additional weight to certainty and 
therefore, the sum of the decision weights of complementary probabilities is less than 1, i.e., 
w(p) + w(1-p) < 1. More formally, if  w(1) – w(5/6) > w(1/6) – w(0), thus 1 – w(5/6) > w(1/6), 
and as a result w(1/6) + w(5/6) < 1. 
Subcertainty entails that probabilities are underweighted, implying risk aversion for 
gains and risk seeking for losses. Nevertheless, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) also argued 
that this holds for moderate and large probabilities but not for small ones. They propose that 
small probabilities are overweighted, implying risk seeking for small gains and risk aversion 
for small losses. This explains why people gamble, even though there is a low probability of 
winning, and why they pay for insurance, even though there is a low probability of loosing 
(i.e., of needing the insurance).  
Overall, the weighting function is an S-shaped function, according to which small 
probabilities are overweighted and moderate to large probabilities are underweighted, as 
represented in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3. Example of a weighting function. 
 
As we previously referred, in the present research we examine gambles involving 
elementary tradeoffs between probability and outcome. To avoid pronounced nonlinearities 
near impossibility (very small probabilities) and certainty (very large probabilities), our 
gambles entail only moderate probabilities (the largest probability interval ranges from a 
probability of .212 to a probability of .846). Thus, our weighting function is relatively flat and 
linear and implies the common preference for the riskier gamble in gains and for the safer 
gamble in losses.   
Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) allows for violations of the axioms of 
expected utility theory, among which completeness and transitivity, in the form inconsistent 
preferences across occasions. However, like expected utility theory, it does not accommodate 
preference uncertainty at any given occasion. Next we discuss a theory that addresses conflict 
in risky choice and predicts in what choice situations it will occur. 
Security-Potential/Aspiration Theory 
Security-potential/aspiration theory (Lopes, 1987, 1995; Schneider & Lopes, 1986; 
Schneider, 1992) describes people‟s preferences between multi-outcome gambles (e.g., 
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lotteries) by combining psychophysical and motivational approaches of risky choice. It 
assumes that choice is determined by two factors, a dispositional and a situational factor, and 
that conflict can occur when these factors are in disagreement.  
The first factor, the security-potential factor is motivational, a dispositional variable 
that reflects a person‟s evaluation of risk (Lopes, 1987; Schneider & Lopes, 1986). A person 
is motivated to achieve security or to achieve potential. The security-potential criterion is the 
overall utility of an option and is given by a decumulative weighting value rule (Lopes & 
Oden, 1999). That is, as in other decumulative weighting models (e.g., cumulative prospect 
theory, Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), in the security-potential criterion, the distribution of 
probabilities associated with the utility of the outcomes is transformed by a rank dependent 
method (first developed by Quiggin, 1982) in which, the weight associated with the 
probabilities will depend on the ordinal position of the outcomes (Zank, 2004). The outcomes 
are ordered from the worst (lowest outcome) to the best (highest outcome) and probabilities 
are decumulatively weighted. In other words, the decision weights are determined by a 
(decumulative) probability function, which gives the probability of winning an outcome at 
least as high as outcome x (Lopes & Oden, 1999). Similarly to other decumulative weighting 
models, this weighting function can be different for gains and losses; however, the utility 
function is linear (Lopes & Oden, 1999).  
Since prospect theory, it is recognized that in risky choices decision makers are risk 
seeking for gains and risk seeking for losses. Nevertheless, either for gains or for losses, the 
distinction between security and potential means that we can classify individuals‟ attitude 
toward risk in two poles. At one end are the security seekers, who tend to avoid bad outcomes 
and who choose the safer option showing a risk averse behavior. At the other end are the 
potential seekers, who are motivated to get good outcomes, in spite of the risk. They usually 
behave like risk seeking persons, choosing the riskier option.  
However, this does not mean that security seekers are never risk seeking and that 
potential seekers are never risk averse. The indecision between choosing security or potential 
can be a source of conflict (Lopes, 1987). For instance, security seekers may take a chance 
depending on the choice set (i.e., on the available options). When the options available have 
only a small difference on the worst outcomes and a large advantage in potential, they will 
probably choose the riskier option (Schneider, 1992).  
Lopes and Oden (1999) argue that people are security motivated (security seekers) or 
potential motivated (potential seekers) depending on the relative weight that they assign to 
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security and potential. Accordingly, the authors categorize people‟s preference toward risk 
into three groups: Security-minded (security motivated), potential-minded (potential 
motivated), and cautiously-hopeful (with some degrees of caution and hope). In the security-
minded group, a greater weight is assigned to security, and thus, the safer option is generally 
preferred. Conversely, in the potential-minded group, a greater weight is given to potential, 
and thus, the riskier option is usually preferred. In the limiting cases, where only security or 
potential is weighted, people are strictly security-minded (always preferring the safer option) 
or strictly potential-minded (always preferring the riskier option), respectively. Between these 
extremes, with some combination of caution and hope, is the cautiously hopeful group (both 
options can be preferred depending on the choice set characteristics). 
The second factor, level of aspiration, is a situational variable that describes the 
individual differences in responding to different needs and situational constraints, demands, 
and opportunities (Lopes, 1987). It includes: Decision maker‟s aspirations (what they hope to 
win), contextual influence (e.g., high probability gains tend to be preferred), and outside 
influence (e.g., people tend to make more risky choices when they are losing at the end of a 
round).  
The aspiration level is a reference point. An option is evaluated by assessing the 
probability that an option will yield an outcome at or above the aspiration level. As a result, 
the aspiration level is expressed by the lowest outcome value that a decision maker considers 
acceptable to win (or lose). This value depends on the frame of the option. Usually people set 
up lower aspiration levels for gains than for losses. As Schneider (1992) stated, people are 
more demanding, or more ambitious, for losses, because they “have a stronger desire to 
minimize losses than to maximize gains” (p. 1054), as implied by the loss aversion principle. 
Also, security-motivated (risk averse) people set lower aspiration levels than potential 
motivated (risk seeking) people. However, the inverse can occur under high situational 
constraints (Schneider & Lopes, 1986). 
From the interaction between the security-potential factor and the aspiration level 
conflict may arise. If these two factors are in accordance, there will be no conflict because 
both factors favor the same option. In contrast, when motivation is in disagreement with 
aspiration level, there will be conflict because each factor favors a different option. That is, 
conflict arises when the motives that lead a person to prefer the safer or the riskier option are 
incompatible with the needs aspired or with the situational constraints. When conflict occurs, 
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both options can be chosen, depending on other factors such as the weight that each criterion 
has to the decision maker or the choice set characteristics.  
This hypothesis was tested with multi-outcome lotteries (Lopes, 1987; Schneider & 
Lopes, 1986) where the task was to order the lotteries according to the preferences of the 
participants. The authors demonstrate that, in general, when people are security seekers, there 
is no conflict for gains but there is conflict for losses, and the inverse situation for potential 
seekers. For a better understanding of how conflict can arise, let us consider the case of a 
security seeker, which is by far more common. First of all, it is relevant to remember that: (1) 
security seeking implies weighting more the worst outcomes (i.e., small gains or large losses), 
which leads to a preference for the gambles that offer certain, or at least, high probable gains 
(or losses); (2) a low or moderate aspiration level will be set for gains, which leads to a 
preference for gambles that provide low or moderate gains; and (3) a more ambitious 
aspiration level will be set for losses than for gains, which leads to a preference for the 
gambles that provide only low losses.  
When a security seeker is faced with a choice between gains, e.g., between gamble y 
(€68) and gamble z (€170, 40% or €0, 60%), no conflict arises. The safer option, i.e., gamble 
y, is uniformly preferred because it favors both desire for security (a certain gain) and 
aspiration level (a moderate gain, €68). In contrast, when a security seeker is faced with a 
choice between losses, e.g., between y’ (-€68) and z’ (-€170, 40% or €0, 60%), conflict does 
arises because each factor favors a different option. In particular, while gamble y satisfies 
desire for security (a certain loss), gamble z provides a high probability of satisfying the 
aspiration level (a low loss, €0). In other words, while desire for security requires a risk averse 
choice, the satisfaction of aspiration level requires a risk seeking choice. As a consequence, 
this conflict between security and aspiration will probably cause “vacillation back and forth in 
a frustrating attempt to isolate „the lesser of two evils‟” (Schneider, 1992, p. 1055). When 
conflict is present both options can be preferred depending on other aspects of the decision.  
Although security-potential/aspiration theory predicts conflict, it is, like expected 
utility theory and prospect theory, a deterministic-static theory. A stochastic-dynamic theory 
of choice and conflict is discussed next.
8
  
                                               
8A stochastic (or probabilistic) model predicts choice probabilities and consequently a direction of preference, 
whereas, a deterministic model predicts with certainty which option will be preferred (Busemeyer & Townsend, 
1993). A dynamic model considers the existing relation between preference strength, i.e., the magnitude of 
choice, and deliberation time, i.e., choice response times, whereas a static model does not (Busemeyer & 
Townsend, 1993).  
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Decision Field Theory 
Decision field theory (Busemeyer & Diederich, 2002; Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; 
Diederich, 1997) is a stochastic-dynamic theory of decision behavior under uncertainty, which 
predicts not only the choice probabilities (like other models of decision making), but also 
choice response times, taken as a manifestation of conflict. In other words, decision field 
theory predicts what decisions will be more or less conflicting.  
Decision field theory describes a two step process of preference formation and 
evolution. Preferences are initially formed in the first phase, the initial impression, and 
subsequently evolved in the second phase, the deliberation. In the end a decision is made. 
In the initial impression, a preference state is primarily formed from prior knowledge 
and past experience with the choice task. Thus, the deliberation process starts from this 
preliminary preference state, rather than from a neutral point.  
In the deliberation process, people evaluate the options by anticipating the possible 
outcomes of each option and comparing them against each other. Thus, a momentary 
preference state is originated by the value difference between the options. The initial 
preference state (produced earlier in the initial impression phase) is then updated by the 
subsequent momentary preference state (formed in the deliberation phase).  
However, because the evaluation of the outcomes cannot be made all at the same time, 
deliberation continues. Thus, many momentary preference states can be formed within a 
decision. These momentary preference states will be continually updated until the preference 
is strong enough. This means that the deliberation process stops and an option is chosen when 
the preference state goes beyond a threshold set by the decision maker. Therefore, the greater 
the number of preference states necessary to cross the threshold, the longer the decision time 
will be. 
An important point of decision field theory is that it can be regarded as a model of 
choice and conflict: It is a choice model because it predicts choice probabilities, and it is a 
conflict model because it accounts for deliberation time, which is a manifestation of conflict.  
Moreover, decision field theory accommodates the effect of type of conflict on 
decision time. The theory predicts that the preference state is affected by the value difference 
between the options, but also by the valence of the options, i.e., type of conflict: In contrast to 
approach-approach conflicts, avoidance-avoidance conflicts generate vacillation in the 
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preference state, which leads to longer decisions processes in avoidance-avoidance than in 
approach-approach conflicts. In consequence, the decision field theory includes a (goal 
gradient) parameter, which increases when avoidance-avoidance conflicts are involved, 
causing the decision time to be longer. The sign of the (goal gradient) parameter thus depends 
on whether the decision involves an approach-approach conflict or an avoidance-avoidance 
conflict, or in other words, on whether the decision involves gains or losses.  
While conflict arises where tradeoffs between probability and outcome must be made, 
decision field theory has so far not been applied to the issue of how conflict is related to the 
size of the tradeoffs, i.e., the magnitude of probability and outcome differences. This issue is 
addressed by the double-mediation model of conflict generation (Scholten & Sherman, 2006), 
a deterministic-static model of a probabilistic-dynamic phenomenon. 
Tradeoffs and Conflict: The Double-Mediation Model 
Tradeoffs and Conflict 
It is generally agreed upon that conflict is related to the size of the tradeoffs between 
the attributes (e.g., Chatterjee & Heath, 1996; Festinger, 1957; Scholten, 2002; Shafir et al., 
1993; Simonson & Tversky, 1992; Tversky & Simonson, 1993). However, until the 
formulation of Scholten and Sherman‟s (2006) double-mediation model, there was no 
consensus as to the precise relation between tradeoff size and conflict. Before moving to the 
double-mediation model, we present a brief summary of the existing perspectives. 
The dominant perspective on the relation between tradeoff size and conflict is that 
conflict increases with tradeoff size (Chatterjee & Heath, 1996; Festinger, 1957; Scholten, 
2002; Simonson & Tversky, 1992; Tversky & Simonson, 1993) because more sacrifices are to 
be incurred in choosing one option instead of the other. That is, losses are more painful than 
equivalent gains are pleasant (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), or, as Simonson and Tversky 
(1992; Tversky & Simonson, 1993) argued, disadvantages are more painful than equivalent 
advantages are pleasant. Thus, larger tradeoffs lead to a greater unattractiveness of both 
options under consideration by amplifying the lose-lose nature of the decision and 
intensifying the vacillation between the options (Chatterjee & Heath, 1996). This means that 
when more or larger advantages have to be traded off, greater are the sacrifices that one must 
forego with the decision, and therefore, greater is the conflict aroused. In order to illustrate, 
consider again the following three gambles: Gamble x (€600, 90%), gamble y (€835, 65%), 
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and gamble z (€1350, 40%). Deciding between x and z implies sacrificing an amount of €750 
(when x is preferred) or a 50% chance of winning (when z is preferred), whereas deciding 
between x and y implies sacrificing only €235 (when x is preferred) or a 25% chance of 
winning (when y is preferred). Because greater sacrifices are involved in deciding between x 
and z than between x and y (or between y and z), a greater conflict is aroused in the former 
case. 
The other perspective on the relation between tradeoff size and conflict is that conflict 
decreases with tradeoff size because arguing in favor of one option becomes easier. As 
Scholten and Sherman (2006) noted, when asked about this, people often disagree with the 
assumption that conflict is greater when tradeoffs are large. Rather, they claim that conflict is 
greater when tradeoffs are small because it is more difficult to find good reasons in favor of 
one of the options. This view is supported by reason-based choice theory (Shafir et al., 1993; 
Simonson 1989), which posits that decisions are based on the reasons for selecting one option 
instead of the other. That is, decision makers are concerned with the argumentation that can 
be made in order to justify the decision. Thus, smaller tradeoffs imply that fewer or weaker 
arguments can be made for any decision, and therefore, that a greater conflict is aroused. 
Conversely, larger tradeoffs imply that more or stronger arguments can be made for any 
decision, and therefore, that less conflict is aroused. For instance, a decision between gamble 
x and z offers a stronger reason for choosing either option (a high probability of winning in 
the case of gamble x or a large amount to be won in the case of gamble z) than a decision 
between gamble x and y (or between y and z), therefore, less conflict is aroused in the former 
than in the latter case. 
In order to unify these two contradictory perspectives, Scholten and Sherman (2006) 
developed the double-mediation model. The model posits that the relation between the size of 
the tradeoffs and conflict is mediated both by sacrifice and argumentation in opposite 
directions.  
The Double-Mediation Model 
The double-mediation model (Scholten & Sherman, 2006) is a model of conflict 
generation on preference formation that describes how conflict is related to the tradeoff size 
and how this relation is moderated by third variables in the choice context. The model 
assumes that conflict is generated by two sources: The concern about sacrifice, that is to be 
incurred in choosing one option instead of the other, and the concern about argumentation, 
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that can be made for any decision. While sacrifice focuses on what one foregoes with the 
decision (the dark side of the decision), argumentation focuses on how a decision can be 
justified to oneself (the bright side of the decision). 
Both the concern about argumentation and about sacrifice arouse conflict but it is 
through argumentation that conflict is resolved (see Scholten, Rosa, & Ferreira, 2010). 
Argumentation consists in arguing unilaterally in favor of an option, i.e., in overweighting its 
pros and underweighting its cons. In a decision between gamble x and z, argumentation in 
favor of x means overweighting the advantage in probability of winning and underweighting 
the disadvantage in amount to win. Thus, argumentation is, in the double-mediation model, 
pro-argumentation. The contra-argumentation, for instance, the argument that gamble x offers 
a smaller gain, or conversely, that gamble z offers a larger gain, belongs to the role of 
sacrifice. Therefore, the consideration of sacrifice is, in the double-mediation model, contra-
argumentation, which consists in underweighting the pros and overweighting the cons of one 
option. Accordingly, as Scholten et al. (2010, p. 6) asserted, “the double-mediation model is 
basically an argumentation model, although it was originally not conceived that way.” 
Although the decision maker will be engaged in pro- and contra-argumentation (i.e., 
will weight the pros and cons of each option), which causes indecision, conflict is resolved 
when, at some point, the decision maker follows a single line of argumentation in favor of one 
of the options.  
The double-mediation model has his roots in decision field theory (Busemeyer & 
Diederich, 2002; Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Diederich, 1997), but it was developed as an 
autonomous model for two main reasons. First, decision field theory does not address the 
relation between tradeoff size and conflict or the way in which this relation is moderated by 
other aspects of the decision situation. Second, the double-mediation model distinguishes two 
sources of conflict and it is not obvious how these can be incorporated in the formal 
machinery of decision field theory (Scholten & Sherman, 2006).   
Drawing on decision field theory, the double-mediation model posits that the process 
of preference evolution consists of two phases: Preliminary impression and subsequent 
deliberation. In the preliminary impression phase, the decision maker forms a preliminary 
impression of the choice problem from prior knowledge and past experience. During the 
subsequent deliberation process, the decision maker compares the options along their 
attributes, contemplating the consequences of choosing one option instead of the other.   
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The concern about sacrifice and the concern about argumentation arouse conflict in 
both phases. Nevertheless, it is only in the deliberation phase that conflict is affected by the 
tradeoff size given that it is in this stage that attributes are traded off against one another. The 
relation between tradeoff size and conflict is mediated by the two conflict sources in opposite 
directions: Concern about sacrifice generates a positive relation, whereas concern about 
argumentation generates a negative relation. Large tradeoffs entail large attribute differences, 
which imply that a decision is easier to justify to oneself because a stronger argument can be 
made in favor of one option, and thus, that little conflict is aroused by the concern about 
argumentation. Of course that in this case a strong argument can be made in favor of the other 
option as well, but this is the consideration of sacrifice. So, large tradeoffs also imply that 
large sacrifices are to be incurred when choosing on option, and thus, that a lot of conflict is 
aroused by the concern about sacrifice. Conversely, in small tradeoffs the attribute differences 
are small, which implies that the decision is more difficult to justify to oneself because only 
weak arguments can be made in favor of an option, and thus, a lot of conflict is aroused by the 
concern about argumentation. Of course, that the argument in favor of the other option is also 
weak, which means that small sacrifices are to be incurred, and thus, that little conflict is 
aroused by concern about sacrifice.  
The conflict aroused by each concern is updated along the choice process and in both 
cases the preliminary conflict is updated by the conflict from subsequent deliberation. 
Therefore, the degree to which conflict is affected by tradeoff size ultimately depends on the 
level of preliminary conflict. Preliminary conflict has a mobilizing effect “producing a drive 
to gather information about the alternative courses of action and to get ready for action” 
(Scholten & Sherman, p. 239). Therefore, conflict from preliminary impression is a drive for 
focused deliberation and the greater the preliminary conflict aroused by a concern, the 
stronger the drive to devote attention to that concern during subsequent deliberation and the 
more the preliminary conflict is updated by the conflict from subsequent deliberation. 
Because only the conflict from the deliberation stage is affected by tradeoff size, the degree of 
updating directly determines the degree to which the conflict aroused by a concern is affected 
by tradeoff size.  
Moreover, people are averse to conflict, thus, when choice deferral (or avoidance) is 
not an option, they will follow the path of least resistance. Conflict aversion manifests itself as 
defensive inattention to the concern that arouses the most conflict, and as a consequence, the 
source that contributes more to the final conflict is the one that arouses less conflict. When, in 
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small tradeoffs, concern about sacrifice arouses a low conflict level and concern about 
argumentation a high level, more attention is devoted to the small sacrifice than to the weak 
arguments. The decision tends to be viewed as “trivial” (small sacrifices) rather than “very 
hard to justify” (weak arguments). Conversely, when, in large tradeoffs, concern about 
sacrifice arouses a high conflict level and concern about argumentation a low level, more 
attention is devoted to the strong arguments than to the large sacrifices: The decision tends to 
be viewed as “very easy to justify” (strong arguments) rather than “highly consequential” 
(large sacrifices). As depicted in Figure 4, in this case, an inverse U-shaped relation between 
tradeoff size and conflict is originated. 
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Figure 4. General relation between tradeoff size and conflict. 
 
The double-mediation model generally predicts an inverse U-shaped relation between 
tradeoff size and conflict. Nevertheless, it also predicts that this relation between tradeoff size 
and conflict can become (more) positive or (more) negative, depending on several aspects of 
the decision situation, which modify the way in which the concern about sacrifice and about 
argumentation mediate it. For instance, if, in a given context the concern about argumentation 
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arouses more preliminary conflict than the concern about sacrifice, the conflict originated by 
this concern will decrease more with tradeoff size than the conflict from concern about 
sacrifice increases. Thus, according to the double-mediation model, the negative mediating 
effect produced by the concern about argumentation is accentuated relatively to the positive 
effect of concern about sacrifice, which generates a (more) negative relation between tradeoff 
size and conflict, as illustrated in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Relation between tradeoff size and conflict when preliminary conflict from 
argumentation increases. 
 
In contrast, if, in a given context the concern about sacrifice arouses more preliminary 
conflict than the concern about argumentation, the conflict originated by this concern will 
decrease more with tradeoff size than the conflict from concern about sacrifice increases. 
Thus, according to the double-mediation model, the positive mediating effect produced by the 
concern about sacrifice is accentuated relatively to the positive effect of concern about 
argumentation, which generates a (more) positive relation between tradeoff size and conflict, 
as illustrated in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Relation between tradeoff size and conflict when preliminary conflict from sacrifice 
increases. 
 
Scholten and Sherman (2006) studied the impact of differential attribute importance 
on the moderation of the relation between tradeoff size and conflict. Differential attribute 
importance is an aspect of the decision situation that favors a particular decision (the option 
that is superior on the more important attribute). This moderating factor turns the relation 
between tradeoff size and conflict less dependent from tradeoff size and changes it into a 
more positive relation. Specifically, differential attribute importance produces a decrease in 
the preliminary conflict generated by the concern about sacrifice “because incurring a 
sacrifice along the less important attribute seems less painful than incurring a sacrifice along 
the more important attribute” (Scholten & Sherman, 2006, p. 243). Nevertheless, it produces 
an even greater decrease in the preliminary conflict generated by the concern about 
argumentation because people will have a strong argument to decide in favor of the option 
that is superior along the most important attribute, without alleviating the sacrifices that are to 
be incurred with that decision. Because the preliminary conflict aroused by both concerns 
decreases, the relation between tradeoff size and conflict is attenuated. Moreover, because the 
negative effect of concern about argumentation is more attenuated than the positive effect of 
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concern about sacrifice, the relation between tradeoff size and conflict will become mediated 
less by argumentation and more by sacrifice, and a more positive relation arises. The results 
obtained by Scholten and Sherman (2006) confirmed their predictions. In the next section we 
present the formal specification of the model.  
The double-mediation model: Formal specification. Conflict is a function of 
concern about sacrifice and concern about argumentation: The final conflict level, C, results 
from the conflict aroused by concern about sacrifice, S, and from the conflict aroused by 
concern about argumentation, A. To accommodate conflict aversion, C is the geometric mean 
of S and A: 
SAC  ,           (A1) 
where S, A ≥ 0. 
Each source of conflict arouses conflict in the preliminary impression and subsequent 
deliberation. Therefore, for each source, the conflict from the preliminary impression, S0 and 
A0, is updated by the conflict from deliberation, wSS1 and wAA1. The updating consists in 
adding the conflict from deliberation to the residual conflict from the preliminary impression, 
(1 - wS)S0 and (1 – wA)A0: 
10)1( SwSwS SS           (A2) 
10)1( AwAwA AA  ,        (A3) 
where S0, A0, S1, A1 ≥ 0, and 0 ≤ wS, wA < 1.  
The updating is a function of preliminary conflict: The greater the preliminary 
conflict, the stronger the drive for focused deliberation, and the more the preliminary conflict 
is updated by the conflict from deliberation. Thus, the updating parameters, wS and wA, 
increase with preliminary conflict, S0 and A0: 
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where  is an arbitrary scaling constant, and  ≥ 0 is a drive-capacity parameter. 
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Finally, the conflict from deliberation is affected by the size of the tradeoffs: The 
conflict aroused by concern about sacrifice in the positive direction and the conflict aroused 
by concern about argumentation in the negative direction. Therefore, while S1 increases with 
tradeoff size, A1 decreases with tradeoff size. Assuming that S1 and A1 are linearly related to 
tradeoff size, T, we have: 
TS 1 ,          (A6) 
)1(1 TA  ,          (A7) 
where   0 is an arbitrary scaling constant. As in Scholten and Sherman (2006), tradeoff size 
is expressed on the same scale as conflict, so that  = 1. 
In summary, according to the double-mediation model, there are two conflict sources, 
the concern about sacrifice and the concern about argumentation, which mediate the relation 
between tradeoff size and conflict in opposite directions, producing, in general, an inverse U-
shaped relation. The model also predicts that third variables in the choice context can 
moderate this relation by affecting the mediating effects of concern about sacrifice and about 
argumentation, and thus, changing the relation into a (more) positive or (more) negative one.  
Research Goal 
While the double-mediation model has so far been applied by Scholten and Sherman 
(2006) to conflict formation in riskless choice, many choices that we make are in the risky 
domain.  
Risky choice is an intensively investigated domain, but conflict in risky choice has 
received only scarce attention. Except for security-potential/aspiration theory (Lopes, 1987, 
1995; Schneider & Lopes, 1986; Schneider, 1992) and the decision field theory (Busemeyer 
& Diederich, 2002; Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Diederich, 1997), which address conflict 
in risky choice, most research focuses on the choices that people make.  
The security-potential/aspiration theory describes when conflict occurs, while the 
decision field theory also predicts that conflict might affect choice. Nevertheless, our focus is 
on how conflict depends on tradeoff size, therefore, the main goal of the present research is to 
extend the application of the double-mediation model from riskless choice to risky choice. If 
successful, the model captures a process of conflict generation that is common to both 
domains. Moreover, because this process of conflict generation is intimately related to the 
36 
 
process of preference formation, successful application of the model also exposes how 
choices are made.  
To validate the substantive claims of the double-mediation model we focus on the 
conflict aroused by decisions between gambles implying elementary tradeoffs between 
probability and monetary outcome and examine the effects of situational and individual 
variables in the choice context on decisional conflict.
9
 The situational variables are outcome 
sign, preference elicitation method, and differential attribute weight. The individual variable 
is the decision maker‟s thinking style. We intend to demonstrate that these factors influence 
the conflict experienced in a risky choice and the way in which conflict and tradeoffs are 
related, by affecting the conflict generated by the two sources (the concern about sacrifice and 
the concern about argumentation). In the terms of the double-mediation model, outcome sign, 
preference elicitation method, thinking style, and differential attribute weight, as other factors 
in the choice context, have an impact on the preliminary conflict generated by concern about 
sacrifice and about argumentation, and moderate the relation between tradeoff size and 
conflict. This analysis will unveil some of the processes that govern conflict generation in 
risky choice. 
The study of outcome sign, i.e., the study of decisions involving positive versus 
negative options (gains versus losses), is a central aspect of the analyses of risky choice, 
nevertheless, nearly all these analyses concern the choices that people make and not the 
conflict that they experience (when making a choice). In Experiments 1 and 2 we address the 
effects of outcome sign on conflict arousal. On the topic of conflict among gains and losses, 
an additional objective is to go back to Lewin‟s (1951) analysis of conflict, particularly, to the 
distinction between approach-approach and avoidance-avoidance conflicts, and extend it to 
risky choice. 
Furthermore, in Experiment 1, the effects of outcome sign are examined in 
combination with the effects of preference elicitation method (choosing versus rejecting). 
Nagpal and Krishnamurthy (2008) claimed that the level of conflict experienced by the 
decision makers in gains and in losses depends on whether the task is to choose or to reject an 
option. Our aim is to investigate how conflict arousal is affected by the sign of the outcomes, 
by the preference elicitation method, and by their interaction. In Experiment 2, we examine 
the effects of outcome sign and of decision maker‟s thinking style. Our purpose is to provide 
further support for the role of outcome sign on conflict, and more importantly, to extend the 
                                               
9Part of this research has been reported in Scholten et al.‟s (2010) paper. 
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application of Epstein‟s (1994) cognitive-experiential self-theory to the study of individual 
differences in decisional conflict, which has been applied in several areas, including in the 
study of individual differences in judgment and decision making. We investigate how a 
rational and/or experiential thinking style affect the conflict aroused by the two sources (the 
concern about sacrifice and about argumentation) and the way in which conflict is related 
with tradeoff size.  
In sum, in chapter 2 we investigate the role of outcome sign, of preference elicitation 
method, of the interaction between outcome sign and preference elicitation method, and of 
thinking style, on conflict arousal. 
In chapter 3 (Experiments 3, 4 and 5) we address the effects of a third situational 
factor, the differential attribute weight. The relevance of this factor stems from Scholten and 
Sherman‟s (1996) research on conflict in riskless choice. Scholten and Sherman (2006) 
highlighted differential attribute importance as a relevant moderating factor of the relation 
between tradeoff size and conflict in riskless choice. Yet, research (e.g., Myers & Alpert, 
1977) has suggested that a decision is determined not by the most important attribute, but 
rather by the attribute to which the decision makers assign a greater weight on a particular 
decision (the determinant attribute). Therefore, our analysis is focused on the prior importance 
of the attributes (probability versus outcome), the weight that these attributes receive in a 
given decision situation, and the implications for the arousal of conflict. We examine the 
impact of manipulating the attribute weight on the relation between tradeoff size and conflict, 
by increasing the outcome differences between the gambles (Experiments 3, 4 and 5) and by 
decreasing the probability differences between the gambles (Experiments 4 and 5). In 
Experiments 3 and 4 we focus on the effect of these manipulations in choices involving gains, 
whereas in Experiment 5 we focus on the effect of these manipulations in choices involving 
losses.  
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CHAPTER 2: EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 2  
Theoretical Overview 
“Conflict arises because a person does not always know how to trade off costs against 
benefits, risk against value” (Tversky & Shafir, 1992, p. 358). In risky choice this means that 
conflict can arise from the tradeoff between probability and monetary outcome, either when 
decisions involve positive outcomes, i.e., when money can be won, because probability of 
winning and amount to win cannot be maximized at the same time, or when decisions involve 
negative outcomes, i.e., when money can be lost, because probability of losing and amount to 
lose cannot be minimized at the same time. In other words, conflict arises both in gains and 
losses.  
According to the double-mediation model conflict is aroused by the concern about 
sacrifice and by the concern about argumentation both in riskless and in risky choice. The two 
sources originate conflict both in the preliminary impression and in the subsequent 
deliberation phase, and it is in deliberation that conflict is affected by tradeoff size. In general, 
the model predicts an inverse U-shaped relation between tradeoff size and conflict. 
Nevertheless, it also predicts that this relation is moderated by third variables in the choice 
context. That is, different aspects of the decision situation (i.e., choice context) can influence 
the preliminary conflict aroused by concern about sacrifice and about argumentation, and 
consequently change the relation between tradeoff size and conflict. We now present which 
factors will be examined in this chapter. 
In risky choice, whether the outcomes are gains or losses is one of the factors that has 
an impact on decisional conflict. By merging the double-mediation model (Scholten & 
Sherman, 2006) with Lewin‟s (1951) analysis of conflict, we investigate conflict arousal in 
decisions between positive gambles, or approach-approach conflicts in Lewin‟s terminology, 
and decisions between negative gambles, or avoidance-avoidance conflicts. The aim is to 
validate the application of the double-mediation model to risky choice, and also to validate 
Lewin‟s approach to risky choice (Experiment 1 and 2). 
Furthermore, as recently suggested by Nagpal and Krishnamurthy (2008), the 
decisional conflict will also be affected by whether the task is to choose or to reject an option. 
Experiment 1 addresses the effect of outcome sign (gains versus losses), of preference 
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elicitation method (choice versus rejection), and of the interaction between outcome sign and 
preference elicitation method.  
In Experiment 2 we examine the effects of outcome sign and thinking style. We 
combine the double-mediation model with Epstein‟s (1994) cognitive-experiential self-theory 
to derive predictions about the way in which a rational and/or an experiential thinking style 
affect the preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice and argumentation, and thus, the 
relation between tradeoff size and conflict. Our aim is to extend the application of the double-
mediation model to the study of the individual differences in decisional conflict, and also to 
extend Epstein‟s (1994) theory to the study of individual differences in decisional conflict. 
Given that both Experiments address the study of conflict arousal in gains and losses, 
it is to the effect of outcome sign that we turn now, leaving the discussion of the effect of 
preference elicitation method and of thinking style for the introductions of Experiment 1 and 
2, respectively. We derive the predictions about the role of outcome sign by first applying 
Lewin‟s analysis of conflict to risky choice and then by integrating it with the double-
mediation model. 
Conflict in Gains and Losses: Lewin’s Analysis 
As we previously stated, Lewin (1951) asserted that a person will experience an 
approach-approach conflict when choosing between competing attractive (or positive) 
options, and that, the closer the person is to one of the options, the stronger the attraction to 
that option and the weaker the attraction to the competing options. Approach-approach 
conflicts produce an unstable equilibrium because a step closer to one of the options is a step 
toward conflict resolution by making that option seem more attractive than the competing 
one. Therefore, they are easier to resolve and generate shorter decision times. This in 
comparison with avoidance-avoidance conflicts, in which there is a choice between 
competing repulsive (or negative) options, and that, the closer the person is to one of the 
options, the stronger the repellence by that option, and the weaker the repellence by the 
competing ones. They produce a stable equilibrium because a step closer to one of the options 
is a step away from the resolution of conflict by making that option seem more unattractive 
than the competing ones, which generates more hesitancy, tension, and vacillation, or 
complete blocking between the choice options. 
Avoidance-avoidance conflicts are therefore more difficult to resolve, which will lead 
to longer decision times. Accordingly, Lewin (1951) argued that avoidance-avoidance 
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conflicts are more intense than approach-approach conflicts and many studies have confirmed 
it: Avoidance-avoidance conflicts result in longer decision times (Arkoff, 1957; Minor et al., 
1968; Murray, 1975; Schill, 1966) and in more “undecided” choices (Barker, 1946; Murray, 
1975), and they are judged to be more difficult (Arkoff, 1957; Murray, 1975), than approach-
approach conflicts. An approach-approach conflict will be experienced in a decision involving 
gains, given that it entails a possible positive outcome (a chance to obtain gain), and an 
avoidance-avoidance conflict will be experienced in a decision involving losses, given that it 
entails a possible negative outcome (a chance of incurring a loss). We thus expect to validate 
Lewin‟s (1951) analysis of conflict in risky choice, i.e., that changing the sign of the 
outcomes of the options from gains to losses will increase the level of experienced conflict, by 
employing a variety of conflict measures. We thus arrive at the following hypothesis: 
H1.1. Conflict will be greater for losses than for gains. 
 According to Lewin (1951), the force with which a person is attracted or repelled by 
an option increases as the psychological distance to that option decreases. In our studies, the 
options are gambles which imply a tradeoff between probability and outcome, and the 
distance between the gambles is the size of these tradeoffs. Therefore, we combine Lewin‟s 
(1951) analysis with Scholten and Sherman‟s (2006) double-mediation model, to derive a 
second prediction about the way in which the tradeoff size affects conflict in gains and in 
losses. 
Gains and Losses: The Double-Mediation Model and Lewin´s Analysis 
 The double-mediation model predicts that the two conflict sources, the concern about 
sacrifice and the concern about argumentation, generally produce an inverse U-shaped 
relation between tradeoff size and conflict. Nevertheless, as we referred previously, the model 
also predicts that this relation can be moderated by third variables in the choice context, 
which change the mediating effect of concern about sacrifice and about argumentation, and 
consequently, the shape of the relation between tradeoff size and conflict. As we discuss next, 
outcome sign is one of these moderating factors.  
Concern about argumentation drives decision makers to look for positive arguments in 
favor of one of the gambles to justify their choice. As we previously referred, in decisions 
involving gains, conflict is due to the concurrent attraction of the gambles (which involve a 
chance of obtaining a gain). This, produces an unstable equilibrium, in which getting closer to 
one of two positive gambles is a step toward conflict resolution. In the double-mediation 
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model, „getting closer to‟ a gamble means arguing in favor of that gamble, and this indeed 
strengthens the argument in favor of it (the higher probability of winning or the larger amount 
to win). As decision makers approach one of the gambles by arguing in favor of it, the more 
that gamble becomes preferred. 
On the other hand, in decisions involving losses, conflict is due to the concurrent 
repellence of the gambles (which involve a chance of incurring a loss), implying that 
whatever the choice is made, it always entails an undesirable and repulsive outcome. This 
produces a stable equilibrium, in which getting closer to one of the gambles is a step away 
from the resolution of conflict. In the double-mediation model, this is true as far as it is 
contradictory to argue in favor of a negative gamble. There is a great difficulty in finding a 
positive argument in favor of a negative gamble. As decision makers approach to one of the 
gambles, the more they become repelled by it; this reverses the preference toward the 
competing gamble, causing vacillation back and forth, which complicates the resolution of the 
conflict. For instance, if the decision makers‟ preference is directed to the riskier option (i.e., 
to the option that provides a lower probability of losing), they will be repelled by the 
associated potential large loss. In turn, if their preference goes in the direction of the safer 
option (i.e., of the option that provides a lower loss), they will be repelled by the associated 
high probability of losing. This ambivalence will, up to a certain point, sustain vacillation, i.e., 
the decision makers‟ preference will oscillate between the safer and the riskier gamble. 
Nevertheless, beyond that point, conflict must be resolved and the person will eventually 
strengthen the argument in favor of one of the gambles (the lower probability of losing or the 
smaller amount to lose).  
In sum, we argue that the point of contact between Lewin‟s (1951) analysis and the 
double-mediation model is argumentation, not sacrifice: If it were for sacrifice, the person 
would never „get closer to‟ either gamble, because the advantage foregone would prevent that 
from happening. In particular, changing the outcome sign from gains to losses will increase 
the concern about argumentation because it is contradictory to argue in favor of a negative 
gamble but there is no contradiction in arguing in favor of a positive one. In other words, the 
preliminary conflict aroused by concern about argumentation will be greater for losses than 
for gains. We thus arrive at the following hypothesis: 
H1.2.1. When the sign of the outcomes changes from gains to losses, the preliminary conflict 
from concern about argumentation will increase. 
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In addition, because the preliminary conflict has a mobilizing effect, i.e., the 
preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation is the drive to devote attention to that 
concern during subsequent deliberation, and because only the conflict from deliberation is 
affected by tradeoff size, the conflict from concern about argumentation will be affected more 
by tradeoff size for losses than for gains. Therefore, the negative mediating effect of concern 
about argumentation will be accentuated relatively to the positive mediating effect of concern 
about sacrifice, and the relation between tradeoff size and conflict will become more negative, 
or less positive, for losses than for gains. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1.2.2. When the sign of the outcomes changes from gains to losses, the relation between 
tradeoff size and conflict will change in a downward direction. 
The assertion that the relation between tradeoff size and conflict changes in a 
downward direction (H1.2.2) is about the linear trend of the relation, but not about the 
specific shape of the relation. For instance, when a positive relation changes into an inverse 
U-shaped relation, the linear trend changes from greater than zero to (nearly) zero. 
Alternatively, when an inverse U-shaped relation changes into a negative relation, the linear 
trend changes from (nearly) zero to smaller than zero. Finally, when a positive relation 
changes into a negative relation, the linear trend changes from greater than zero to smaller 
than zero. The assertion that the relation changes in a downward direction covers all these 
situations. The same rational applies to all hypotheses regarding the changing shape of the 
relation between tradeoff size and conflict in every Experiment.  
Experiment 1: 
Outcome Sign and Preference Elicitation Method 
 In Experiment 1 we investigate the effects of outcome sign, i.e., whether the decision 
involves gains or losses, in combination with the effects of preference elicitation method, i.e., 
whether the task is to choose or to reject an option (choice versus rejection). According to 
Nagpal and Krishnamurthy (2008), decisional conflict depends on the interaction between 
outcome sign and preference elicitation method, rather than on the sign of the outcomes by 
itself, due to (in)compatibility effects. Accordingly, in decisions involving gains conflict 
should be greater in rejecting than in choosing tasks, whereas, in decisions involving losses 
conflict should be greater in choosing than in rejecting tasks. We will argue, however, that the 
level of conflict will be affected not only by the interaction between outcome sign and 
preference elicitation method but also by the outcome sign and by the preference elicitation 
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method alone. We also derive predictions on how the preference elicitation method will affect 
the preliminary conflict and consequently the relation between tradeoff size and conflict.  
 We have previously discussed the impact of outcome sign on conflict arousal in risky 
choices and predictions were derived by combining Lewin‟s analysis of conflict with the 
double-mediation model. In brief, decisions involving avoidance-avoidance conflicts (i.e., 
losses) generate more hesitancy and vacillation between the alternatives than decisions 
involving approach-avoidance conflicts (i.e., gains). Thus, conflict will be more complicated 
to resolve in the former than in the latter case. Moreover, conflict will be greater in losses than 
in gains essentially because, while there is no contradiction in arguing in favor of a positive 
gamble, it is contradictory to argue in favor of a negative gamble, which will increase the 
preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation. As a consequence, in the subsequent 
deliberation phase, the negative mediating effect produced by this concern on the relation 
between tradeoff size and conflict will be accentuated and the relation will become more 
negative (or less positive). Therefore, in what concerns the effect of outcome sign on conflict, 
the following hypotheses will be tested: 
H1.1. Conflict will be greater for losses than for gains. 
H1.2.1. When the sign of the outcomes changes from gains to losses, the preliminary conflict 
from concern about argumentation will increase. 
H1.2.2. When the sign of the outcomes changes from gains to losses, the relation between 
tradeoff size and conflict will change in a downward direction. 
  We now discuss the effects of preference elicitation method and its interaction with 
outcome sign.  
Preference Elicitation Method: Choosing Versus Rejecting 
 From a rational perspective, choosing or rejecting should reveal the same preference. 
Nevertheless, research has demonstrated the opposite. As it was already mentioned, Shafir 
(1993) investigated the decision maker‟s preferences across the choice and rejection methods 
and showed that the two preference elicitation methods led to inconsistent preferences. The 
enriched option, the one with more positive and more negative attributes (i.e., more extreme 
attribute values), tended to be chosen more often and rejected more often than the 
impoverished option, the one with fewer positive and negative attributes (i.e., more moderate 
attribute values). Drawing on the compatibility principle, according to which the compatibility 
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between an input and an output increases the weight of the input (Tversky et al., 1988), Shafir 
(1993) argued that the positive and negative features of the options are differentially weighted 
depending on the nature of the task, such as choice or rejection. When making a decision, 
people look for reasons in favor and against the options (pros and cons), thus, in choice, 
people will focus on reasons for choosing, whereas, in rejection, they will focus on reasons to 
reject. A greater weight will be assigned to the features that are compatible with the nature of 
the task: Positive attributes will be more heavily weighted in choosing tasks but negative 
attributes will be more heavily weighted in rejecting tasks (Shafir, 1993).  
 In Shafir‟s (1993) research, each option comprised both positive and negative 
attributes, and the difference between them was the extremeness of the attribute values. This 
manipulation implied that one option, the one with more extreme values, generated a greater 
compatibility between task and valence than the other option, the one with moderate attribute 
values, both in choice and in rejection. In Hovland and Sears‟s (1938) typology of choice 
conflicts, this manipulation motivated double approach-avoidance conflicts. Meloy and Russo 
(2004, study 2) developed “exclusively compatible and incompatible decision contexts” (p. 
119), by creating decisions between options comprising only positive or negative attributes. In 
other words, the authors motivated approach-approach conflicts and avoidance-avoidance 
conflicts, as we did in the present research. Their results not only supported the compatibility 
principle, but also revealed that incompatibility led to a greater decision uncertainty and less 
extreme attribute evaluations, or in other words, to a greater conflict.  
 Recently, Nagpal and Krishnamurthy (2008) addressed the effects of compatibility on 
conflict. They investigated decisions between attractive and unattractive options (i.e., 
approach-approach conflicts and avoidance-avoidance conflicts) and their aim was to 
demonstrate that the compatibility between the valence of the options and the preference 
elicitation method had an impact on decision time, decision difficulty, attribute recall, and 
decision effort. They argued that choosing requires an attractiveness judgment, which is more 
compatible with attractive than with unattractive options, whereas rejecting requires an 
unattractiveness judgment which is more compatible with unattractive than with attractive 
options. They also argued that incompatibility generates a greater conflict than compatibility. 
Indeed, their results showed that incompatible situations (choosing between unattractive 
options or rejecting between attractive ones) generated a greater conflict level than compatible 
ones (choosing between attractive options or rejecting between unattractive ones).  
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 In sum, decisional conflict is affected by the compatibility between the preference 
elicitation method and the valence of the options. In our study, the positive or attractive 
options are positive gambles and the negative or unattractive options are negative gambles. 
Thus, gains should be more compatible with choosing but more incompatible with rejecting, 
whereas losses should be more compatible with rejecting but more incompatible with 
choosing. Furthermore, because a greater conflict is expected when the valence of the options 
(outcome sign) is incompatible with the preference elicitation method, we predict that, in 
gains conflict will be greater in rejecting than in choosing tasks and in losses the reverse will 
occur:  
H2.1.1. In choices involving gains, conflict will be greater in a reject than in a choice task.  
H2.1.2. In choices involving losses, conflict will be greater in a choice than in a reject task. 
Nagpal and Krishnamurthy (2008) claimed that decisional conflict is aroused not by 
the valence of the options itself, but rather, by the interaction between the valence and the 
preference elicitation method. We argue that this is not entirely true for several reasons. First, 
as it was earlier discussed, outcome sign should have a main effect on conflict. Regardless of 
the nature of the task, i.e., whether it is to choose or to reject a gamble, it is always 
contradictory to argue in favor of a negative gamble. Second, as we discuss below, the 
preference elicitation method should have a weaker effect on losses than in gains and the 
preference elicitation method should have a main effect on conflict. We first address the effect 
of preference elicitation method on losses and then turn to the main effect of preference 
elicitation method on conflict. 
The scenario to which people are most accustomed is choosing among gains because it 
is by far the most common one. Not only a great deal of research is focused on how people 
choose among positive options, but also, most decisions in our everyday life, involve positive 
options. All the other scenarios, choosing among losses, rejecting among gains, and rejecting 
among losses, are less common (and thus people are less accustomed) than choosing among 
gains. Therefore, choosing among losses, rejecting among gains and rejecting among losses, 
should result in more similar levels of conflict than the choosing among gains scenario. The 
implication is that the difference in the level of experienced conflict should be larger when 
changing from choice among gains (more common task) to rejection among gains (less 
common task) than when changing from choice among losses (less common task) to rejection 
among losses (less common task).  
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This does not mean that in decisions involving losses the compatibility between task 
(elicitation preference method) and valence (outcome sign), cannot, to some extent, facilitate 
the decision by decreasing the experienced conflict, and thus, originating a greater conflict in 
choosing (i.e., incompatible situations) than in rejection (i.e., compatible situations). 
However, a smaller difference in conflict will be aroused when changing the preference 
elicitation method from choice to rejection in losses than in gains. We thus arrive at the 
following hypothesis:  
H2.2. The effect of preference elicitation method on conflict will be weaker for losses than for 
gains.  
 Furthermore, not only outcome sign but also preference elicitation method should have 
an independent effect on conflict. Meloy and Russo (2004, study 2) found that people prefer 
to choose than to reject an option, perhaps because they are more used to decisions involving 
choices than to decisions involving rejections.
10
 They showed that despite of the compatibility 
effects, a greater decision uncertainty (i.e., conflict) is experienced when people are asked to 
reject rather than to choose an option. We therefore expect that rejection tasks will be more 
difficult to perform than choice tasks. In other words, a greater conflict should be aroused in 
rejecting than in choosing tasks (either if the options are positive or negative). This leads to 
the following hypothesis: 
H3.1. Overall conflict will be greater in rejecting than in choosing tasks. 
In addition, we predict that the effect of preference elicitation method on the two 
conflict sources will also be similar to that of outcome sign. When changing from choice to 
rejection, or from gains to losses, conflict will increase essentially due to an increase of the 
preliminary conflict from argumentation. As Nagpal and Krishnamurthy (2008) noted, a 
rejection task involves an unattractiveness judgment because people will look for reasons to 
reject an option. Therefore, just as it is contradictory to argue in favor on a negative gamble, it 
is contradictory to argue in favor of any gamble when an unattractiveness judgment is 
required. In other words, arguing in favor of a gamble is incompatible with a rejection task 
because people are focused on the reasons against a gamble. As a result, it is expected that the 
concern about argumentation will arouse a greater preliminary conflict in rejecting than in 
choosing tasks. We thus arrive at the following hypothesis: 
                                               
10This does note rules out the fact that choosing in gains is by far the most common task, as previously argued. 
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H3.2.1. When the preference elicitation method changes from choice to rejection, the 
preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation will increase. 
Moreover, in the double-mediation model, the preliminary conflict from a concern is 
the drive to devote attention to that concern during subsequent deliberation, and only the 
conflict from deliberation is affected by tradeoff size. Therefore, in the subsequent 
deliberation phase, the negative mediating effect of concern about argumentation will be 
accentuated (relatively to the positive mediating effect of concern about sacrifice), and thus, 
the relation between tradeoff size and conflict will become more negative (or less positive): 
H3.2.2. When the preference elicitation method changes from choice to rejection, the relation 
between tradeoff size and conflict will change in a downward direction. 
In sum, in Experiment 1 we predict that conflict is affected by the outcome sign (H1.1, 
H1.2.1 and H.1.2.2), by the interaction between outcome sign and preference elicitation 
method (H2.1.1, H2.1.2 and H2.2), and by the preference elicitation method, (H3.1, H3.2.1 
and H3.2.2).  
Method of Experiment 1 
Participants. A total of 286 psychology students from ISPA University Institute 
(ISPA-IU) participated in the study and each participant received a voucher of €7.50 for the 
library or the cafeteria. 
Materials and stimuli. The data were collected through a computerized questionnaire 
developed in Turbo Pascal. The questionnaire was composed by two parts. In the first part the 
participants completed 12 decision tasks and after completing each task they completed three 
rating scales corresponding to three measures of conflict. In the second part, the participants 
repeated the 12 decision tasks but without having to complete the rating scales. The 
consistency, or rather, the inconsistency between the decisions made in two parts corresponds 
to another conflict measure (decision inconsistency). The decision tasks were dyadic choices 
between gambles that implied a tradeoff between probability of winning and amount to win or 
a tradeoff between probability of losing and amount to lose. 
Each stimulus, i.e. each gamble, yield an outcome x with probability p or a zero 
outcome with probability 1-p. Two sets of stimuli comprised two outcome sign conditions:  
The gains condition, in which the decision outcomes are positive, and the losses condition, in 
which the decision outcomes are negative. As described in Appendix A, the stimuli of the 
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gains condition were constructed on the basis of estimates of prospect theory (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992) such that, according to those estimates, the participants should be pairwise 
indifferent between the gambles. The stimuli of the losses condition were obtained by 
reversing the sign of the outcomes.
11
  
The chance device of the gambles was a card gamble and consisted in drawing one 
card, at random, from a deck of 52 cards. The probability of winning/losing (e.g., .346) 
corresponded to the number of winning/losing cards (e.g., 18) relatively to the total number of 
cards in the deck (52). Therefore, in each decision task, the participants were presented with a 
specification of the winning/losing cards (e.g., a black number), the respective winning/losing 
percentage (e.g., 34.6%), and the outcome (e.g., €17.00 or €-17.00), as follows: “Win €17.00 
upon drawing a black number (a chance of 34.6%)” - gains condition, or “Lose €17.00 upon 
drawing a black number (a chance of 34.6%)” - losses condition. Note that the information 
about the nonzero outcome was explicit but the information about the zero outcome remained 
implicit.  
In both outcome sign conditions, probability (of winning or losing) ranged from .308 
to .693, which corresponds to a range of winning/losing cards from 16 to 36. The 
specifications of the winning/losing cards are given in Appendix B. Moreover, in order to 
avoid that the participants were presented with repeated descriptions of the cards, two 
different specifications for every probability level were constructed (see Appendix B). The 
outcome differences (amount to be won or lost) ranged from €5.00 to €20.00 in the gains 
condition and from €-5.00 to €-20.00 in the losses condition. The gambles and their 
probabilities (p), outcomes (x), and expected values (px) are showed in Table 2. Lower 
probabilities (i.e., the riskier gambles) had higher (more positive) expected values in gains 
and lower (more negative) expected values in losses, compensating for the common 
preference for the safer gamble in gains (due to risk aversion) and for the riskier gamble in 
losses (due to risk seeking) when the probability of the nonzero outcome is not very low 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
 
 
 
                                               
11This could be done because the curvature was the same in gains and in losses, and because constant loss 
aversion does not affect preferences between negative gambles. 
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Table 2 
Probabilities, Outcomes, and Expected Values (Experiment 1) 
   
Outcome Sign condition 
   
Gains   Losses 
f
a
 p   x
b
 px   x
b
 px 
16 .308 
 
20.00 6.16 
 
-20.00 -6.16 
17 .327 
 
18.50 6.05 
 
-18.50 -6.05 
18 .346 
 
17.00 5.88 
 
-17.00 -5.88 
19 .365 
 
15.50 5.66 
 
-15.50 -5.66 
20 .385 
 
14.50 5.58 
 
-14.50 -5.58 
21 .404 
 
13.50 5.45 
 
-13.50 -5.45 
23 .442 
 
11.50 5.08 
 
-11.50 -5.08 
24 .462 
 
11.00 5.08 
 
-11.00 -5.08 
25 .481 
 
10.00 4.81 
 
-10.00 -4.81 
26 .500 
 
9.50 4.75 
 
-9.50 -4.75 
27 .519 
 
9.00 4.67 
 
-9.00 -4.67 
28 .538 
 
8.50 4.57 
 
-8.50 -4.57 
30 .577 
 
7.50 4.33 
 
-7.50 -4.33 
31 .596 
 
7.00 4.17 
 
-7.00 -4.17 
32 .615 
 
6.50 4.00 
 
-6.50 -4.00 
34 .654 
 
6.00 3.92 
 
-6.00 -3.92 
35 .673 
 
5.50 3.70 
 
-5.50 -3.70 
36 .692   5.00 3.46   -5.00 -3.46 
a
The number of winning or losing cards in a deck of 52 cards. 
 
bEuros (€). 
 
Design. Conflict was the dependent variable and was assessed with five component 
measures. Four of these measures were the ones used by Scholten and Sherman (2006) in 
previous tests of the double-mediation model: Decision time (i.e., the time to reach a 
decision), decision difficulty (i.e., the difficulty in reaching a decision), lack of confidence 
(i.e., the lack of confidence in the decision reached) or decision uncertainty, and preference 
equality (i.e., the degree to which options are equally preferred). The fifth measure was 
decision inconsistency (i.e., the inconsistency between the decision made in the first part and 
in the second). 
The decision time and decision inconsistency measures are behavioral manifestations 
of conflict. The decision difficulty, decision uncertainty, and preference equality measures are 
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mental manifestations. In particular, decision difficulty and decision uncertainty are „direct-
rating‟ measures, and preference equality is an „indirect-rating‟ measure. 
The design included three within-participants independent variables. The first variable 
is outcome sign, which has 2 levels: Gains (positive outcomes) and losses (negative 
outcomes). The second variable is tradeoff size, which has 3 levels: Small, intermediate, and 
large tradeoffs. That is, the differences between the options (gambles) along the attributes 
(outcome and probability) are small, intermediate, or large. Finally, the third variable is 
reference gamble, which had not been mentioned so far given that it is a counterbalancing 
variable. This variable refers to the (reference) option from which the tradeoff size will vary. 
Reference gamble has 2 levels: Large-amount and high-probability. In the large-amount 
condition, the small, intermediate, or large tradeoffs are specified (or vary) with respect to a 
gamble involving a large amount to be won/lost but a low probability of winning/losing. 
Conversely, in the high-probability condition, the small, intermediate, or large tradeoffs are 
specified (or vary) with respect to a gamble involving a high probability of winning/losing but 
a small amount to be won/lost.  
This means that the large-amount condition implies the manipulation of larger 
outcome values, whereas the high-probability condition implies the manipulation of higher 
probability values. For instance, given that the largest possible outcome to be won is €20.00, 
in the large-amount condition a small tradeoff is implied by the choice between the gambles 
(€20, 30.8%) and (€18.50, 32.7%), an intermediate tradeoff between the gambles (€20.00, 
30.8%) and (€11.50, 44.2%), and a large tradeoff between the gambles (€20.00, 30.8%) and 
(€7.50, 57.70%). Conversely, because the highest probability of winning is .692, in the high-
probability condition a small tradeoff is implied by the choice between the gambles (€5.00, 
69.2%) and (€5.50, 67.30%), an intermediate tradeoff between (€5.00, 69.2%) and (€8.50, 
53.8%), and a large tradeoff between (€5.00, 69.2%) and (€14.50, 38.50%). 
The three independent variables were manipulated according to a 2 (range condition) x 
3 (tradeoff size) x 2 (reference gamble) within-participants design, resulting in 12 pairs of 
gambles (12 decision tasks) for each participant.  
The design also included three between-participants factors. Two of these were 
counterbalancing factors introduced in order to avoid that the participants were repeatedly 
exposed to the same stimuli (gambles). The first factor was reference-gamble extremeness, 
which was developed to preclude that within each reference-gamble condition, tradeoff size 
would vary with respect to one and the same reference gamble. Accordingly, tradeoff size and 
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reference gamble were varied in different levels of the probability attribute, counterbalancing 
the extremeness of the reference gamble across tradeoff sizes, as showed in Table 3. The 
second factor counterbalances the assignment of the extremeness conditions to the two 
outcome sign conditions. The outcome sign conditions varied across the six different 
extremeness conditions (see Table 3) in accordance with Table 4.  
 
Table 3 
Assignment of Reference-Gamble Extremeness to Tradeoff Sizes (Experiment 1)
a
 
  
Large-amount condition   High-probability condition 
Extremeness 
Condition 
 Small 
Tradeoff 
Intermediate 
Tradeoff 
Large 
Tradeoff 
  Small 
Tradeoff 
Intermediate 
Tradeoff 
Large 
Tradeoff     
1.1 
 
16-17 18-25 20-36 
 
35-36 26-34 16-31 
1.2 
 
20-21 16-23 19-35 
 
30-31 28-36 17-32 
1.3 
 
18-19 21-28 16-31 
 
32-34 23-30 20-36 
         2.1 
 
16-17 20-27 19-35 
 
35-36 24-31 17-32 
2.2 
 
18-19 17-24 20-36 
 
32-34 27-35 16-31 
2.3   20-21 18-25 17-32   30-31 26-34 19-35 
a
The tradeoff sizes are indicated by the number of winning (losing) cards in each 
option pair. See Table 2.  
 
Table 4 
Assignment of Extremeness Conditions to  Outcome Sign Conditions (Experiment 1)
a
 
Outcome 
Sign 
 
Counterbalancing Condition 
               1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Gains 
 
1.1 1.1 1.2 2.1 2.1 2.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 2.2 2.3 2.3 
Losses   1.2 1.3 1.3 2.2 2.3 2.3 1.1 1.1 1.2 2.1 2.1 2.2 
a
For the extremeness conditions, see Table 3. 
 
The third between-participants factor was the preference elicitation method: Choice 
versus rejection. In the choice condition, the participants were asked to choose one of the two 
gambles, whereas in the rejection condition, they were asked to reject one of the two gambles.   
Across the within and between participants design five factors were randomized: (1) 
the distribution of the participants by the experimental conditions; (2) the order of the 12 
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decision tasks for each participant (in both parts of the experiment); (3) the order by which the 
options are presented, specifically, the left-right position of options y and z (y-z or z-y), which 
was randomized across participants and choice tasks; (4) the order by which the conflict 
scales are presented, which was randomized across participants and choice tasks; and (5) the 
specification of the winning/losing cards, which was randomized across the different levels of 
the probability attribute. 
Procedure. Experiment 1 was conducted in the laboratory of ISPA-IU. Each 
experimental session was run by computer with at most 20 participants at a time and lasted 
about 30 minutes. With previous authorization of the professors, the participants were 
recruited in their classrooms.  
When all the participants where in the lab, the participants were told that they could 
start the experiment and that the instructions were given by the computer. The instructions 
informed them that they would have to decide between gambles that involved choosing (in the 
case of the participants in the choice condition) or rejecting (in the case of the participants in 
the rejection condition) among different monetary outcomes associated to different 
probabilities. In half of the tasks one gamble presents a higher probability of winning a 
monetary amount and the other gamble presents a larger monetary amount to be won; in the 
other half, one gamble presents a higher probability of losing a monetary amount and the 
other gamble presents a larger monetary amount to be lost. They were also informed that the 
experiment was composed by two parts, which always involved having two choose/reject one 
of two gambles, and that in the first part they would have to complete three rating scales after 
each decision task. Moreover, they rehearsed the instructions for keyboard handling. They 
were reminded that there was no right or wrong answer; that we just wanted to understand 
their true preference in risky choices.  
The gambles that involved winning a monetary amount (gains condition) were 
displayed in a blue background, whereas the gambles that involved losing a monetary amount 
(losses condition) were displayed in a green background in order to avoid „distractions‟. In 
each decision task, the gambles were displayed in an attribute (row) by option (column) 
format and the options were labelled from left to right as P and Q. An arrow sign was located 
below each option (a leftward below P and a rightward below Q). Figure 7 illustrates a 
decision task, specifically, a choosing task in the gains condition. 
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 P Q 
Win: €9.50 €6.00 
Upon drawing: A black card 
(a chance of 50.0%) 
A red card or a black figure 
(a chance of 65.4%) 
 
Choose: 
 
◄ 
 
► 
 
 
Figure 7. Decision task. In this example, the outcome sign condition is gains and the 
preference elicitation method condition is choice. 
 
The participants selected a gamble by pressing the correspondent arrow on the 
keyboard. At this moment, this arrow started to blink and the other (corresponding to the non 
selected gamble) disappeared. Also, a message appeared on the bottom of the screen 
reminding the participants that they could correct the answer by pressing “Backspace” or that 
they could confirm it by pressing “Enter”. In the former situation, the program returned to the 
decision task, and in the latter, the experiment proceeded to the first rating scale. Three rating 
scales, corresponding to three measures of conflict (difficulty to reach a decision, uncertainty 
in the decision reached, and equality of preferences), were completed sequentially. The fourth 
measure of conflict, decision time, was automatically recorded (in milliseconds). The time 
started to be counted when the decision task was displayed and ended when the participant 
confirmed the decision.  
In each rating scale the gambles and the attributes were displayed in a matrix format 
on the top of the screen, the chosen gamble was marked with an arrow (below it), and a 9-
point rating scale appeared on the bottom of the screen. All numbers were presented on the 
scale but only the odd numbers (1, 3, 5, 7, and 9) were labelled. An example of a rating scale 
is given in Figure 8. 
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To what extent do you prefer one gamble to the other? 
 
_______._______._______._______._______._______._______._______._______ 
 
Much more 
preferred 
More 
preferred 
 
Equally 
preferred 
 
More 
preferred 
Much more 
preferred 
 
       
 
Figure 8. Rating scale. This example illustrates a preference rating scale in the choice 
condition.  
 
In the preference rating scale the left-right location of the each option (gamble) 
corresponded to the same location in the matrix in both outcome sign conditions (see Figure 
8). In the choice condition, the positions 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 were labelled as “much more 
preferred”, “more preferred”, “equally preferred”, “more preferred”, and “much more 
preferred”, respectively; in the rejection condition, the same positions were labelled as “much 
less preferred”, “less preferred”, “equally preferred”, “less preferred”, and “much less 
preferred”, respectively. In the difficulty rating scale the positions 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9, were 
labelled as “very easy”, “easy”, “neither easy nor difficult”, “difficult”, and “very difficult”, 
respectively. Finally, in the confidence rating scale, the positions 1 and 9 were labelled as “no 
confidence” and “full confidence”, respectively. For each rating scale, the participant pressed 
the correspondent digit on the keyboard. At this moment, this number started to blink and the 
others (corresponding to the non selected positions) disappeared. Also, a message appeared on 
the bottom of the screen, reminding the participants that they could correct the answer by 
pressing “Backspace” or that they could confirm it by pressing “Enter”. In the former 
situation, the program returned to the rating task and in the latter the computer program 
proceeded to the next rating scale. Moreover, when the three rating scales were completed, the 
program continued to the next decision task (pair of gambles). 
 When the first part of the experiment ended (i.e., when all the 12 decision tasks and 
respective rating scales were completed), the program proceeded two the second part. At this 
moment, the participants were informed that the same 12 decision tasks were presented and 
that they would again have to chose/reject one of the gambles, but without having to complete 
the rating scales.  
1 9 2 4 5 6 7 8 3 
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Measures. The difficulty and confidence ratings were simply coded from 1 to 9. 
Higher values indicated greater difficulty and less confidence or more uncertainty. These are 
the conflict measures d and u, i.e., the difficulty of reaching a decision and the uncertainty 
about the correctness of the decision reached (respectively).  
The preference ratings, v, were converted to a 0 to 1 scale by coding them from 1/10 to 
9/10. These values were transformed into a conflict measure by using Shannon‟s (1948) 
entropy formula: 
 )1(log)1()(log)( 22 vvvvve  , 
where 1,0  wv . Thus, v was transformed into e(v), which corresponds to the degree to 
which the options were equally preferred. To illustrate, when v = .5, the options are equally 
preferred, and thus, conflict reaches its highest level, e(v) = 1. As 0v  or 1v , the 
preference for one of the options increases, and consequently, 0)( ve  because conflict is 
decreasing.  
The response (or decision) times were transformed from milliseconds to seconds. In 
addition, because the decision times had positively skewed distributions (i.e., their means 
were disproportionately affected by the relativelyly few very slow responses), a logarithmic 
transformation was performed and the positive skew was largely removed from all 
distributions. Thus, the conflict measure t (time to reach a decision), was transformed into 
)(log 2 t (the logarithm of decision time).  
Decision inconsistency, i, was evaluated by the value of the difference between the 
decisions made in the first part and the decisions made in the second part of the questionnaire. 
Accordingly, 0 was assigned when the decisions were consistent and 1 when they were 
inconsistent.  
In sum, the conflict measures are d for decision difficulty, u for decision uncertainty, 
e(v) for preference equality, log2(t) for decision time, and i for decision inconsistency. All 
measures are positively related to conflict. 
Results of Experiment 1 
In all the analyses (in this and subsequent Experiments), the tests of explicitly stated 
hypotheses are one-tailed tests, whereas all others are two-tailed tests. More information on 
the results of Experience 1 is presented in Appendix C. 
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Conflict: Variable construction. The dependent variable, conflict, is a composite 
factor obtained from five conflict measures. For this reason, a principal component analysis 
was conducted on the five conflict measures. To decide about the number of components to 
extract (in this and subsequent principal component analyses) we used Cattell‟s scree test, 
unless the scree plot was not clear, in which case we used Kaiser‟s rule. In the present 
analysis, one component was extracted, which had an eigenvalue of 1.72 and explained 
34.34% of the total variance. The five measures loaded positively on this common factor: 
Decision time (.36), decision difficulty (.78), decision uncertainty (.73), preference equality 
(.62), and decision inconsistency (.23). This is the conflict factor that we intended to extract. 
We ran an internal consistency reliability analysis on the conflict measure, which revealed a 
standardized Cronbach alpha of .48 and an average inter-item correlation of .16.
12
 The 
analysis of „alpha if item deleted‟ provides information about the content validity of the 
conflict variable. There was no increase in the value of alpha when an item was deleted, 
attesting to the content validity of the all items. The decision inconsistency measure had a low 
loading on the conflict factor; nevertheless, the experimental results were not affected by the 
inclusion or exclusion of the decision inconsistency measure. So we constructed the conflict 
variable as a composite of all five measures. Accordingly, we derived the (standardized) 
scores on the principal component and then linearly transformed them to scales from 0 to 1. 
Conflict: Test of hypotheses. Six linear regressions were performed. Regression 1 
was performed in order to test H1.1 (the difference in conflict between gains and losses), 
H1.2.2 (the moderating effect of outcome sign on the relation between tradeoff size and 
conflict), H3.1 (the difference in conflict between choice and rejecting tasks), and H3.2.2 (the 
moderating effect of preference elicitation method on the relation between tradeoff size and 
conflict). Conflict was the dependent variable and outcome sign, preference elicitation 
method, tradeoff size, and reference gamble were the independent variables. The analysis 
included: A contrast between gains and losses; a contrast between choice and rejection; two 
polynomial contrasts (linear and quadratic) between small, intermediate, and large tradeoffs; a 
contrast between the large-amount condition and the high-probability condition; and 18 
contrasts capturing the interactions between the independent variables. With respect to the 
tradeoff size variable, the linear contrast compares small to large tradeoffs capturing the linear 
relation between them, and the quadratic contrast compares intermediate to small and large 
                                               
12It can be argued that the internal consistency of the conflict scale was „low‟. Nevertheless, this was likely due 
to the fact that the scale is composed of a reduced number of items given that reliability is highly sensitive to the 
length of the scale (e.g., Ferguson & Takane, 1989). 
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tradeoffs capturing the quadratic relation between them (this applies to all the analyses of 
every Experiment). 
Regressions 2 and 3 were conducted to evaluate the specific shape of the relation 
between tradeoff size and conflict in each outcome sign condition, and to test H2.1.1 (the 
difference in conflict between choice and rejecting tasks in gains) and H2.1.2 (the difference 
in conflict between choice and rejecting tasks in losses), respectively. These analyses included 
all the contrasts of regression 1, except the ones associated with the outcome sign conditions. 
Regressions 4 and 5 were performed in order to evaluate the specific shape of the relation 
between tradeoff size and conflict in each preference elicitation method condition. We 
included all the contrasts of regression 1, except those associated with the preference 
elicitation method conditions. Finally, regression 6 was conducted to test H2.2 (the difference 
in conflict between choice and rejecting tasks when gains change into losses). The contrasts 
were the ones included in regression 1, except that the contrast between choice and rejection 
was replaced by a contrast between choice-gains-and-rejection-losses and choice-losses-and-
rejection-gains. 
The results of regression 1 showed a significant effect of outcome sign, t(3432) = 4.26 
p < .001: Conflict was greater for losses than for gains, consistent with H.1.1. There was also 
a significant effect of the interaction between outcome sign and tradeoff size (linear contrast), 
t(3432) = -2.42, p = .01: Consistent with H1.2.2, when gains changed into losses, the relation 
between tradeoff size and conflict changed in a downward direction as depicted in Figure 9. 
In addition, regressions 2 and 3 demonstrated that for gains there was a positive relation 
between tradeoff size and conflict, t(1716) = 3.02, p < .01, whereas for losses there was an 
inverse U-shaped relation, t(1716) = 1.82, p = .07 (effect marginally significant). 
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Figure 9. Relation between tradeoff size and conflict by outcome sign conditions (Experiment 
1). 
 
The results of regression 1 also showed a significant interaction effect between 
preference elicitation method and outcome sign, t(3432) = -3.12, p < .01, which demonstrates 
that preference elicitation method has a differential effect on gains and losses. As depicted in 
Figure 10, when changing the preference elicitation method from choice to rejection, conflict 
did increase in gains, t(1716) = 4.33, p < .001 (regression 2), but almost did not decrease in 
losses, t(1716) = -0.07, p = .47 (regression 3). Thus, H2.1.1 was supported but H2.1.2 was 
not. Figure 10 also shows that the effect of preference elicitation method was weaker for 
losses as predicted by H2.2. Indeed, regression 6 revealed a significant effect of the contrast 
between choice-gains-and-rejection-losses and choice-losses-and-rejection-gains, t(3432) = -
3.02, p < .01, which demonstrates that the effect of preference elicitation method was less 
pronounced in losses than in gains, consistent with H2.2. 
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Figure 10. Level of conflict by outcome sign and preference elicitation method conditions. 
  
Furthermore, regression 1 also demonstrated a significant main effect of preference 
elicitation method, t(3432) = 3.02, p < .01: Overall conflict was greater in the rejection 
condition than in the choice condition, consistent with H3.1. The interaction effect between 
preference elicitation method and tradeoff size (linear contrast) was also (marginally) 
significant, t(3432) = -1.43, p = .08: Consistent with H3.2.2, changing the preference 
elicitation method from choice to rejection changed the relation between tradeoff size and 
conflict in a downward direction, as depicted in Figure 11. In addition, regressions 4 and 5 
demonstrated that there was a positive relation between tradeoff size and conflict when the 
task was to choose, t(1716) = 2.29, p = .02, whereas there was an inverse U-shaped relation 
when the task was to reject, t(1716) = 2.05, p = .04. 
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Figure 11. Relation between tradeoff size and conflict by preference elicitation method 
conditions.  
 
Model estimation and parametric hypotheses test. Different levels of final conflict 
aroused by different choice problems were observed. From these observed levels of final 
conflict, the double-mediation model can then be estimated. When the formal specification of 
the model was presented, we specified how the degree of updating is related to preliminary 
conflict and how the conflict from deliberation is related to tradeoff size. The only substantive 
elements of the double-mediation model to be estimated are the levels of preliminary conflict, 
S0 and A0. The predicted levels of final conflict follow automatically from the equations given 
in that section. Therefore, in order to estimate the parameters of the double-mediation model, 
Equations A4 and A6 were substituted into Equation A2, Equations A5 and A7 were 
substituted into Equation A3, and Equations A2 and A3 were substituted into Equation A1. 
Furthermore, the parameters were estimated with the Hooke-Jeeves and Quasi-Newton 
routine in the Statistica software (StatSoft, 2003), minimizing the sum of squared deviations 
between observed and predicted levels of conflict. The dependent variable, conflict, was 
expressed on a scale from 0 to 1, and so were the independent variables. We assumed an equal 
spacing between the three tradeoff sizes. Thus, for each independent variable, we let the 
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preliminary conflict from sacrifice S0 = 0, ½, and 1, and, conversely, the preliminary conflict 
from concern about argumentation A0 = 1, ½, and 0, for small, intermediate, and large 
tradeoffs, respectively. The procedure for estimating the parameters is the same in all 
Experiments. 
In Experiment 1 we estimated ten parameters from the 2 (outcome sign) × 2 
(preference elicitation method) × 2 (reference gamble) × 3 (tradeoff size) = 24 levels of 
conflict observed across all 12 tasks. Two of these were the auxiliary parameters.
13
 The other 
eight were the estimated levels of preliminary conflict. The estimates are given in Appendix 
C. The goodness-of-fit of the estimated model was R
2 
= .89 (i.e., the estimated model 
accounted for 89% of the variance in the observed levels of conflict). Given that the estimated 
model provided an accurate description of the data, we could proceed by testing our 
hypotheses on the estimated levels of preliminary conflict.
14
 
When gains changed into losses, preliminary conflict from concern about 
argumentation increased, t(15) = 3.27, p = .01, consistent with H1.2. At the same time, 
preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice decreased, t(15) = -3.90, p < .01. 
Nonetheless, the difference in preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice was not as 
great as the difference in preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation, t(15) = -
4.02, p < .01.  
When the preference elicitation method changed from choice to rejection, preliminary 
conflict from concern about argumentation increased, t(15) = 2.28, p = .02, consistent with 
H3.2.1. The preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice decreased as well, t(15) = -2.47, 
p = .03. Nevertheless, the difference in preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice was 
not as great as the difference in preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation, t(15) 
= -2.57, p = .02. 
Discussion of Experiment 1 
One objective of Experiment 1 was to examine the impact of a situational factor, 
outcome sign (gains versus losses), on conflict arousal in risky choices by combining the 
double-mediation model with Lewin‟s (1951) analysis of conflict. The three hypotheses that 
                                               
13
The auxiliary parameters, the arbitrary scaling constant and the drive-capacity parameter were obtained from 
Equations A4-A5. 
14When fitting the double-mediation model to the data our concern was estimating the levels of preliminary 
conflict, which requires the model to provide an accurate description of the data (as it was the case). Therefore, 
we were interested in the descriptive, and not in the predictive, accuracy of the model. 
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addressed the effects of outcome sign were confirmed: Conflict was greater for losses than for 
gains; when gains changed into losses the preliminary conflict from concern about 
argumentation increased; and when gains changed into losses the relation between tradeoff 
size and conflict became more negative (or less positive).  
Nevertheless, another significant result has emerged. Although it was not expected, 
changing the outcome sign from gains to losses also affected the concern about sacrifice, even 
though not as much as the conflict from concern about argumentation. In losses, the 
preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice decreased. Thus, the positive effect 
produced by this mediator on the relation between tradeoff size and conflict was attenuated, 
which also contributed to the negative change in this relation.  
In Experiment 1 we also aimed to investigate the effects of outcome sign in 
combination with another situational factor, the preference elicitation method, i.e., whether 
the task is to choose or to reject a gamble. Two of the three hypotheses that addressed these 
effects were confirmed: Conflict was greater in rejection than in choice tasks for gains, but the 
reverse did not occur in losses; and the effect of preference elicitation method was weaker for 
losses than for gains. Indeed, the effect of preference elicitation method in losses was almost 
nil meaning that the participants in the choice condition experienced about the same amount 
of conflict as the participants in the rejection condition.  
The effect of preference elicitation method in gains is in agreement with the 
compatibility principle: Conflict was greater when people were asked to reject (incompatible 
situation) than when they were asked to choose between one of two options (compatible 
situation). Nevertheless, it may well be that this was not really (or at least not only) a 
consequence of a compatibility effect. It could be because choosing among gains is a much 
more common scenario than rejecting among gains. Thus, as we previously argued, conflict 
would be greater when the task is to reject because people are much less accustomed to reject 
than to choose among gains. 
The three hypotheses that concerned the effects of preference elicitation method on 
conflict arousal were also confirmed. Conflict was greater in rejecting than in choosing tasks. 
When the preference elicitation method changed from choice to rejection, the preliminary 
conflict from concern about argumentation increased, and the relation between tradeoff size 
and conflict became more negative (or less positive). Although not predicted, the concern 
about sacrifice was also affected by the preference elicitation method, but not as much as the 
concern about argumentation. When the preference elicitation method changed from choice to 
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rejection the preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice decreased, which also 
contributed to the negative change in the relation between tradeoff size and conflict.  
The main effect of preference elicitation method must be qualified, in that preference 
elicitation method had a simple main effect in gains and practically no simple main effect in 
losses. Choosing between two options is indeed more difficult than rejecting between two 
options, but apparently only in gains.  
Overall, our results demonstrated that outcome sign does had an independent effect on 
conflict, moderating the relation between tradeoff size and conflict. Preference elicitation 
method also affected conflict arousal and the relation between tradeoff size and conflict, but 
only in gains. Unexpectedly, the effect of preference elicitation method did not hold across 
gains and losses. Furthermore, although we did expect a weaker compatibility effect in losses 
than gains (because both choosing among losses and rejecting among losses are uncommon 
scenarios), we did not expect that the effect would be almost nil. Moreover, these results are 
inconsistent with previous findings. First, Nagpal and Krishnamurthy (2008), for instance, did 
found a compatibility effect between the valence of the options and the nature of the task 
(preference elicitation method) in gains and in losses: A greater conflict was aroused in 
incompatible situations. Second, apart from the compatibility effects, Meloy and Russo (2004, 
study 2), also demonstrated an effect of the preference elicitation method. Third, none of their 
studies found a main effect of outcome sign, whereas we did. Naturally, this raises the 
question of what could possibly explain these divergences. We argue that the answer lies in 
the manipulation of the valence conditions. 
Our manipulation involved decisions between gambles in which money could be won 
(positive condition) or in which money could be loss (negative condition). This implies that 
the two valence conditions are outcome sign conditions, meaning that the outcomes are 
different in sign, and that they entail an absolute and „pure‟ gain or loss to the decision maker. 
In the literature, however, the decisions in the negative condition imply only „relative‟ losses 
for the decision maker. Consider the stimuli used by Nagpal and Krishnamurthy (2008, study 
2). In the positive condition, one of the attributes of one of the options, an automobile, was 
having a 90% chance of not needing major repairs during the first 100,000 miles, whereas in 
the negative condition it was having a 10% chance of needing major repairs during the first 
100,000 miles. Although the outcomes in the negative condition are unattractive, they do not 
really imply a loss for the decision maker. Indeed, in Nagpal and Krishnamurthy‟ (2008, study 
2) research, the two valence conditions are framing conditions, i.e., the outcomes are equal in 
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sign although they appear to be different, and thus, the outcome of choice is not „really‟ 
negative.
15
 There are other studies in which the valence conditions are not manipulated by 
framing (see Meloy & Russo, 2004, study 1, and Nagpal & Krishnamurthy, 2008, study 1). 
Nevertheless, the outcomes of choice still do not imply a „direct‟ or „pure‟ loss for the 
decision maker as in our research, i.e., the decision maker does not, in fact, incur in a loss.  
It is reasonable to assume that the feeling that a person experiences when a decision 
entails a possible loss is more intense than when a decision entails a merely negative or 
unattractive outcome. If losses are much more unpleasant than merely negative or unattractive 
options, then the level of conflict should be much greater in the former than in the latter case. 
Moreover, because losses are so aversive (causing so much vacillation between the options), 
people become focused on how to deal with it, and thus, whether the task is to choose or to 
reject one option becomes irrelevant (none of the tasks alleviates the loss). This explains why 
the main effect of preference elicitation method did not hold across gains and losses and why 
there was no compatibility effect for losses in our study but there was in previous research. 
Moreover, this also implies that the contrast between gains and losses produces a greater 
difference in conflict than the contrast between merely positive (or attractive) and negative (or 
unattractive) options, explaining why we did find a main effect of outcome sign (valence 
condition), whereas previous research did not. 
Finally, conflict was assessed with five component measures: Decision time, decision 
difficulty, decision uncertainty, preference equality, and decision inconsistency. Decision 
inconsistency was the weakest conflict measure. Nevertheless, because the inclusion or 
exclusion of this measure did not affect the experimental results, conflict was constructed as a 
composite of all five measures. Scholten and Sherman (2006) used another conflict measure, 
the attribute-weight equality.
16
 Like decision difficulty, decision uncertainty and preference 
equality, attribute-weight equality is a mental manifestation of conflict. In particular, it is an 
„indirect-rating‟ measure (as the preference equality measure). This measure will also be 
included in the subsequent Experiments.   
In this Experiment we investigated how conflict was affected by the outcome sign in 
choosing and in rejecting tasks. In Experiment 2, as in all subsequent Experiments, we focus 
                                               
15For a more detailed distinction between framing and reflection studies see Fagley (1993) and Kühberger, 
Schulte-Mecklenbeck, and Perner (1999). 
16In Scholten and Sherman‟s (2006) investigation, this measure appears under the name of equality of attribute 
importance (i.e., the degree to which attributes are equally important for the decision reached). We renamed it as 
attribute-weight equality, given that, the „importance for the decision reached‟ is the weight that an attribute has 
in a particular decision.   
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on choice tasks. We aim to provide further evidence in support of the role of outcome sign on 
conflict arousal, and to broaden the scope of our investigation, by also examining the effect of 
an individual factor, which is the decision maker‟s thinking style. 
Experiment 2:  
Outcome Sign and Thinking Style 
In Experiment 1 we examined the effects of two situational factors in the arousal of 
conflict in risky choices: Outcome sign and preference elicitation method. We demonstrated 
that, regardless of preference elicitation method, outcome sign has an impact on conflict. 
Consistent with Lewin‟s (1951) analysis of conflict, we confirmed that people experience 
more conflict when choosing among losses than when choosing among gains. More 
importantly, we successfully applied the double-mediation model (Scholten & Sherman, 
2006) to risky choice by showing that outcome sign moderated the relation between tradeoff 
size and conflict: When gains changed into losses, the preliminary conflict from concern 
about argumentation increased and the relation between tradeoff size and conflict became 
more negative (or less positive). In Experiment 2, we aim to provide further evidence in 
support of the role of outcome sign on the arousal of conflict, and to broaden the scope of our 
investigation, by examining the effects of a situational factor (outcome sign) and of an 
individual factor. The individual factor is the thinking style of the decision maker. Drawing 
on Epstein‟s (1994) cognitive-experiential self-theory, we propose that individual differences 
in the thinking style, i.e., in level of rationality and experientiality, will correspond to 
individual differences in the preliminary conflict from the two sources. For instance, we 
predict that the level of preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation will be greater 
when the level of rationality and/or experientiality is high, than when both are low. These and 
other predictions will be tested in this Experiment. 
The predictions about the effect of outcome sign on conflict were already derived (see 
theoretical overview) and tested in Experiment 1. The same hypotheses will be tested in this 
Experiment:  
H1.1. Conflict will be greater for losses than for gains. 
H1.2.1. When the sign of the outcomes changes from gains to losses, the preliminary conflict 
from concern about argumentation will increase. 
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H1.2.2. When the sign of the outcomes changes from gains to losses, the relation between 
tradeoff size and conflict will change in a downward direction. 
In brief, decisions involving losses generate more hesitancy and vacillation between 
the alternatives than decisions involving gains. Thus, conflict is more complicated to resolve 
in the former than in the latter case. Moreover, conflict is greater in losses than in gains 
essentially because while there is no contradiction in arguing in favor of a positive gamble it 
is contradictory to argue in favor of a negative gamble, which increases the preliminary 
conflict from concern about argumentation. As a consequence, the negative mediating effect 
produced by this concern on the relation between tradeoff size and conflict is accentuated and 
the relation becomes more negative (or less positive).  
We now focus on the individual differences in the thinking style. We combine the 
double-mediation model (Scholten & Sherman, 2006) with Epstein‟s (1994) theory to derive 
predictions about how the two thinking styles, rational and experiential, affect conflict and its 
relation with tradeoff size.  
Thinking Style 
The dual-system approach is common to many different areas such as persuasion and 
attitude change (Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981, 1986), judgment and decision 
making (Stanovich & West, 2000; Kahneman, 2003), reasoning (Evans, 1984; Sloman, 1996), 
and personality (Epstein, 1994).
17
 They converge to the notion that the mind has dual aspects, 
that behavior results from the relationship between two systems (Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 
2004), which Stanovich and West (2000) generically labeled as System 1 and System 2. As 
Kahneman (2003) noted, system 1 is ruled by habits and operates in a fast, automatic, 
effortless, associative, and implicit manner, whereas system 2 is guided by rules and is more 
serial, slow, effortful, conscious, and deliberatively controlled. System 1 can be influenced by 
emotions, whereas system 2 cannot.  
The view that risky choice is governed by the operation of two systems (one more 
rational or cognitive, the other more experiential or affective) has recently gained growing 
acceptance (e.g., Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Mukherjee, 2010; Slovic, 
Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004). Our research is grounded on Epstein‟s (1994) 
                                               
17See Evans (2008) for a recent review. 
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cognitive-experiential self-theory, a broader theory, which incorporates the dualism of 
information processing in a global personality theory.  
Cognitive-experiential self-theory has been shown to be applicable to a wide range of 
psychological domains, including judgment and decision making (see Epstein & Pacini, 
1999), and has been used for the study of individual differences in judgment and decision 
making (e.g., Bartels, 2006; Björklund & Bäckström, 2008; Danziger, Moran, & Rafaely, 
2006; Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002; McIntosh, 2005; Pacini & Epstein, 1999; 
Shiloh, Salton, & Sharabi, 2002). Moreover, the importance of the cognitive-experiential self-
theory in risky choice has already been discussed by Slovic et al. (2004; see also Loewenstein 
et al., 2001). Our aim is to extend its application to the study of individual differences in 
decisional conflict. 
Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory 
The cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST), introduced by Epstein (1973), posits 
that people automatically create a theory of reality “in order to make life as livable, meaning 
as emotionally satisfying, as possible.” (Epstein, 1994, p. 715). This theory of reality is an 
implicit model of the world composed by a world theory, a self-theory, and by propositions 
connecting the both. According to CEST, there are two ways (systems) by which people can 
adapt to the world: A rational system and an experiential system.
18
 The essential proposition 
of CEST is that the experiential system is guided by emotions. In comparison to other dual-
process models, CEST emphasizes the role of the experiential system, by assuming that it is 
by this system that the personal theories of reality are created. This that does not imply that 
the experiential system is more important than the rational system, only that CEST “has 
nothing new to say about it, other than to note that CEST assumes it is far less important in 
the conduct of everyday affairs than most people realize” (Epstein, Lipson, Holstein, & Huh, 
1992, p. 328). Therefore, the rational system is assumed to be primarily conscious, reason 
oriented and affect free, deliberative and analytical, operating according to conventionally 
established rules of logic and evidence. The experiential system is assumed to be primarily 
preconscious, holistic, fast, and automatic, driven by emotion, operating according to the 
pleasure/pain principle, i.e., is motivated to approach pleasure and to avoid pain.  
                                               
18The rational and the experiential systems correspond to systems 2 and 1 (respectively) in Stanovich and West‟s 
(2000) terminology. 
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The experiential system implies a relatively automatic, intuitive, and effortless 
processing, and therefore, is considered to be the mode that operates by default (Epstein, 
Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996). The responses produced by this system are, in general, 
adaptive and efficient; however, they can also be a source of error, generating several 
maladaptive biases (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994). Nevertheless, this does not mean that the 
rational system, which implies a relatively controlled, analytical, and effortful processing, 
would be the most appropriate mode for processing information. Each system has his 
advantages and disadvantages, and is suitable for resolving different types of situations 
(Epstein, 1990). The rational system usually encodes reality in terms of abstract symbols, and 
thus, is more appropriate to resolve situations which imply logic, analytic and/or abstract 
thinking, for instance, mathematical problems. The experiential system, usually encodes 
reality in terms of concrete images, metaphors and narratives, and thus, is more appropriate to 
resolve situations implying the use of knowledge derived from past experience, as the case of 
interpersonal problems (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; Epstein, 1994; Epstein et al., 1996).  
The two systems function in a parallel, independent but interactive way. That is, the 
activation of one system does not depend on the activation of the other, but they can 
communicate with each other and mutually influence one another (they sometimes reinforce 
each other‟s response, and other times produce different responses that compete for 
dominance). This interaction is usually seamless and integrated, but conflict between feelings 
and thoughts (heart and mind) may arise (e.g., Epstein et al., 1996). The activation or 
dominance of each system depends on individual and situational factors. The situational 
factors include the nature of the situation, the emotion involvement with the situation, and the 
repeated amount of relevant experience. The individual factors are the individual differences 
in information processing styles (Pacini & Epstein, 1999), or thinking styles (Epstein et al., 
1996).  
Our analysis focuses on how the individual differences in the style of thinking affect 
the decisional conflict. In the double-mediation model, thinking style, as other factors in the 
choice context, should have an impact on preliminary conflict. We thus propose that the 
individual differences in the „normal level of activation‟ of each system correspond to 
individual differences in the conflict aroused by the concern about sacrifice and about 
argumentation when a preliminary impression is formed. To assess individual differences in 
rationality and experientiality, we apply Pacini and Epstein‟s (1999) rationality-experientiality 
inventory, which is described in the next section.  
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Measuring Individual Differences in Thinking Style 
To assess the individual differences in the style of thinking, i.e., in the degree to which 
people tend to use the analytical-rational and the intuitive-experiential processing modes, 
Epstein and his colleagues (see Epstein et al., 1996) developed the rational-experiential 
inventory (REI). REI is a self-report questionnaire which measures rationality and 
experientiality through two unipolar scales: Need for Cognition (NFC) and Faith in Intuition 
(FI). The NFC scale measures the degree to which people use an analytical-rational thinking 
and was adapted from the original scale developed by Cacioppo and Petty (1982). The FI 
scale measures the degree to which people engage in intuitive-experiential thinking (see 
Epstein et al., 1996). 
Two versions of REI were developed. In the first version of REI (Epstein et al., 1996), 
1996), the NFC scale (the rationality scale) was composed by 19 items and the FI scale (the 
experientiality scale) by 12 items, performing a total of 31 items. Epstein et al. (1996) 
demonstrated that REI was valid and reliable, although the NFC scale presented a greater 
reliability than the FI scale (α = .87 and α = .77, respectively). Moreover, the correlation 
between the two scales was small and not significant, r = .07, which supports the assumption 
that rationality and experientiality are two independent modes of processing information. The 
factor structure also supported this assumption.  
Nevertheless, this version of REI presented some limitations, for instance, the content 
of the scales was not equivalent, the length of the scales was unbalanced, and the number of 
positively versus negatively worded items in each scale was uneven (see Pacini & Epstein, 
1999, for more information). In order to account for these limitations, Epstein, Pacini, and 
Norris (1998, cited in Pacini & Epstein, 1999) developed, and Pacini and Epstein (1999) 
validated a new version of REI.  
This REI version (see Pacini & Epstein, 1999) consists of two scales, the rationality 
scale and the experientiality scale. Both the rationality scale and the experientiality scale were 
composed of 20 items, performing a total of 40 items. Furthermore, each scale was divided 
into two subscales (10 items per subscale), engagement and ability. Thus, rationality and 
experientiality result from the addition of the respective subscales. Rational engagement 
evaluates the degree to which people enjoy or rely in an analytic and logic thinking; rational 
ability evaluates the degree to which people are able to think in an analytical and logic 
manner; experiential engagement evaluates the degree to which people make decisions (and 
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enjoy making those decisions) by relying on feelings and intuitions; and experiential ability 
evaluates the degree to which people follow their feelings and intuitions (Pacini & Epstein, 
1999). In addition, approximately half of the items are positively worded and the other half 
negatively worded. The answering scale was a 5 point rating scale, which ranged from 1 
(definitely not true of myself) to 5 (definitely true of myself). 
Pacini and Epstein (1999) demonstrated that this improved version of REI was valid 
and reliable (rationality scale, α = .90, and experientiality scale, α = .87). The scales presented 
a more similar and greater reliability than previously, especially the experientiality scale, in 
which reliability rose from α = .77 to α = .87. Moreover, the correlation between the scales 
(which was again not significant) and the factor structure supported the independence 
assumption. With respect to the ability and engagement subscales, the factor analysis only 
supported the rational scale. Nevertheless, the authors maintained this subdivision for the 
experientiality scale, arguing that its correlations with other variables showed discriminant 
validity.  
In the present research we apply the REI version of Pacini and Epstein (1999) to 
assess individual differences in rationality and experientiality. As it was previously said, the 
main idea is that individual differences in the „normal activation level‟ of the rational system 
and the experiential system will correspond to individual differences in the conflict aroused 
by the concern about sacrifice and about argumentation when a preliminary impression of a 
choice problem is formed. Thus, given the scores on this inventory, we assign each participant 
to one of four groups, depending on whether the participant‟s level of rationality or 
experientiality is relatively high or low. We will have a group that scores high on both, a 
second group that scores high on rationality but low on experientiality, a third group that 
scores low on rationality but high on experientiality, and a fourth group that scores low on 
both. We are then able to test our hypotheses through specific comparisons between these four 
groups. In the next section we combine CEST (Epstein, 1944) with the double-mediation 
model (Scholten & Sherman, 2006) and derive predictions about how the relatively high or 
low level of rationality and experientiality of the participants will affect conflict arousal in 
risky choice.  
Conflict and Thinking Style 
We investigate the impact of thinking style on the arousal of conflict in choices 
involving a tradeoff between probability and outcome (amount to win or to lose). This is an 
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environment of abstract symbols (words and numbers), which, according to CEST, should 
foster a more rational thinking. In other words, it can be expected that the rational system will 
dominate the experiential one. Thus, because in the double-mediation model thinking style 
will have an impact on preliminary conflict, it can be expected that if the rational system will 
dominate the experiential one, then preliminary conflict will not depend on experientiality 
when rationality is high: 
H3. When rationality is high, preliminary conflict will not depend on experientiality. 
 CEST assumes that there are two ways by which people can adapt to the world and 
therefore to the choice problems that they have to face: A rational and an experiential one. In 
other words, it is through rationality and experientiality that people can deal or cope with the 
challenges posed by the environment. “Rational persons” (those who score high on rationality 
but low on experientiality) will adapt to the choice problem in a more analytical way. 
“Experiential persons” (those who score high on experientiality but low on rationality) will 
adapt the choice problem in a more intuitive way. “Rational and experiential persons” (those 
who score high on both rationality and experientiality) may adapt to the choice problem either 
way. Nevertheless, in situations where the rational system dominates the experiential one, 
adaptation will probably be made in a more analytical way. Finally, in persons who are 
neither rational nor experiential (those who score low on both rationality and experientiality), 
adaptation will be more complicated because no adaptation mode is immediately available to 
the person. It must be highlighted that we are referring to relative levels of rationality and 
experientiality, not absolute levels. Thus, low scores on REI do not imply that the person is 
completely devoid of rationality and experientiality (and that no adaptation will occur), only 
that it is less likely that an adaptation mode is immediately available to the person. And 
whether an adaptation mode is immediately available or not will be reflected in the 
preliminary conflict aroused by the decision problems, which will affect the relation between 
tradeoff size and conflict as we discuss next. 
According to the double-mediation model, people will form a preliminary impression 
when facing a choice problem, realizing that a tradeoff must be made and that it must 
somehow be resolved. Adaptation means that people can deal or cope with the challenges 
posed by the environment; in our research, adaptation means that people can cope with the 
choice problems, and thus, resolve the decisional conflict. Therefore, in the double-mediation 
model, adaptation means that people can make an argument to resolve the decisional conflict 
(recall that the model assumes that conflict is resolved to argumentation).  
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This implies that, in cases where at least one adaption mode is immediately available 
(“rational persons,” experiential persons,” or “rational and experiential persons”), the person 
will be more confident that an argument can be made in favor of one of the options, either 
analytically or intuitively, and the preliminary conflict aroused by the concern about 
argumentation should decrease. In contrast, in cases where no adaptation mode is immediately 
available (persons who are neither rational nor experiential), a person will have no immediate 
mode to deal with the choice problem and to resolve conflict and, as a consequence, the 
preliminary conflict aroused by the concern about argumentation will be greater. We thus 
arrive at the following hypothesis: 
H4.1. The preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation will be greater when both 
rationality and experientiality are low (persons who are neither rational nor 
experiential) than when either or both are high (“rational persons,” experiential 
persons,” or “rational and experiential persons”). 
 In the double-mediation model, the preliminary conflict from a concern is the drive to 
devote attention to that concern during subsequent deliberation and only the conflict from 
deliberation is affected by tradeoff size. Therefore, given that when rationality and 
experientiality are low the preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation will be 
greater (than when either or both are high), in the subsequent deliberation phase, the negative 
mediating effect of concern about argumentation will be accentuated (relatively to the positive 
mediating effect of concern about sacrifice), and thus, the relation between tradeoff size and 
conflict will become more negative (or less positive): 
H4.2. The relation between tradeoff size and conflict will be more negative, or less positive, 
when both rationality and experientiality are low (persons who are neither rational nor 
experiential) than when either or both are high (“rational persons,” “experiential 
persons,” or “rational and experiential persons”). 
We have asserted that adaptation favors argumentation, i.e., the immediate availability 
of an adaptation mode leads to a decrease in preliminary conflict from concern about 
argumentation. Nevertheless, we also predict that the decrease will be less pronounced when 
people adapt to the choice problem by the rational system than when they adapt by the 
experiential system. Stated differently, the preliminary conflict from concern about 
argumentation will be greater when adapting to the choice problem by the rational system 
than when adapting to the choice problem by the experiential system as we discuss next. 
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Argumentation in the double-mediation model is pro-argumentation, that is, arguing 
unilaterally in favor of one option overweighting its pros and underweighting its cons. Thus, 
contrary to what the terminology might imply, the rational system in CEST is not best 
equipped for argumentation. The rational system should foster a careful evaluation/weighting 
of the pros and cons of each option, which in terms of the double-mediation model means that 
it should be more oriented to pro- and contra-argumentation. As Epstein (1994, p. 711) stated, 
the rational system is oriented toward “justification via logic and evidence”, whereas the 
experiential system is oriented toward what is “self-evidently valid”. The “logic and 
evidence” support both options and arguing in favor of one of the options is more arbitrary. 
Thus, the rational system can be expected to reject pro-argumentation as arbitrary. In contrast, 
the experiential system can be expected to accept pro-argumentation as “self-evidently valid”. 
In sum, adapting to the choice problem by the rational system should arouse a greater 
preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation, than adapting to the choice problem 
by the experiential system.  
As discussed previously, the rational system should dominate the experiential system, 
therefore, adaptation by the rational system should occur when rationality is high and 
experientiality is either high or low, whereas adaptation by the experiential system should 
occur when rationality is low but experientiality is high. We thus arrive at the following 
hypothesis: 
H5.1. Preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation will be greater when 
rationality is high (“rational persons” or “rational and experiential persons”) than 
when rationality is low but experientiality is high (“experiential persons”). 
The rational system is more likely to reject pro-argumentation as arbitrary because it is 
more oriented toward contra-argumentation, or consideration of sacrifice, than the 
experiential system. This implies that, not only the preliminary conflict from concern about 
argumentation (pro-argumentation) will be greater when the adaptation is made through the 
rational system, but also, that the preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice (contra-
argumentation) will be greater when the adaptation is made through the rational system. This 
leads to the following hypothesis: 
H5.2. Preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice will be greater when rationality is 
high (“rational persons” or “rational and experiential persons”) than when rationality 
is low but experientiality is high (“experiential persons”).  
75 
 
Because when people adapt to the choice problem by the rational system they are more 
oriented toward pro- and contra-argumentation, H5.1 and H5.2 predict that both the 
preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation and from concern about sacrifice will 
be greater when rationality is high than when rationality is low but experientiality is high. 
Thus, the hypotheses do not imply differential effects on the two mediators, and therefore, do 
not imply a moderating effect of thinking style on the relation between tradeoff size and 
conflict.  
Method of Experiment 2 
Participants. A total of 228 psychology students from ISPA-IU participated in the 
study. They received a voucher of €7.50 for their participation. 
Materials and stimuli. Conflict was measured through a computerized questionnaire 
developed by computer in Turbo Pascal. The questionnaire was similar the one used in 
Experiment 1, except that it consisted of only one part and that the participants completed 
four (instead of three) rating scales. There were again 12 decision tasks, which involved 
dyadic choices between card gambles implying a tradeoff between probability of winning and 
amount to win, or a tradeoff between probability of losing and amount to lose. The stimuli 
were gambles yielding an outcome x with probability p or a zero outcome with probability 1-p 
and were the same as in the previous Experiment.  
To measure thinking style we used a reduced Portuguese version of the rational-
experiential inventory (REI), which we adapted from the REI version of Pacini and Epstein 
(1999). We started by translating the REI to Portuguese and pretesting it on 66 psychology 
students. More details about the questionnaire, pre-test, and respective results are given in 
Appendix D. The results were similar to those obtained by Pacini and Epstein (1999) in that 
relatively strong and weak items in their study (with high and low saturation on the target 
scales) tended to be relatively strong and weak items in our study as well. Because the 
participants complained that the questionnaire was very repetitive, and because we wanted to 
avoid that this would jeopardize their cooperativeness in the experiment, we developed a 
reduced Portuguese version of REI. By doing so, the reliability of the rationality scale rose 
from  = .84 to  = .88 and the reliability of the experientiality scale from  = .89 to  = .90. 
This was the REI questionnaire used in the present Experiment, which is presented in 
Appendix E.  
The reduced version of REI consisted of a total of 26 items. Items 1 to 13 evaluate 
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rationality and items 14 to 26 evaluate experientiality. In addition, items 3, 6, 10, 13, 14, 16, 
17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, and 26 are positively worded, and items 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 
22, 29, and 30 are negatively worded. The answering scale is a 5 point rating scale: (1) 
strongly disagree; (2) disagree; (3) nor agree or disagree; (4) agree; and (5) strongly agree. 
The participants marked the option with which they most identify. In addition, to avoid 
possible order effects, we developed five other versions of this questionnaire, in which the 
order of presentation of the scales and the order of presentation of the items were 
counterbalanced. 
Design. Conflict was the dependent variable and it was assessed with five measures: 
Decision time, decision difficulty, decision uncertainty, preference equality and attribute-
weight equality. The decision inconsistency measure was excluded as a conflict measure to 
keep the duration of the entire session within limits (on average, 35 minutes). 
Similarly to Experiment 1, Experiment 2 yielded a 2 (outcome sign) × 3 (tradeoff size) 
× 2 (reference gamble) within-participants design, resulting in 12 pairs of gambles (12 
decision tasks) for each participant. Moreover, four between-participants factors were 
included. Two of these were counterbalancing factors, as in Experiment 1: Reference-gamble 
extremeness and assignment of the extremeness conditions to the outcome sign conditions. 
The other two between-participants factors were rationality and experientiality. Both 
rationality and experientiality have two levels: High and low rationality, and high and low 
experientiality. Five factors were randomized across the within and between participants 
design: (1) the distribution of the participants by the experimental conditions and by the REI 
versions; (3) the order of the 12 decision tasks for each participant; (3) the order by which the 
options are presented; (4) the order by which the conflict scales are presented; and (5) the 
specification of the winning/loosing cards. 
Procedure. Each experimental session was run with at most 20 participants at a time 
and lasted about 35 minutes. The session was divided into two stages.  
In the first stage the participants completed the REI questionnaire, which was 
administered by paper and pencil in the classroom where the participants were recruited (with 
previous authorization of the professors). After completing REI, the participants were guided 
to the laboratory, were the second stage of the session took place. On this stage, the procedure 
was similar to that of Experiment 1, but, as we said previously, each choice task was 
accompanied by four rating tasks because of the inclusion of the attribute-weight equality 
measure.  
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In the attribute-weight rating scale (as in the others), the gambles and the attributes 
were displayed in a matrix format on the top of the screen, the chosen gamble was marked 
with an arrow (below it), and a 9-point rating scale appeared on the bottom of the screen. All 
numbers were presented on the scale but only the odd numbers were labelled. Specifically, the 
positions 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 were labelled as “much more important”, “more important”, 
“equally important”, “more important”, and “much more important”, respectively. In the gains 
condition, above the attribute-weight rating scale, the first attribute in the matrix appeared on 
the left side of the scale and the second on the right side. In the losses condition, the first 
attribute in the matrix appeared on the right side of the scale and the second on the left side. 
Measures. The attribute-weight ratings, w, were computed as the preference ratings in 
Experiment 1. The other measures were also computed as in Experiment 1. 
Thus, the conflict measures are d for decision difficulty, u for decision uncertainty, 
e(w) for attribute-weight equality, e(v) for equality of preferences, and log2(t) for decision 
time. 
 Each REI item was answered according to a 5 point rating scale. Therefore, the 
rationality and experientiality ratings were coded from 1 to 5 for the positive items and from 5 
to 1 for the negative items, so that the degree of rationality and experientiality increased as the 
score increased. The rationality and experientiality final scores were obtained by conducting 
principal component analysis and deriving their (standardized) scores. Then, we performed a 
median split on the two factors in order to transform rationality and experientiality into two 
dichotomous variables: Scores above the median value were coded as 1 (high rationality or 
high experientiality) and scores below the median value were coded as -1 (low rationality or 
low experientiality). Therefore, the participants were assigned to one of the four groups, 
depending on whether their level of rationality and experientiality was relatively high or low. 
This procedure allowed us to test our hypotheses which require specific contrasts between 
participants who are high or low in rationality and high or low in experientiality. 
Results of Experiment 2 
More information on the results of Experience 2 is presented in Appendix F. 
Conflict: Variable construction. A principal component analysis was conducted on 
the five conflict measures to obtain the conflict variable. The first component, the conflict 
factor, was extracted. This component presented an eigenvalue of 1.98 and explained 39.61% 
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of the total variance. Moreover, this component loaded positively on all five measures: 
Decision time (.38), decision difficulty (.70), decision uncertainty (.72), preference equality 
(.68), and attribute-weight equality (.61). The internal consistency reliability analysis revealed 
a standardized Cronbach alpha of .61 and an average inter-item correlation of .24. There was 
no increase in the value of alpha when an item was deleted, attesting to the content validity of 
all items. Therefore, we constructed a composite measure of conflict, by deriving the 
(standardized) scores on the principal component and then linearly transforming them to 
scales from 0 to 1. 
Rationality and experientiality measures. We started the analysis of REI by 
performing an internal consistency analysis to each scale. The reliability analysis performed 
on the rationality scale (13 items) revealed a standardized Cronbach alpha of .77 and an 
average inter-item correlation of .21. The exclusion of item 12 led to an increase of alpha; 
therefore, we excluded this item from the rationality scale. By doing so, the reliability of the 
rationality scale rose to  = .79 and the average inter-item correlation to .25. The reliability 
analysis performed on the experientiality scale revealed a standardized Cronbach alpha of .79 
and an average inter-item correlation of .23. The exclusion of item 20 led to an increase of 
alpha. Although, the increase was small, we excluded this item from the experientiality scale 
to maintain the same number of items in each scale. By doing so, the reliability of the 
experientiality scale rose to  = .80 and the average inter-item correlation to .26.  
We then conducted a principal component analysis with varimax rotation on the 
remaining 24 items. The first component, the rationality factor, presented an eigenvalue of 
5.05 and explained 21.05% of the total variance. The second component, the experientiality 
factor, presented an eigenvalue of 3.52 and explained 14.67% of the total variance. The items 
and factor loadings are reported in Table 5. The factor structure was fairly good, but not as 
good as in the pretest. Three rationality items had very low loadings on either factor (items 2, 
4, and 11); two of these had marginally higher loadings on the experientiality factor (items 2 
and 4). Three experientiality items had higher loadings on the rationality factor (items 15, 21, 
and 23); one of these, substantially higher (item 15). However, because the inclusion or 
exclusion of these items, barely affected the reliability and unaffected the experimental 
results, the results reported below are those obtained with all 24 items. 
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Table 5 
    
 
Factor Structure of the Reduced Rationality-Experientiality Inventory  
Scale Nº Item R E  
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3 I enjoy intellectual challenges. .83 -.10  
5 I don't like to have to do a lot of thinking. .82 -.11  
1 I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something. .77 .00  
10 I prefer complex problems to simple problems. .73 -.03  
6 I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking. .61 -.13  
9 Reasoning things out carefully is not one of my strong points. .55 .00  
13 I have no problem thinking things through carefully. .49 .19  
8 I am not a very analytical thinker. .49 .12  
7 Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable activity. .40 .13  
11 Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction. .09 .02  
4 I am not very good at solving problems that require careful logical analysis. .08 .09  
2 I'm not that good at figuring out complicated problems. .05 .19  
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16 Using my gut feelings usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life. -.23 .70  
18 Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems. .07 .68  
22 If I were to rely on my gut feelings, I would often make mistakes. .15 .66  
17 I believe in trusting my hunches. .10 .66  
19 I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action. -.04 .64  
14 I like to rely on my intuitive impressions. .34 .62  
25 I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest gut feelings to find an answer.  -.06 .57  
26 I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong, even if I can't explain how I know. -.05 .54  
24 I think there are times when one should rely on one's intuition. .30 .49  
23 I don't like situations in which I have to rely on intuition. .37 .36  
15 I don't have a very good sense of intuition. .61 .21  
21 When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings. .32 .20  
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Conflict: Test of hypotheses. Five linear regressions were performed. Regression 1 
was conducted in order to test H1.1 (the difference in conflict between gains and losses), 
H1.2.2 (the moderating effect of outcome sign on the relation between tradeoff size), and 
H4.2 (the moderating effect of thinking style on the relation between tradeoff size). Conflict 
was the dependent variable and REI, outcome sign, tradeoff size, and reference gamble were 
the independent variables. The analysis included a contrast between gains and losses, two 
polynomial contrasts (linear and quadratic) between small, intermediate, and large tradeoffs, a 
contrast between the large-amount condition and the high-probability condition, three 
orthogonal contrasts between the four REI conditions, and 40 contrasts capturing the 
interactions between the independent variables.  
The three orthogonal contrasts between the four REI conditions were:  
(1) A contrast between low-rationality-and-low-experientiality (1 condition) and high-
rationality-and-or-high-experientiality (3 conditions). This contrast, in combination 
with the linear contrast between tradeoff sizes, is needed to test H4.2, according to 
which the relation between tradeoff size and conflict will be more negative, or less 
positive, when both rationality and experientiality are low than when either or both are 
high. 
(2) A contrast between low-rationality-and-high-experientiality (1 condition) and high-
rationality (2 conditions). This contrast, in combination with the linear contrast 
between tradeoff sizes, is needed to test a null hypothesis, according to which the 
linear trend in the relation between tradeoff size and conflict is the same when 
rationality is high as when rationality is low but experientiality is high. (This null 
hypothesis holds when the effects predicted by H5.1 and H5.2 are equally strong.) 
(3) The remaining contrast between high-rationality-and-low-experientiality (1 condition) 
and high-rationality-and-high-experientiality (1 condition). 
Regressions 2 and 3 were conducted in order to evaluate the specific shape of the 
relation between tradeoff size and conflict in each outcome sign condition. These analyses 
included all the contrasts included in regression 1, except those associated with the outcome 
sign conditions. Regressions 4 and 5 evaluated the specific shape of the relation between 
tradeoff size and conflict in the low-rationality-and-low-experientiality condition and in the 
high-rationality-and-or-high-experientiality conditions. These analyses included all the 
contrasts included in regression 1, except those associated with thinking style. 
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The results of regression 1 showed a significant effect of outcome sign, t(2688) = 7.22, 
p < .001: Conflict was greater for losses than for gains, consistent with H1.1. The interaction 
effect between outcome sign and tradeoff size (linear contrast) was also significant, t(2688) = 
-1.83, p = .03: Consistent with H1.2.2, when gains changed into losses, the relation between 
tradeoff size and conflict changed in a downward direction as depicted in Figure 12. 
Furthermore, the effect of the linear contrast between tradeoff sizes was also significant, 
t(2688) = 2.10, p = .04: Conflict increased with tradeoff size. Regressions 2 and 3 
demonstrated that for gains there was a positive relation between tradeoff size and conflict, 
t(1344) = 2.75, p = .01, whereas for losses there was an inverse U-shaped relation, t(1344) = 
1.92, p = .05, respectively. 
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Figure 12. Relation between tradeoff size and conflict by outcome sign conditions 
(Experiment 2). 
  
We now turn to the analysis of the effects of thinking style. Figure 13 demonstrates 
the observed relation between tradeoff size and conflict as a function of thinking style. The 
results of regression 1 revealed a (marginally) significant interaction effect between tradeoff 
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size (linear contrast) and thinking style (contrast between low-rationality-and-low-
experientiality and high-rationality-and-or-high-experientiality), t(2688) = -1.31, p = .10: The 
relation between tradeoff size and conflict was less positive when both rationality and 
experientiality were low than when either or both were high, consistent with H4.2. Moreover, 
when both rationality and experientiality were low, there was an inverse U-shaped relation 
between tradeoff size and conflict, although not reliable, t(672) = 1.08, p = .28 (regression 4). 
When either or both were high, there was a positive relation between tradeoff size and 
conflict, t(2040) = 2.42, p = .02 (regression 5). 
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Figure 13. Relation between tradeoff size and conflict by thinking style: Contrast of low-
rationality-and-low-experientiality with high-rationality-and-or-high-experientiality.  
  
Furthermore, regression 1 also showed significant effects of two of the three contrasts 
between the rationality-experientiality conditions: Conflict was greatest when both rationality 
and experientiality were low, t(2688) = 5.14, p < .001, and greater when rationality was high 
than when rationality was low but experientiality was high, t(2688) = 2.43,  p = .01. Finally, 
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when rationality was high, conflict did not depend on experientiality, t(2688) = 0.93, p = .35. 
These results are displayed in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14: Level of conflict as a function of thinking style. 
 
Model estimation and parametric hypotheses test. In Experiment 2, eighteen 
parameters were estimated from the 2 (rationality) × 2 (experientiality) × 2 (outcome sign) × 3 
(tradeoff size) × 2 (reference gamble) = 48 observed levels of conflict. Two parameters were 
the auxiliary ones and the other 16 were the estimated levels of preliminary conflict. The 
estimates are given in Appendix F. The goodness-of-fit of the estimated model was R
2 
= .88.  
When gains changed into losses, the preliminary conflict from concern about 
argumentation increased, t(30) = 7.13, p < .001, consistent H1.2.1. The preliminary conflict 
from concern about sacrifice also increased, t(30) = 1.84, p = .08. Nevertheless, the difference 
in preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice was not as great as the difference in 
preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation, t(30) = -2.50, p = .02. 
We now turn to the analyses of the levels of preliminary conflict from concern about 
sacrifice and argumentation as a function thinking style, which are depicted in Figure 15. The 
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preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice was greater than preliminary conflict from 
concern about argumentation, t(30) = 2.56, p = .02. We next examine the results that address 
our hypotheses.  
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Figure 15. Level of preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice and about 
argumentation as a function of thinking style. 
 
When rationality was high, preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation did 
not depend on experientiality, t(30) = 0.71, p = .48 (main effect of experientiality) and, t(30) = 
0.88, p = .38, in support of H3.  
Furthermore, the preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation was greater 
when both rationality and experientiality were low than when either or both were high, t(30) = 
5.21, p < .001, consistent with H4.1. The preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice 
was also greater when both rationality and experientiality were low than when either or both 
were high, t(30) = 1.56, p = .13. However, the difference in preliminary conflict from concern 
about sacrifice was not as great as the difference in preliminary conflict from concern about 
argumentation, t(30) = -1.94, p = .06.  
85 
 
Finally, the preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation and the 
preliminary conflict from sacrifice were greater when rationality was high than when 
rationality was low but experientiality was high, t(30) = 1.99, p = .03, and, t(30) = 1.96, p = 
.06, consistent with H5.1 and H5.2, respectively. In addition, the difference in the preliminary 
conflict from argumentation was about as great as the difference in preliminary conflict from 
sacrifice, t(30) = 0.51, p = .62. 
Discussion of Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2 we aimed to provide support for the role of outcome sign and to 
examine the effects of the rational and experiential thinking styles on conflict arousal in risky 
choice. The three hypotheses that addressed the effects of outcome sign were confirmed and 
the findings of Experiment 1 were corroborated: The participants experienced more conflict 
when choosing among losses than when choosing among gains; when gains changed into 
losses, the preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation increased; and when gains 
changed into losses, the relation between tradeoff size and conflict became more negative (or 
less positive). Although not expected, the results also revealed that when gains changed into 
losses the preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice increased. This accentuated the 
positive effect of concern about sacrifice on the relation between tradeoff size and conflict, 
which contributed to a positive change in the relation. Nevertheless, the argumentation 
mediator was more strongly affected by the outcome sign than the sacrifice mediator, so that 
the relation between tradeoff size and final conflict indeed became more negative (or less 
positive) in losses than in gains. 
The five hypotheses that addressed the effects of thinking style on conflict were also 
confirmed. One hypothesis related to the dominance of the rational system over the 
experiential system: We have confirmed that when rationality was high, preliminary conflict 
did not depend on experientiality. 
Two other hypotheses concerned the effect of the immediate availability of an 
adaptation mode on conflict arousal. We have confirmed that preliminary conflict from 
concern about argumentation was greater when both rationality and experientiality were low 
(persons who are neither rational nor experiential) than when either or both were high 
(“rational persons,” experiential persons,” or “rational and experiential persons”). We have 
also confirmed that the relation between tradeoff size and final conflict was less positive when 
both rationality and experientiality were low than when either or both were high. In addition, 
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and although not predicted, the preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice was also 
greater when both rationality and experientiality were low than when either or both were high. 
This accentuated the positive effect of concern about sacrifice on the relation between tradeoff 
size and conflict, which contributed to a positive change in the relation. Yet, the effect on the 
argumentation mediator was greater than on the sacrifice mediator, so that the relation 
between tradeoff size and final conflict was indeed less positive, or more negative, when both 
rationality and experientiality were low than when either or both were high.  
In short, preliminary conflict indeed depended on the immediate availability of an 
adaption mode. Both the preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation and the 
preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice were greater when no adaptation mode was 
immediately available to the person (than when at least one system was immediately 
available). Our interpretation is that when an adaptation mode is immediately available, the 
person becomes more confident that an argument can be made in favor of one of the options, 
either analytically or intuitively, which decreases the concern about argumentation. In 
addition, this greater confidence in pro-argumentation alleviates the concern about contra-
argumentation as well, which decreases the concern about sacrifice. Nevertheless, contra-
argumentation is still the obstacle to conflict resolution. Therefore, the effect of thinking style 
on the sacrifice mediator is not as strong as on the argumentation mediator. 
The last two hypotheses addressed how the system by which adaptation takes place 
affects the preliminary conflict. We have confirmed that the preliminary conflict from concern 
about argumentation was greater when rationality was high (“rational persons” or “rational 
and experiential persons”) than when rationality was low but experientiality is high 
(“experiential persons”), and so was the preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice.  
In short, preliminary conflict depended on the system by which adaptation took place. 
The preliminary conflict from both sources was greater when adaptation was made through 
the rational system than when it was made by the experiential system. It seems that, in 
agreement with our prior interpretation, the experiential processing is more prone to argue 
unilaterally in favor of one of the options (i.e., is more prone to dealing with pro-
argumentation), which facilitates conflict resolution, whereas the rational processing is more 
oriented to pro- and contra-argumentation, which complicates conflict resolution. 
We have seen that, although the immediate availability of an adaptation mode 
decreased the level of preliminary conflict from both sources, the decrease was smaller when 
adaptation is made by the rational system than when adaptation is made by the experiential 
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system. In accordance, higher levels of conflict were observed when people adapt by the 
rational system than when they adapt by the experiential one, but the highest levels of conflict 
were observed when none of the adaptation modes was immediately available to the person. 
This is in agreement with CEST, in that it is through the rational and experiential systems that 
people adapt to the world, and that adaptation becomes more complicated when people cannot 
immediately resort to either system (which is when none of the systems is immediately 
available).  
CEST assumes that conflict between the rational and the experiential systems 
(between feelings and thoughts) may arise (e.g., Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994). Nevertheless, it 
is important to highlight that our investigation did not address any conflict between the two 
processing modes. We examined how a rational and an experiential processing influenced the 
conflict aroused by tradeoffs between probability and outcome, and not the conflict aroused 
by the two processing modes when dealing with a particular situation. In other words, we 
measured the participants thinking style, i.e., we focused on the conflict experienced by 
individuals with different levels of activation of the systems, whereas Denes-Raj and Epstein 
(1994) for instance, manipulated the participants thinking style, i.e., they focused on a 
situation that activated the two systems. 
 To conclude, we must address a methodological issue. As we previously mentioned, 
the four REI conditions, „low‟ and „high‟ rationality and „low‟ and „high‟ experientiality, were 
constructed by the use of median splits. This procedure has some undesirable consequences, 
as for instance, the loss of information about individual differences, the loss of effect size, and 
the loss of power (MacCallum, Zhang, Preacher, & Rucker, 2002). Nevertheless, there was no 
better way to test the orthogonal contrasts between the four conditions, which made the use of 
median splits unavoidable.  
In Experiment 2 we investigated how the arousal of conflict was affect by a situational 
factor, the outcome sign, and by an individual factor, the decision maker thinking style. In the 
next section we provide a summary and a discussion of the evidence found in Experiments 1 
and 2. 
Summary of Experiments 1 and 2 
Experiments 1 and 2 provided evidence in support for the double-mediation model in 
the domain of risky choice. Outcome sign (gains and losses), preference elicitation method 
(choice and rejection), and thinking style (rational and/or experiential) affect the decisional 
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conflict by having an impact on the preliminary conflict from argumentation and sacrifice, 
and thus, moderating the relation between tradeoff size and conflict. 
In what concerns the effect of outcome sign, and before moving to the discussion of its 
effects on the two mediators of the double-mediation model, it should be mentioned that our 
results validate Lewin‟s (1951) analysis of conflict in risky choice: The Experiments 
consistently demonstrate that choices involving losses, or avoidance-avoidance conflicts, 
arouse more conflict than choices among gains, or approach-approach-conflicts.  
Notably, Experiments 1 and 2 also demonstrate that outcome sign moderates the 
relation between tradeoff size and conflict by affecting mostly the argumentation mediator: In 
losses, people become more concerned about argumentation which leads to a more negative 
(or less positive) relation for losses than for gains. Although the effect of outcome sign on the 
argumentation mediator was stronger, the sacrifice mediator was also affected by outcome 
sign. The effect of outcome sign on the sacrifice mediator was however less clear across 
Experiments: Preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice was greater for gains than for 
losses in Experiment 1, but greater for losses than for gains in Experiment 2. The effect was 
highly significant in Experiment 1 but only marginally significant in Experiment 2. This 
suggests that preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice tends to decrease, rather than 
increase, when changing from gains to losses (i.e., tends to be greater in gains than in losses 
rather than the reverse). Theoretically, this makes sense: In losses, conflict is so high due to 
the difficulty in argumentation, that people become focused on looking for a positive 
argument in favor of one of the negative gambles, and thus, their attention shifts toward 
argumentation (increasing the preliminary conflict aroused by this concern) and away from 
sacrifice (decreasing the preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice).  
The effect of preference elicitation method and the effect of outcome sign are 
therefore similar in that they have an equivalent moderating effect on relation between 
tradeoff size and conflict. Changing from gains to losses, or from choice to rejection, involves 
a process of shift of attention toward argumentation and away from sacrifice, which leads to a 
more negative (or less positive) relation between tradeoff size and conflict: Just as it is 
contradictory to argue in favor of a negative gamble, it is contradictory to argue in favor of 
any gamble when people are looking for reasons against a gamble, which makes them more 
focused on argumentation and less on sacrifice. Nevertheless, the main effect of preference 
elicitation method on conflict only holds for gains; for losses the effect disappears. Our 
interpretation is that in losses the level conflict was so high that the nature task became 
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„irrelevant‟. This led us to conclude that the effect of outcome sign (gains versus losses) on 
conflict is itself very strong, prevailing over the effect of preference elicitation method. 
The effects of outcome sign and preference elicitation method are similar to the effect 
of need for justification investigated by Scholten and Sherman (2006): The need for justifying 
one‟s choice to others increased the preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation 
but decreased the preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice, probably because the 
person‟s attention shifts away from sacrifice to argumentation.  
Furthermore, the findings that outcome sign has an independent effect on conflict and 
that the preference elicitation method affected the decisional conflict only in gains are, 
apparently, inconsistent with previous findings. We have explained the differences by looking 
at the manipulation of the valence conditions. In contrast with decisions in which the 
negatively valenced condition involves merely negative or unattractive options, decisions 
which involve „pure‟ losses for the decision maker, as it was the case of our decision 
problems, generate a higher level of conflict. This caused preference elicitation method to 
become „irrelevant‟ in losses, and thus, both its main effect and its interaction effect with 
outcome sign were almost nill (in losses). At the same time, this manipulation also created a 
greater difference between the conflict experienced in losses and in gains, leading to a main 
effect of outcome sign on conflict. If our hypothesis is accurate, Nagpal and Krishnamurthy‟s 
(2008) assertion that the decisional conflict results only from the interaction between the 
valence of the options and the nature of the tasks, may not be valid for all types of decisions.  
We have also extended the application of the double-mediation model to the study of 
the individual differences in decisional conflict by combining the double-mediation model 
with Epstein‟s (1994) cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST). The effects of the style of 
thinking on the mediators of the double-mediation model support the conclusion that the 
immediate availability of an adaptation mode moderates the relation between tradeoff size and 
conflict. A rational and/or an experiential processing boosts confidence that an argument can 
be made in favor of one of the options (either analytically or intuitively). This greater 
confidence in argumentation, i.e., pro-argumentation, reduces the concern about sacrifice, i.e., 
contra-argumentation, but not as much, because contra-argumentation is still the obstacle to 
conflict resolution.  
Scholten and Sherman (2006) found a similar effect produced by differential attribute 
importance. Increasing the importance of one attribute decreases the preliminary conflict from 
both sources, but more from concern about argumentation than from concern about sacrifice. 
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Even though Scholten and Sherman (2006) do not contemplate the role of confidence, it may 
be that a greater differential importance also increases confidence: A greater difference in 
importance between the attributes (i.e., when one attribute is more important than the other), 
may increase a person‟s confidence that an argument can be made in favor of one of the 
options, i.e., in favor of the option that is superior/better along the more important attribute.  
Moreover, the effects of the thinking style on the mediators of the double-mediation 
model also support the conclusion that the system by which people adapt also affects the 
arousal of conflict. More conflict is experienced when people adapt by the rational system 
than by the experiential one: A rational processing breeds more contra-argumentation, and 
therefore, more skepticism about pro-argumentation, than an experiential processing. 
According to Epstein et al. (1996, p. 391), “experiential processing is often adaptive, 
but it is ill-suited for solving problems that require logical analysis and an understanding of 
abstract relations.” From a normative perspective, experiential processing may be ill-suited 
for solving certain kinds of problems, insofar as it results in more decision errors and biases 
(but see the literature on individual differences and framing effects cited above). From a 
hedonic perspective, however, experiential processing may be very adaptive.  
The risky choice problems facing our participants were stated in terms of abstract 
symbols (words and numbers), by which, according to Epstein (1994), the rational system 
usually encodes reality. Our results suggest that the rational system indeed dominated the 
experiential one: “Rational and experiential persons” (i.e., participants who scored high on 
both rationality and experientiality) adapted to the choice problems in a more analytical way; 
only “experiential persons” (i.e., participants who scored high on experientiality but low on 
rationality) adapted to the choice problems in a more intuitive way. Even in this adverse 
situation, however, experiential processing led to lower levels of conflict than rational 
processing. We conclude, therefore, that experiential processing is well-suited for pro-
argumentation, while rational processing is more prone to contra-argumentation.  
Pacini and Epstein (1999, study 2) investigated the role of the individual differences in 
the thinking style on the „ratio bias‟ susceptibility and they also demonstrate a dominance of 
the rational system over the experiential one. The ratio bias effect refers to the preference for 
the lower probability gamble over the higher probability gamble, because the former presents 
a ratio of larger numbers, i.e., a larger number of winning events (e.g., 7 in 100), whereas the 
latter presents a ratio of smaller numbers, i.e., a larger proportion of winning events (e.g., 1 in 
10). The authors found that the rational processing decreased the number of non-optimal 
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responses, and that when experientiality was low there was no other effect. When 
experientiality was high, rationality interacted with another variable, the monetary incentive 
(„high‟ versus „low‟). In particular, a greater monetary incentive increased the number of non-
optimal responses but only when rationality was low; when rationality was high there was no 
interaction effect. The finding that monetary incentive only affected the ratio bias 
susceptibility when experientiality was high but rationality was low, reveals that it is only in 
this situation that the experiential processing actually occurs. Thus, Pacini and Epstein (1999, 
study 2) findings also support the conclusion that the rational system dominates the 
experiential one when the decision problems are presented by words and numbers, or in other 
words, in situations where abstraction and logic reasoning are implied. This seems a 
significant finding for the decision making research given that it is typically based on verbal 
and numerical formats. 
In the next chapter we aim to provide further evidence in support of the double-
mediation model in the domain of risky choice by broadening the scope of our investigation to 
the study of the impact of differential attribute weight on the arousal of decisional conflict. 
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CHAPTER 3: EXPERIMENTS 3, 4 AND 5 
Theoretical Overview 
 The previous Experiments have provided evidence supporting the extension of the 
application of the double-mediation model from riskless choice (Scholten & Sherman, 2006) 
to risky choice. Scholten and Sherman‟s (2006) investigation of conflict arousal in riskless 
choice demonstrated that differential attribute importance moderates the relation between 
tradeoff size and conflict. In risky choice, the probability attribute tends to be more important 
than the outcome attribute. This is implied by the common preference for the safer gamble in 
gains (i.e., for the higher probability of winning) and by the common preference for the riskier 
gamble (i.e., for the lower probability of loosing) in losses.  
An important attribute is a significant attribute, i.e., an attribute that weights on the 
decision maker‟s preferences and choices (Alpert, 1980; Myers & Alpert, 1977). This does 
not imply that every decision will be made, or determined, by the most important attribute. 
Indeed, the attribute that has the greater influence or that actually determines the decision 
maker‟s preferences and choices is called the determinant attribute (Alpert, 1971; Myers & 
Alpert, 1968). In other words, the determinant attribute is the one to which the decision 
makers assign a greater weight on a particular decision. Thus, depending on the choice set 
under consideration, the determinant attribute may or may not be the most important attribute. 
For instance, consider a decision where the tradeoff rate between the attributes is not constant, 
that is, the options under consideration have a small difference along the more important 
attribute compared with a large difference along the less important attribute. In this decision, 
it may be that the determinant attribute will be the less important instead of the more 
important attribute.  
Goldstein (1990) conceptualized attribute importance in a different but equivalent 
way. The author distinguished between global and local interpretations of relative attribute 
importance. A global interpretation considers relative importance a stable feature that is 
context independent, i.e., that is not influenced by the particular set of available options. 
Conversely, a local interpretation considers relative importance to be an assessment that is 
context dependent. A major implication is that, when a decision maker considers an attribute 
locally, preferences can be different from choice set to choice set because different subjective 
weights (i.e., subjective perceptions of relative importance) can be assigned (Goldstein, 
1990).  
94 
 
Taking into account both approaches and applying them to risky choice, it can be 
asserted that, even though probability may be globally more important, receiving a greater 
weight and thus being determinant for choice, locally, in a particular decision, the amount to 
win/lose can receive the greatest weight, meaning that the outcome attribute is most 
determinant of choice.  
The weight of an attribute is assessed from the particular choice set under 
consideration (Simonson, 1990) and for this reason different weights can be assigned to the 
same attribute. In normative analyses of multi-attribute choice the impact of tradeoff rate on 
the determinance, or weight, of the attributes is captured by the range-sensitivity principle 
(Fischer, 1995), according to which the attribute weight will be greater when widening the 
range of that attribute (Fischer, 1995; Goldstein, 1990; Simonson, 1990; von Nitzsch & 
Weber, 1993) or narrowing the range of the other attribute (Simonson, 1990).  
In risky choice, the weight of the outcome attribute can be increased by increasing the 
outcome range or by decreasing the probability range. Outcome range is increased by 
increasing the magnitude of larger outcomes while decreasing the magnitude of smaller ones. 
Probability range is decreased by decreasing the magnitude of higher probabilities while 
increasing the magnitude of lower ones. Therefore, in the present investigation, the weight of 
amount to win/lose (outcome attribute) should be increased either by increasing the 
magnitude of the monetary differences between the gambles (increased outcome range) or by 
decreasing the magnitude of the probability differences between the gambles (decreased 
probability range). Both manipulations influence the tradeoff rate by enhancing the magnitude 
of outcome differences relatively to the magnitude of probability differences, and thus, 
increasing the weight of the outcome attribute.  
According to the double-mediation model, differential attribute weight, as any other 
factor in the choice context, will have an impact on preliminary conflict, and consequently, on 
the relation between tradeoff size and conflict. In Chapter 3 (Experiments 3, 4 and 5) we aim 
to provide further evidence in support of the extension of the double-mediation model from 
riskless to risky choice, by investigating the effect of differential attribute weight on conflict 
arousal in gains (Experiments 3 and 4) and in losses (Experiment 5). Our analysis will focus 
on the prior importance of the attributes (probability versus outcome), the weight that these 
attributes receive in a given decision situation, and the implications for the relation between 
tradeoff size and conflict. In Experiment 3 we examine the effects of an increased outcome 
range. In Experiments 4 and 5 we examine the effects of an increased outcome range and of a 
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decreased probability range. The manipulations should have the same effect on attribute 
weighting (and thus, on preferences), but a differential effect on preliminary conflict, and 
therefore, on the relation between tradeoff size and conflict. We will address these effects in 
the introduction of each Experiment. 
Experiment 3: 
Gains and Outcome Weight - Increasing Outcome Range 
 When choosing among gains there is a common preference for the safer gamble, 
which means that probability of winning is a priori more important than amount to win, and 
thus, that security is preferred over potential. Nevertheless, research (e.g., Myers & Alpert, 
1977) suggests that depending on the decision context, the outcome attribute can be more 
heavily weighted, and thus, more determinant of choice. In Experiment 3, we develop an 
outcome range manipulation that consists of increasing the magnitude of the monetary 
differences between the gambles, which according to the range sensitivity principle (Fischer, 
1995), should increase the weight of the outcome attribute so that potential becomes preferred 
over security, leading to a greater choice of the riskier gamble. We predict that increasing the 
outcome range will increase the preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation, 
which will lead to a more negative (or less positive) relation between tradeoff size and 
conflict. 
Preferences and Outcome Weight in Gains 
Risk aversion for gains is the major well-known phenomenon in risky choice and, as 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) stated, it is most prevalent when 
choosing between moderately and highly probable gains. As we previously referred, to be risk 
averse means that, when choosing between a sure thing and a risky prospect with equal 
expected value, people prefer the sure thing (the option that offers a smaller but certain gain). 
People prefer to gain something, even if the amount is small, rather than to take a risk and 
gain nothing. In choices between two gambles involving a tradeoff between probability of 
winning and amount to win, risk aversion implies that people will prefer the safer option (i.e., 
the gamble that provides a higher probability of winning) over the riskier one (i.e., the gamble 
that provides chance of winning a larger gain). In terms of security-potential/aspiration theory 
(Lopes, 1987, 1995; Schneider & Lopes, 1986; Schneider, 1992), people will prefer security 
(i.e., a greater probability of winning) over potential (i.e. the possibility of winning a larger 
96 
 
amount).  
As discussed in the previous section, a decision is not necessarily determined by the 
most important attribute but rather by the one that receives the greatest weight in a particular 
decision, which may or may not be the most important attribute. We develop an outcome 
range manipulation that consists in increasing the outcome range (the amplitude of the 
outcome differences between the gambles), which according to the range sensitivity principle, 
should increase the weight of the outcome attribute and thus the choice of the riskier gamble. 
That is, if the prior importance of probability of winning provides a strong argument in favor 
of security, leading to a greater choice of the safer gamble, then, increasing the weight of 
amount to win, provides a strong argument in favor potential (i.e., in favor of the opposite 
choice), increasing the preference for potential over security and leading to a greater choice of 
the riskier gamble. 
Furthermore, according to the double-mediation model, differential attribute weight, as 
any other factor in the choice context has an impact on preliminary conflict, moderating the 
relation between tradeoff size and conflict. Therefore, increasing the outcome weight by 
increasing the outcome range should increase its determinance on choice, which will affect 
not only the decision maker‟s preferences but also conflict arousal, as we discuss next. 
Conflict and Outcome Weight in Gains  
According to the double-mediation model, making a choice implies that people will 
look for reasons to choose one of option instead of the other in order to justify the decision to 
oneself. That is, people will be concerned about argumentation, i.e., the arguments that can be 
made in favor of any decision, for example, the argument for potential and the argument for 
security. If decision makers were not risk averse, it would be difficult to argue in favor of one 
of the gambles. That is, they would have two (equally) strong arguments to choose: The 
argument for security (higher probability of winning), which favors the safer gamble, and the 
argument for potential (larger gain), which favors the riskier one. Consequently, there would 
be no reason to prefer one gamble over the other, and thus, arguing unilaterally in favor of one 
the gambles would become more complicated, or in other words, people would be concerned 
about argumentation. 
However, people are indeed risk averse, i.e., they tend to give more importance to 
probability of winning than to amount to win, and as a consequence, to prefer security over 
potential. It may be argued, therefore, that the decision maker views the argument for security 
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as a particularly cogent one. Thus, arguing unilaterally in favor of the safer option becomes 
easier and the preliminary conflict generated by the concern about argumentation decreases. 
Therefore, because conflict from the preliminary impression as mobilizing effect, the greater 
preliminary conflict aroused by concern about argumentation creates a stronger drive to 
devote attention to this concern during subsequent deliberation, which is when conflict is 
affected by tradeoff size. Accordingly, the negative mediating effect of concern about 
argumentation is accentuated, and the generally predicted inverse U-shaped relation between 
tradeoff size and conflict becomes more positive.  
In addition, the shape of this relation is expected to change under differential attribute 
weight. We now discuss how increasing the outcome weight by increasing the outcome range 
should affect preliminary conflict and the relation between tradeoff size and conflict. 
Increasing the outcome range, i.e., the magnitude of the outcome differences between 
the gambles, means that larger outcomes become larger and smaller ones become smaller. 
That is, the rate of the tradeoffs between probability and outcome is manipulated so that the 
differences in the amount to win become larger relatively to the probability differences (which 
are maintained because the probability range is preserved). This should strengthen the 
argument for potential (larger gain), while the argument for security (more probable gain) 
maintains its strength. On the one hand, potential becomes more appealing (the difference in 
weight offers an argument for choosing) and, on the other hand, people remain concerned 
about safety (the prior importance of the probability attribute still offers an argument for 
choosing). Thus, there will be no reason to prefer one gamble over the other and arguing 
unilaterally in favor of one of the gambles becomes more difficult. In other words, the 
preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation will increase. This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
H6.1. When the outcome range increases, the preliminary conflict from concern about 
argumentation will increase. 
The preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation is the drive to devote 
attention to this concern during subsequent deliberation and only the conflict from 
deliberation is affected by tradeoff size. Thus, in the deliberation phase, the negative 
mediating effect of concern about argumentation will be accentuated, and the relation between 
tradeoff size and conflict will become more negative (or less positive). We thus arrive at the 
following hypothesis: 
98 
 
H6.2. When the outcome range increases, the relation between tradeoff size and conflict will 
change in a downward direction.  
The double-mediation model draws on decision field theory (Busemeyer & Diederich, 
2002; Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Diederich, 1997) in that it assumes that it is from prior 
knowledge and past experience with the choice problems that a preliminary impression is 
formed. This implies that, when participants are familiarized (i.e., have experience) with the 
choice problems, a preliminary impression can immediately be formed. For instance, in 
Experiments 1 and 2, where gains were contrasted with losses, no learning was necessary 
because the difference between gains (positive outcomes) and losses (negative outcomes) is 
evident. In other words, sensitivity to sign manipulations was acquired prior to Experiment, 
and thus, a preliminary impression could be immediately formed. 
Nevertheless, when there is no prior experience, i.e., when participants are unfamiliar 
with the choice tasks, they have to learn how to choose as they proceed through the choice 
tasks. So, the effects of the manipulations may not appear (or may be less pronounced) until 
later in the experimental session, once knowledge about, and experience with the gambles has 
accumulated, and preliminary impressions can actually be formed on the basis of that 
knowledge and experience. In the present and subsequent Experiments, we contrast tradeoff 
rates (i.e., the magnitude of outcome differences are increased relatively to the magnitude of 
probability differences), which imply more subtle differences between the tasks, and thus, that 
experience is indeed necessary so that the participants can learn how to choose and become 
more familiar with the tasks. In other words, sensitivity to range manipulations will be 
acquired during the Experiment, and for this reason, it is expected that a preliminary 
impression cannot be formed immediately, but rather, progressively, as the participants 
proceed in the experimental situation. Therefore, it is expected that the moderating effect of 
outcome range will become more pronounced in the later tasks than in the earlier ones.
19
 This 
leads to the following hypothesis: 
H6.3. The moderating effect of outcome range on the relation between tradeoff size and 
conflict will become stronger with progress through the choice tasks. 
 
 
                                               
19We tested the effect of progress through the choice tasks in Experiments 1 and 2, but as expected, it did not 
affect the experimental results. 
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Method of Experiment 3 
Participants. A total of 216 psychology students from ISPA-IU participated in the 
study. Each participant received a voucher of €7.50 for their participation. They also gained 
access to a lottery, in which three participants from each device condition were randomly 
selected to play out one of the gambles (one of the 12 decision tasks) of their experiment. The 
gamble to play was also randomly selected.  
Materials and stimuli. The data were again collected through a computerized 
questionnaire developed in Turbo Pascal. As in Experiment 2, the participants completed 12 
decision tasks and after completing each task they completed four rating scales corresponding 
to four measures of conflict. The decision tasks were dyadic choices between gambles 
implying a tradeoff between probability of winning and amount to win. 
Each gamble yield an outcome x with probability p or a zero outcome with probability 
1-p. Two sets of stimuli comprised two range conditions: S-range (standard range) and O-
range (outcome range increased). The stimuli of the S-range condition were those of the gains 
condition in Experiments 1 and 2. Thus, in the S-range condition, participants should, 
according to prospect theory, be pairwise indifferent between the gambles. The O-range 
condition (as the S-range condition) was developed on the basis of estimates of prospect 
theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) as described in Appendix G. In the O-range condition, 
the range of the outcomes was increased, such that larger outcomes increased and smaller 
outcomes decreased. Therefore, in this condition, participants should prefer the riskier gamble 
over the safer one. The two range conditions and respective gambles are presented in Figure 
16 in terms of outcome values (log scales), v(x), and probability weights, w(p).  
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Figure 16. Probability weights and outcome values (Experiment 3). 
 
The main chance device of the gambles was a card gamble as in the previous 
Experiments. In both range conditions, probability (of winning) ranged from .308 to .693, 
which corresponds to a range of winning cards from 16 to 36. The outcomes (amount to win) 
ranged from €5.00 to €20.00 in the S-range condition and from €2.50 to €40.00 in the O-range 
condition. The gambles and their probabilities (p), outcomes (x), and expected values (px) are 
showed in Table 6. Lower probabilities (i.e., the riskier gambles) had higher (more positive) 
expected values in both conditions. In the S-range condition, this compensates for the 
common preference for the safer gamble in gains; in the O-range condition, this is the result 
of the increased outcome range. 
 
 
 
 
○ S-range 
● O-range 
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Table 6 
Probabilities, Outcomes, and Expected Values (Experiment 3) 
      Range Condition 
   
S-range   O-range 
f
a
 p   x
b
 px   x
b
 px 
16 .308   20.00 6.16   40.00 12.32 
17 .327 
 
18.50 6.05 
 
33.50 10.95 
18 .346 
 
17.00 5.88 
 
29.00 10.03 
19 .365 
 
15.50 5.66 
 
24.50 8.94 
20 .385 
 
14.50 5.58 
 
21.00 8.09 
21 .404 
 
13.50 5.45 
 
18.00 7.27 
23 .442 
 
11.50 5.08 
 
13.50 5.97 
24 .462 
 
11.00 5.08 
 
12.00 5.54 
25 .481 
 
10.00 4.81 
 
10.50 5.05 
26 .500 
 
9.50 4.75 
 
9.00 4.50 
27 .519 
 
9.00 4.67 
 
8.00 4.15 
28 .538 
 
8.50 4.57 
 
7.00 3.77 
30 .577 
 
7.50 4.33 
 
5.50 3.17 
31 .596 
 
7.00 4.17 
 
5.00 2.98 
32 .615 
 
6.50 4.00 
 
4.00 2.46 
34 .654 
 
6.00 3.92 
 
3.50 2.29 
35 .673 
 
5.50 3.70 
 
3.00 2.02 
36 .692   5.00 3.46   2.50 1.73 
a
The number of winning cards in a complete deck of 52 cards.  
b
Euros. 
 
Although the card gamble was the main chance device, another five chance devices 
were developed: Bingo, dice, keys, marbles, and raffles. These gambles were constructed in 
the same way as the card gambles and their characteristics (probabilities, outcomes, and 
expected values) are therefore similar. The six chance devices used in this Experiment are 
described in Table 7. 
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Table 7 
Chance Devices and Descriptions 
Device Description 
Bingo Each game consists in drawing a ball from a bin that contains 90 balls numbered 
from 1 to 90. Both the chance of drawing a winning ball and the prize differ 
between the games. 
Cards Each game consists in drawing a card from a complete deck of 52 cards (13 cards 
of 4 suits). Both the chance of drawing a winning card and the prize differ between 
the games. 
Dice Each game consists in throwing 3 dice with their sides numbered from 1 to 6, the 
sum of which varies from 3 to 18. Both the chance of throwing a winning sum and 
the prize differ between the games. 
Keys Each game consists in drawing a key from a box that contains 52 keys, some of 
which open a safe and others do not. Both the proportion of keys that open the safe 
and the prize differ between the games. 
Marbles Each game consists in drawing a marble from an urn that contains 50 marbles of 2 
colors (blue and red). Both the proportion of drawing a winning color and the prize 
differ between the games. 
Raffles Each game consists in drawing a raffle from a bag that contains 150 raffles, some 
of which are winning and others are not. Both the proportion of winning raffles and 
the prize differ between the games. 
 
Design. The dependent variable, conflict, was assessed with the same five components 
used in the previous Experiment: Decision time, decision difficulty, decision uncertainty, 
preference equality, and attribute-weight equality.  
Three independent within-participants variables were manipulated: (1) range 
condition, (2) tradeoff size, and (3) reference gamble. Range condition has 2 levels: S-range 
(standard range) and O-range (increased outcome range). Tradeoff size has 3 levels: Small, 
intermediate and large. Reference gamble has 2 levels: Large-amount and high-probability. 
The 2 (outcome sign) × 3 (tradeoff size) × 2 (reference gamble) within-participants design 
results in 12 pairs of gambles (12 decision tasks) for each participant. 
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Four between-participants factors were included. Two of these were counterbalancing 
factors as previously: The reference-gamble extremeness, which counterbalances the 
assignment of the extremeness of the reference gamble across tradeoff sizes, as shown in 
Table 8; and the assignment of the extremeness conditions to the two range conditions, which 
varies the extremeness conditions across the range conditions in accordance with Table 9.  
 
Table 8 
Assignment of Reference-Gamble Extremeness to Tradeoff Sizes (Experiment 3)
a
 
  
Large-amount condition   High-probability condition 
Extremeness 
Condition 
 Small 
Tradeoff 
Intermediate 
Tradeoff 
Large 
Tradeoff 
  Small 
Tradeoff 
Intermediate 
Tradeoff 
Large 
Tradeoff     
1.1 
 
16-17 18-25 20-36 
 
35-36 26-34 16-31 
1.2 
 
20-21 16-23 19-35 
 
30-31 28-36 17-32 
1.3 
 
18-19 21-28 16-31 
 
32-34 23-30 20-36 
         2.1 
 
16-17 20-27 19-35 
 
35-36 24-31 17-32 
2.2 
 
18-19 17-24 20-36 
 
32-34 27-35 16-31 
2.3   20-21 18-25 17-32   30-31 26-34 19-35 
a
The tradeoff sizes are indicated by the number of winning cards in each pair. See 
Table 6. 
 
Table 9 
Assignment of Extremeness Conditions to Range Conditions (Experiment 3)
a
 
Range 
Condition 
 
Counterbalancing Condition 
               1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
S-range 
 
1.1 1.1 1.2 2.1 2.1 2.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 2.2 2.3 2.3 
O-range   1.2 1.3 1.3 2.2 2.3 2.3 1.1 1.1 1.2 2.1 2.1 2.2 
a
For the extremeness conditions, see Table 8. 
 
The third between-participants factor was progress through the choice tasks, which has 
two levels: First 6 tasks and last 6 tasks. The fourth between-participants factor was chance 
device. Chance device has two levels: Single-device and multiple-device. In the single-device 
condition the chance device was the same for all the decision tasks, always a card gamble. In 
the multiple-device condition there were six chance devices: Bingo, cards, dice, keys, marbles 
and raffles. The purpose of creating the multiple device condition was to investigate whether 
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our findings hold when using gambles that not of cards, and to enhance the similarity between 
the choice tasks of the present Experiment to the ones in Scholten and Sherman (2006). The 
authors developed different choice tasks involving different consumer products, we developed 
different gambles involving different chance devices.  
Across the within and between participants design six factors were randomized: (1) 
the distribution of the participants by the experimental conditions; (2) the order of the 12 
decision tasks for each participant; (3) the order by which the options are presented; (4) the 
order by which the conflict scales are presented; (5) the specification of the winning cards; 
and (6) the order of the six devices, which was randomized across the first half of the tasks 
and repeated across the second half. 
Procedure and measures. Each experimental session was run by computer in the 
laboratory of ISPA-IU, with at most 20 participants at a time. Each session lasted about 25 
minutes. The procedure was similar to Experiment 2, but a few changes were made. Firstly, 
the experimental session consisted of only one stage. Secondly, because Experiment 3 
addressed conflict arousal only in gains, all gambles were displayed in a blue background, and 
above the attribute-weight rating scale, the first attribute in the matrix always appeared on the 
left side of the scale and the second on the right side.  
The conflict measures were the same as in the previous Experiment.  
Results of Experiment 3  
More information on the results of Experience 3 is presented in Appendix F. 
Conflict: Variable construction. A principal component analysis was conducted on 
the five conflict measures. The first component was extracted. This component, the conflict 
factor, presented an eigenvalue of 1.89, explained 37.80% of the total variance, and loaded 
positively on all five measures: Decision time (.45), decision difficulty (.71), decision 
uncertainty (.69), preference equality (.66), and attribute-weight equality (.52). The internal 
consistency reliability analysis revealed a standardized Cronbach alpha of .58 and an average 
inter-item correlation of .22. There was no increase in the value of alpha when an item was 
deleted, attesting to the content validity of the all items. Thus, we constructed the conflict 
variable, by deriving the (standardized) scores on the principal component and then by 
linearly transforming these scores to scales from 0 to 1. 
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Conflict: Test of hypotheses. One linear regression analysis (regression 1) was 
performed across the 12 tasks in order to test H6.2 (the moderating effect of outcome range on 
the relation between tradeoff size and conflict) and H6.3 (the effect of progress through the 
choice tasks on the moderating effect of outcome range). Conflict was the dependent variable. 
The independent variables were range condition, tradeoff size, reference gamble, chance 
device, and progress through the choice tasks. The analysis included: A contrast between the 
S-range condition and the O-range condition; two polynomial contrasts (linear and quadratic) 
between the small, intermediate, and large tradeoffs; a contrast between the large-amount 
condition and the high-probability condition; a contrast between the single-device condition 
and the multiple-device condition; a contrast between the first six tasks and the last six tasks; 
and 41 contrasts capturing the interactions between the independent variables.  
Three other linear regression analyses were conducted across the last six tasks. One 
analysis tested H6.2 (regression 2). This analysis included all contrasts mentioned previously, 
except those associated with progress through the choice tasks. The other two analyses 
(regressions 3 and 4) evaluated the specific shape of the relation between tradeoff size and 
conflict in each range condition. These analyses included all contrasts included in regression 
1, except those associated with progress through the choice tasks and outcome range. 
 The results of regression 1 revealed a significant effect of the interaction between 
range condition and tradeoff size (linear contrast), t(2544) = -4.09, p = .01: Consistent with 
H6.2, when the outcome range increased, the relation between tradeoff size and conflict 
changed in a downward direction as depicted in Figure 17. The effect of the interaction 
between range condition, tradeoff size (linear contrast) and progress through the choice tasks 
was also significant, t(2544) = -3.69, p < .001: The moderating effect of outcome range 
became more pronounced with the progress through the choice tasks, consistent with H6.3. 
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Figure 17. Relation between tradeoff size and conflict by range conditions across all decision 
tasks (Experiment 3). 
 
We also found reliable main effects of: (1) range condition, t(2544) = -2.44, p = .01, 
which demonstrates that conflict was greater in the S-range condition than in the O-range 
condition; (2) chance device condition, t(2544) = 4.35, p < .001, which demonstrates that 
conflict was greater in the multiple-device condition than in the single-device condition; (3) 
tradeoff size (quadratic contrast), t(2544) = 2.76, p = .01, which demonstrates that conflict 
was greater for intermediate tradeoffs than for small and large tradeoffs (i.e., there was an 
inverse U-shaped relation between tradeoff size and conflict); and (4) progress through the 
choice tasks, t(2544) = -6.84, p < .001, which demonstrates that conflict was greater in the 
first than in the last six tasks. 
Figure 18 shows the relation between tradeoff size and conflict in each range condition 
across the last 6 tasks. The results of regression 2 revealed that the interaction effect between 
range condition and tradeoff size (linear contrast) was again reliable, t(1272) = -5.31, p < 
.001, consistent with H6.2. Indeed, in support of H6.3, the effect became stronger and more 
reliable. Moreover, the main effects of range condition, t(1272) = -2.49, p = .01, chance 
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device, t(1272) = 2.21, p = .03, and tradeoff size (quadratic contrast), t(1272) = 2.45, p = .01, 
were again reliable. Finally, in the S-range condition there was a positive relation between 
tradeoff size and conflict, t(648) = 3.88, p < .001 (regression 3), and in the O-range condition 
there was an inverse U-shaped relation, t(624) = 2.51, p = .01, with a negative trend, t(624) = 
-3.64, p < .001 (regression 4). 
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Figure 18. Relation between tradeoff size and conflict by range conditions across the last six 
tasks (Experiment 3). 
  
Model estimation and parametric hypothesis test. In Experiment 3 we estimated 
five parameters from the 2 (chance device) × 2 (outcome range) × 2 (reference gamble) × 3 
(tradeoff size) = 24 levels of conflict observed across the last six tasks. Two of these were the 
auxiliary parameters. The other three were the estimated levels of preliminary conflict.
20
 The 
estimates are given in Appendix F. The goodness-of-fit of the estimated model was R
2 
= .72.  
                                               
20The preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice in the S-range condition had to be set to 1 in order to 
estimate the remaining parameters. 
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When the outcome range increased, the preliminary conflict from concern about 
argumentation increased, t(19) = 2.53, p = .01, consistent with H6.1. At the same time, the 
preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice decreased, t(19) = -11.93, p < .001. 
Nonetheless, the difference in the preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice was not as 
great as the difference in the preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation, t(19) = -
4.46, p < .001.  
Complementary analysis: Manipulation check. To validate the manipulation of the 
weight of the outcome attribute versus the weight of the probability attribute we analyzed the 
choice probabilities of the riskier option (which is superior along the outcome attribute). A 
choice probability near .5 means that both options were equally chosen, and thus, that the 
attributes were equally weighted. A probability significantly superior or inferior to .5 means 
that one of the gambles (the riskier or the safer one, respectively) was chosen more often than 
the other, and thus, that one attribute was more heavily weighted (outcome or probability, 
respectively). In the S-range condition, the gambles were constructed so that participants 
would be pairwise indifferent between them, i.e., so that the outcome and the probability 
attribute would be equally weighted. In the O-range condition, the gambles were constructed 
so that participants would prefer the riskier gamble over the safer one, i.e., so that the 
outcome attribute would receive a greater weight than the probability attribute.  
To check how the manipulations affected the participant‟s choice patterns we 
conducted a nonlinear regression (LOGIT), in which we regressed choice of the riskier 
gamble on a contrast between the S-range condition and the O-range condition. The results 
showed a significant effect of range condition ²(1) = 169.00, p < .001, which demonstrates 
that the choice of the riskier gamble was more common in O-range than in S-range, as 
depicted in Figure 19. In the S-range condition, the proportion of participants that chose the 
riskier gamble was .44, which was significantly different from the chance level, p < .001 
(binomial test). In the O-range condition, the proportion of participants that chose the riskier 
gamble was .69, which was also significantly different from the chance level, p < .001 
(binomial test).  
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Figure 19. Choice of the riskier gamble by range conditions (Experiment 3). 
 
These results demonstrate that as expected by the range sensitivity principle (Fischer, 
1995), increasing the outcome range increased choice of the riskier gamble, i.e., the weight of 
the outcome attribute. Indeed, when the outcome range increased the choice of the riskier 
gamble was greater than the chance level, meaning that potential became preferred to security, 
and thus, that the outcome attribute became more heavily weighted (and more determinant of 
choice) than the probability attribute (see Figure 19). Moreover, in the standard range 
condition, we attempted to balance the weight of the attributes so that both attributes would be 
equally determinant of choice. Although the weight of the attributes was approximately the 
same, the difference was significant: The probability attribute was still more determinant than 
the outcome attribute, and thus, security was preferred to potential, as revealed by the greater 
choice of the safer gamble (see Figure 19). 
Discussion of Experiment 3 
 The two hypotheses that addressed the effect of range condition on conflict were 
confirmed as well as the hypothesis concerning the effect of progress through the choice tasks 
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on the moderating effect. When the outcome range increased the preliminary conflict from 
concern about argumentation increased and the relation between tradeoff size and conflict 
became more negative (or less positive). The moderating effect of outcome range on the 
relation between tradeoff size and conflict became stronger with progress through the choice 
tasks. 
 The (parameter) estimation of the model revealed that when the outcome range was 
increased, conflict was greater mostly due to an increase of the preliminary conflict from 
concern about argumentation, as expected. Nonetheless, this analysis demonstrated that the 
sacrifice mediator was also affected by the outcome range, even though not as much as the 
argumentation mediator. Increasing the outcome range decreased the preliminary conflict 
from concern about sacrifice, which also contributed to a more negative (or less positive) 
relation between tradeoff size and conflict.  
These results suggest that increasing the outcome range involves a shift of attention, in 
which attention shifts toward argumentation and away from sacrifice. Because arguing in 
favor of one of the gambles is not evident when the outcome range is increased, people 
become focused on argumentation, that is, they become more concerned with looking for a 
strong argument to choose (increasing the concern about argumentation) and less concerned 
with the sacrifices that are to be incurred with the decision (decreasing the concern about 
sacrifice). 
Furthermore, in the present Experiment, two chance device conditions were 
developed. In the multiple device condition participants were presented with different choices 
tasks involving different chance devices, whereas in the single device condition, the 
participants were presented with different choice tasks involving only one chance device. 
Although chance device condition did not affect the experimental results, it did have an effect 
on the dependent variable: The participants experienced a lower conflict level in the single 
device condition than in the multiple-device condition. A possible explanation is that the 
participants in the single-device condition became more familiar with the experimental 
situation than the participants in the multiple-device condition. By becoming more familiar 
with the experimental situation, they became more confident in their decisions, as reflected by 
a lower level of conflict. 
The results of Experiment 3 also showed a main effect of progress through the choice 
tasks on conflict: Conflict was greater in the first than in the last six tasks. In accordance with 
the previous interpretation, as participants proceeded through the choice tasks, they became 
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more familiar with the experimental situation, and thus, they became more confident in their 
decisions, which decreased the level of conflict. 
Finally, our results revealed that conflict was also greater in the standard range 
condition than in the outcome range condition. Conflict should be greater when the options 
are more equally likely to be chosen, thus, conflict was greater in the standard range condition 
probably because the choice probabilities were closer to chance level in this condition (than in 
outcome range condition).   
In agreement with previous research (see Fischer, 1995; Goldstein, 1990; Simonson, 
1990; von Nitzsch & Weber, 1993) we have demonstrated that the choice set under 
consideration influences the weight that decision makers assign to each attribute. We have 
investigated the effects of an outcome range manipulation which increased the weight of the 
outcome attribute. Another form of manipulating the outcome range, and which is expected to 
have the opposite effect on attribute weighting (i.e., increasing the weight of the probability 
attribute), is the one associated with the peanuts effect on choice. The peanuts effect (Prelec & 
Loewenstein, 1991) was first discussed by Markowitz (1952), who suggested that people are 
risk averse merely for large gains and risk seeking for small gains.
21
 For instance, when 
choosing between large gains, people will prefer gamble y ($1,000, 100%), the safer option, to 
gamble z ($10,000, 10%), the riskier option. However, when choosing between small gains 
they will prefer gamble z‟ ($10, 10%), the riskier option, to gamble y‟ ($1, 100%), the safer 
option. Prelec and Loewenstein (1991) defined the peanuts effects in a way that does not 
require a shift from risk seeking to risk aversion as outcome magnitude increases, only that 
people are more risk averse in large outcomes than in small ones. Or, conversely, as Weber 
and Chapman (2005, p. 31) put it: “Decision makers are more willing to take risks when 
playing for peanuts.”  
Several investigations have demonstrated the existence of the peanuts effect. For 
instance, Hogarth and Einhorn (1990) developed choices between gambles (with a p 
probability of winning the outcome $x and l-p probability of obtaining $0) and a certain 
outcome (with the same expected value of the gamble). Probabilities were .10, .50, and .80, 
and three sets (levels) of outcomes, corresponding to expected values of $2, $200 and $20,000 
(i.e., small, medium, and large gains), were used. Their results demonstrated that risk aversion 
decreases as monetary amounts decrease (for all the probability levels). A series of studies 
                                               
21The reverse pattern is expected for losses, in which preferences change from risk seeking in large losses to risk 
aversion in small ones. 
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(Du, Green, & Myerson, 2002; Green, Myerson, & Ostaszewski, 1999; Holt, Green, & 
Myerson, 2003; Myerson, Green, Hanson, Holt, & Estle, 2003; Rachlin, Brown, & Cross, 
2000) confirmed these results by demonstrating that probabilistic (risky) rewards are 
discounted at a higher rate for large amounts than for small amounts. Thus, people are more 
risk averse for larger monetary outcomes. Weber and Chapman (2005) also found support for 
the peanuts effect in choices between two gambles: The choice of the safer gamble increased 
as the outcome magnitude increased. Thus, as they noted, certainty is not required for the 
effect to occur. In addition, the size of the effect increased with an increasing magnitude of 
the probabilities, and with an increasing probability ratio (the ratio between the probabilities 
of the non-zero outcomes in the gambles) but just above a certain size.   
This way, the study of the peanuts effect requires a manipulation of outcome range 
which is different from the one used in our investigations. The outcome range manipulation of 
Experiment 3 (O-range) consisted of widening the outcome differences between the gambles 
by increasing the magnitude of larger outcomes and decreasing the magnitude of smaller 
ones, so that larger outcomes became larger and smaller ones became smaller. This 
manipulation differs from, what we called, a peanuts effect manipulation (PE-range), which 
consists of increasing the magnitude of all outcomes through a common multiplicative 
constant (i.e., all outcomes become larger).  
We ran a study to check the effects of such a manipulation. This study was in all 
similar to Experiment 3 except that the O-range condition was replaced by the PE-range 
condition, in which the outcomes were multiplicatively increased.
22
 In line with the peanuts 
effect, it was expected that in the PE-range condition (which involves larger outcomes) the 
weight of the probability attribute would be increased. That is, the preference for security over 
potential would be reinforced because „weight‟ would become more aligned with „prior 
importance‟ of the probability attribute, which would increase the choice of the safer gamble. 
Thus, to check the effects of the manipulation on choice and on conflict, a LOGIT analysis 
and a multiple linear regression analysis (similar to those of Experiment 3) were performed, 
respectively (see Appendix I). 
The results demonstrated that the PE-range condition increased the choice of the 
riskier gamble, ²(1) = 9.54, p < .01, instead of the safer one as it was expected. Thus, both 
the PE-range and the O-range manipulations increased the weight of the outcome attribute. 
                                               
22 In the PE-range condition the geometric mean of the outcomes and expected values were increased, whereas in 
the O-range condition they were maintained constant. 
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Yet, the effect of PE-range on attribute weighting was smaller than the effect of O-range, 
²(1) = 10.78, p < .001: The PE-range increased the choice probability from .43 to .50, 
meaning that both the outcome and the probability attributes were equally weighted, whereas, 
the O-range manipulation increased the choice probability of the riskier gamble from .44 to 
.69, meaning that the outcome attribute became the most important attribute. In accordance 
with these results, the effect of the PE-range on conflict also tended to be similar to that of the 
O-range, but weaker and not reliable: The regression analysis performed on the last six tasks 
revealed that the relation between tradeoff size and conflict tended to become more negative 
in the PE-range condition, but the effect was not at all significant t(852) = -0.59, p = .55. 
The relevant point is that the PE-range manipulation did not increase the preference 
for the safer gamble as it was supposed to. Rather, it increased the preference for the riskier 
gamble, as the O-range manipulation. There is evidence demonstrating that increasing the 
magnitude of all outcomes would generate a peanuts effect, which leads to the question of 
what could possibly explain these unforeseen results?  
One possible explanation concerns the range manipulations. The outcomes ranged 
from €3.50 to €29.50 in the S-range condition and from €32.00 to €270.00 in the PE-range 
condition. Therefore, it could be argued that a peanuts effect should occur within each range 
condition, i.e., that the choice of the safer gamble would be greater for larger outcomes than 
for smaller ones in each range condition. If this was the case, then the reference gamble 
condition should have an effect on choice: The preference for the safer gamble should be 
greater in the large-amount condition (which involves larger outcomes) than in the high-
probability condition (which involves smaller outcomes). Therefore, we conducted a LOGIT 
analysis on choice of the riskier gamble for each outcome range condition, with reference 
gamble condition as the independent variable. These analyses revealed that the choice did not 
differ by reference gamble condition, neither in the S-range condition, ²(1) = 1.37, p = .24, 
nor in the PE-range condition, ²(1) = 0.78, p = .38.  
Weber and Chapman (2005) demonstrated that the peanuts effect was larger for larger 
probability magnitudes. They defined three levels of probability magnitudes: Low, medium, 
and high. Nevertheless, this manipulation implied that as the probability magnitudes 
increased, the probabilities also increased, i.e., the probabilities became closer to certainty. 
For instance, low, medium, and high magnitude probability levels correspond to tradeoffs 
between a 5% versus 10% winning chance, a 25% versus 50% winning chance, and a 50% 
versus 100% winning chance, respectively. In other words, the participants‟ preference for the 
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safer gamble increased as probabilities became closer to, or actually involved certainty. 
Therefore, and although the authors demonstrated that certainty was not necessary for the 
peanuts effect to occur, it is likely that it does play an important role on the strength of the 
effect. This may have affected our results given that in our investigation we only considered 
choices between gambles, i.e., we did not include a safe option, and the probabilities we used 
were not close to certainty. 
Another factor that has probably contributed to the absence of the peanuts effect in our 
investigation was the multiplicative constant by which the outcomes were increased. Weber 
and Chapman (2005) showed that the choice of the riskier gamble decreased as the payout 
magnitude increased by using multiplicatively constants of 10, 100, and 1000. We multiplied 
our outcomes by 9 and perhaps this was not sufficiently large to raise the choice of the safer 
gamble.  
On the whole, evidence seems to suggest that simply increasing the magnitude of all 
outcomes is not a sufficient condition to produce a peanuts effect; in fact, it leads to an 
increase of the weight of the outcome attribute rather than to an increase of the weight of the 
probability attribute. Other factors such as the presence/absence of certainty and the 
magnitude of the multiplicative constant should be taking into account.  
In Experiment 3, we examined the effect of attribute weight on conflict arousal by 
manipulating (increasing) the range of the outcome differences between the gambles. In the 
next Experiment we extend our analysis by examining the effects of an increased outcome 
range and of a decreased probability range on conflict arousal. 
Experiment 4: 
Gains and Outcome Weight - 
Increasing Outcome Range and Decreasing Probability Range 
In Experiment 3 we addressed the impact of increasing the outcome weight by 
increasing the outcome range. Increasing the outcome range indeed increased the weight of 
the outcome attribute, as revealed by the increase of the choice of the riskier gamble. The 
results supported the predictions. An increased outcome range led to a greater preliminary 
conflict from concern about argumentation and to a more negative (or less positive) relation 
between tradeoff size and conflict. Also, this effect became stronger as participants proceeded 
in the experimental situation. According to the range sensitivity principle (Fischer, 1995), the 
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weight of an attribute can be enhanced not only by widening the range of that attribute, but 
also by narrowing the range of the other attribute. In Experiment 4, we manipulate the 
outcome weight by increasing the outcome range (as in Experiment 3) and by decreasing the 
probability range. Our aim is to corroborate the findings of Experiment 3 and to examine the 
effects of a decreased probability range on conflict arousal. The two manipulations should 
have the same effect on attribute weighting (and thus on preferences), but opposite 
implications for the relation between tradeoff size and conflict.  
Preferences and Manipulations of Outcome Weight in Gains 
In choices involving gains people prefer to play safe. They tend to assign a greater 
importance to probability of winning than to amount to win, and therefore, security is 
preferred over potential and the safer gamble tends to be chosen more often than the riskier 
one. Nevertheless, a decision is not necessarily determined by the most important attribute, 
but rather, by the attribute that is more heavily weighted in a particular decision, as it was 
demonstrated in Experiment 3. Depending on the decision context, the outcome attribute can 
receive a greater weight than the outcome attribute and be the determinant attribute for choice. 
In consequence, people will prefer potential over security, and consequently, the choice of the 
riskier option will increase. 
In accordance with the range sensitivity principle (Fischer, 1995), in the present 
Experiment we manipulate the weight of the outcome attribute not only by increasing the 
outcome range (as in Experiment 3), but also by decreasing the probability range, i.e., by 
decreasing the magnitude of the probability differences between the gambles. Although these 
manipulations of outcome weight are distinct, they both result in an increase of the magnitude 
of the outcome differences relatively to the magnitude of the probability differences 
(manipulation of tradeoff rate). Therefore, because this should provide to the decision maker a 
strong argument in favor of amount to win, potential should become preferred over security 
and the choice of the riskier gamble should increase, either when the outcome range is 
increased or when the probability range is decreased.  
Although it is expected that both manipulations will have a similar effect on 
preferences, it is also expected that they will have a differential effect on the arousal of 
conflict as discussed next.  
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Conflict and Manipulations of Outcome Weight in Gains 
In Experiment 3 we have already derived predictions about the effects of the outcome 
range manipulation on conflict arousal. In brief, increasing the outcome range strengthens the 
argument for potential (larger gain) while maintaining the strength of the argument for 
security (more probable gain). Thus, because there is no longer a reason for the decision 
maker to prefer one gamble over the other, arguing unilaterally in favor of one gamble 
becomes more difficult. Accordingly, the preliminary conflict from concern about 
argumentation increases, and thus, in the subsequent deliberation phase, the negative 
mediating effect produced by this concern will be accentuated and the relation between 
tradeoff size and conflict will become more negative (or less positive). Furthermore, because 
sensitivity to range manipulations will be acquired during the Experiment, preliminary 
impression will be formed progressively as participants proceed through the choice tasks, and 
thus, the moderating effect of outcome range will be more pronounced in the later tasks than 
in the earlier ones. The same hypothesis will be tested here: 
H6.1. When the outcome range increases, the preliminary conflict from concern about 
argumentation will increase. 
H6.2. When the outcome range increases, the relation between tradeoff size and conflict will 
change in a downward direction.  
H6.3. The moderating effect of outcome range on the relation between tradeoff size and 
conflict will become stronger with progress through the choice tasks. 
Increasing the probability range, i.e., the magnitude of the probability differences 
between the gambles, means that higher probabilities become lower and lower probabilities 
become higher. That is, we manipulate the rate of the tradeoffs between probability and 
outcome so that the probability differences become smaller relatively to the outcome 
differences (which are maintained because the outcome range is preserved). This should 
weaken the argument for security (more probable gain) while the argument for potential 
(larger gain) maintains is strength. The prior importance of the probability attribute no longer 
offers a strong argument for choosing the safer gamble, and thus, the argument for potential 
will prevail over the argument for security. As a result, the decision maker is left with an 
argument to choose (a reason to prefer the riskier gamble) and it becomes easier to argue 
unilaterally in favor of the riskier gamble. In other words, the preliminary conflict aroused by 
the concern about argumentation will decrease, and consequently, in the subsequent 
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deliberation phase, the negative mediating effect of argumentation will be attenuated, and the 
relation between tradeoff size and conflict will become more positive (or less negative). We 
thus arrive at the following hypotheses: 
H7.1. When the probability range decreases, the preliminary conflict from concern about 
argumentation will decrease. 
H7.2. When the probability range decreases, the relation between tradeoff size and conflict 
will change in an upward direction.  
Moreover, again because sensitivity to range manipulations will be acquired during 
the Experiment, experience with the tasks is necessary so that a preliminary impression can be 
formed on the basis of knowledge and past experience. Thus, we expect that the preliminary 
impression will be formed progressively as the participants proceed in the experimental 
situation, and, as a consequence, that the moderating effect of probability range predicted by 
H7.2, will become more pronounced in the later tasks than in the earlier ones. We thus arrive 
at the following hypothesis: 
H7.3. The moderating effect of probability range on the relation between tradeoff size and 
conflict will become stronger with progress through the choice tasks.  
Method of Experiment 4 
Participants. A total of 108 psychology students from ISPA-IU participated in the 
study. Although participants were not paid, they gained access to a lottery, similar to the one 
of Experiment 3. 
Materials and stimuli. As in the previous Experiments, the data were collected 
through a computerized questionnaire developed in Turbo Pascal. The participants completed 
18 decision tasks and after completing each task they completed four scales corresponding to 
four conflict measures. As in Experiment 3, the decision tasks were dyadic choices between 
gambles implying a tradeoff between probability of winning and amount to win. 
The gambles yield an outcome x with probability p or a zero outcome with probability 
1-p. Three sets of stimuli comprised three range conditions: S-range (standard range), O-range 
(outcome range increased), and P-range (probability range decreased). The ranges were again 
constructed on the basis of estimates of prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), as 
described in Appendix J. In the S-range condition, participants should, according to prospect 
theory, be pairwise indifferent between the gambles. In the O-range condition, the range of 
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the outcomes was increased, such that larger outcomes increased and smaller outcomes 
decreased. In the P-range condition, the probability range was decreased, such that larger 
probabilities decreased and smaller probabilities increased. Therefore, both in the O-range and 
P-range conditions, participants should prefer the riskier gamble over the safer one. The three 
range conditions and respective gambles are represented in Figure 20 in terms of outcome 
values (log scales), v(x), and probability weights, w(p).  
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Figure 20. Probability weights and outcome values (Experiment 4). 
 
In Experiment 3, the experimental results did not differ by chance device condition. 
For this reason, in Experiment 4, the chance device is always a card gamble. Furthermore, in 
the S-range and in the O-range conditions the probability (of winning) ranged from .212 to 
.846, which corresponds to a range of winning cards from 11 to 44. In the P-range condition 
the probability (of winning) ranged from .327 to .637, which corresponds to a range of 
winning cards from 17 to 35. The specifications of the winning cards are given in Appendix 
K. The outcome differences ranged from €3.50 to €29.50 in the S-range and P-range 
conditions, but from €2.50 to €44.50 in the O-range condition. The gambles, their 
○ S-range 
● O-range 
□ P-range 
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probabilities (p), outcomes (x), and expected values (px) are showed in Table 10. As in the 
previous Experiments, lower probabilities (i.e., the riskier gambles) had higher (more 
positive) expected values in all the three conditions. In the S-range condition, this 
compensates for the common preference for the safer gamble in gains; in the O-range 
condition, this is the result of the increased outcome range; and in the P-range condition, this 
is the result of the decreased probability range. 
 
Table 10 
Probabilities, Outcomes, and Expected Values (Experiment 4)
a
 
S-range   O-range   P-range 
f
a
 p x
b
 px   f
a
 p x
b
 px   f
a
 p x
b
 px 
11 .212 29.50 6.24 
 
11 .212 44.50 9.41 
 
17 .327 29.50 9.64 
12 .231 26.50 6.12 
 
12 .231 38.50 8.88 
 
18 .346 26.50 9.17 
14 .269 22.00 5.92 
 
14 .269 30.00 8.08 
 
19 .365 22.00 8.04 
16 .308 18.50 5.69 
 
16 .308 23.50 7.23 
 
20 .385 18.50 7.12 
17 .327 17.00 5.56 
 
17 .327 21.50 7.03 
 
21 .404 17.00 6.87 
19 .365 15.00 5.48 
 
19 .365 17.50 6.39 
 
22 .423 15.00 6.35 
21 .404 13.00 5.25 
 
21 .404 14.50 5.86 
 
23 .442 13.00 5.75 
23 .442 11.50 5.09 
 
23 .442 12.00 5.31 
 
24 .462 11.50 5.31 
25 .481 10.00 4.81 
 
25 .481 10.50 5.05 
 
25 .481 10.00 4.81 
27 .519 9.00 4.67 
 
27 .519 9.00 4.67 
 
26 .500 9.00 4.50 
29 .558 8.00 4.46 
 
29 .558 7.50 4.18 
 
27 .519 8.00 4.15 
32 .615 7.00 4.31 
 
32 .615 6.00 3.69 
 
29 .558 7.00 3.90 
34 .654 6.00 3.92 
 
34 .654 5.50 3.60 
 
30 .577 6.00 3.46 
36 .692 5.50 3.81 
 
36 .692 4.50 3.12 
 
31 .596 5.50 3.28 
38 .731 5.00 3.65 
 
38 .731 4.00 2.92 
 
32 .615 5.00 3.08 
40 .769 4.50 3.46 
 
40 .769 3.50 2.69 
 
33 .635 4.50 2.86 
42 .808 4.00 3.23 
 
42 .808 3.00 2.42 
 
34 .654 4.00 2.62 
44 .846 3.50 2.96   44 .846 2.50 2.12   35 .673 3.50 2.36 
a
The number of winning cards in a complete deck of 52 cards. 
bEuros (€). 
 
Design. The design was similar to the one of Experiment 3, with a few changes. 
Firstly, range condition has three (instead of two) levels: S-range (standard range), O-range 
(outcome range increased) and P-range (probability range decreased). The 3 (range 
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conditions) × 3 (tradeoff size) × 2 (reference gamble) within-participants design results in 18 
decision tasks for each participant. Secondly, we included three (instead of four) between-
participants factors. Two factors were counterbalancing ones, as in the previous Experiments: 
Reference-gamble extremeness, which counterbalances the assignment of the extremeness of 
the reference gamble across tradeoff sizes, as shown in Table 11; and the assignment of the 
extremeness conditions to the tree range conditions, which varies the extremeness conditions 
across the three range conditions in accordance with Table 12. The third between-participants 
factor was progress through the choice tasks. The chance device factor was excluded because, 
as we referred previously, it did not affect the experimental results of Experiment 3.  
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Table 11 
Assignment of Reference-Gamble Extremeness to Tradeoff Sizes (Experiment 4)
a
 
Extremeness 
condition 
S-range and O-range P-range 
Large-amount condition High-probability condition Large-amount condition High-probability condition 
Small 
tradeoff 
Intermediate 
tradeoff 
Large 
tradeoff 
Small 
tradeoff 
Intermediate 
Tradeoff 
Large 
tradeoff 
Small 
tradeoff 
Intermediate 
tradeoff 
Large 
tradeoff 
Small 
tradeoff 
Intermediate 
tradeoff 
Large 
tradeoff 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
11-12 
17-19 
14-16 
14-25 
12-23 
19-32 
17-42 
16-40 
11-34 
42-44 
34-36 
38-40 
27-40 
29-42 
21-34 
12-36 
14-38 
19-44 
17-18 
21-22 
19-20 
19-25 
18-24 
22-29 
21-34 
20-33 
17-30 
34-35 
30-31 
32-33 
26-33 
27-34 
23-30 
18-31 
19-32 
22-35 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
11-12 
14-16 
17-19 
17-29 
11-21 
16-27 
14-38 
19-44 
12-36 
42-44 
38-40 
34-36 
23-36 
32-44 
25-38 
16-40 
11-34 
17-42 
17-18 
19-20 
21-22 
21-27 
17-23 
20-26 
19-32 
22-35 
18-31 
34-35 
32-33 
30-31 
24-31 
29-35 
25-32 
20-33 
17-30 
21-34 
a
The tradeoff sizes are indicated by the number of winning cards in each pair. See Table 10. 
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Table 12 
Assignment of Extremeness Conditions to Range Conditions (Experiment 4)
a
 
Range 
Condition 
 
Counterbalancing Condition 
             
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
S-range 
 
1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 
O-range 
 
1.2 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.1 1.2 2.2 2.3 2.1 2.3 2.1 2.2 
P-range   1.3 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.1 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.1 
a
For the extremeness conditions, see Table 11. 
 
Procedure and measures. Each experimental session was run by computer (in the 
laboratory of ISPA-IU) with at most 20 participants at a time and lasted about 30 minutes. 
The procedure and measures were the same as in Experiment 3. 
Results of Experiment 4 
More information on the results of Experience 4 is presented in Appendix L. 
Conflict: Variable construction. Again conflict was obtained by a principal 
component analysis conducted on the five conflict measures. The first component was 
extracted. This component, the conflict factor, had an eigenvalue of 1.92, explained 38.38% 
of the total variance, and loaded positively on all the five measures: Decision time (.39), 
decision difficulty (.65), decision uncertainty (.62), preference equality (.74), and attribute-
weight equality (.65). The reliability analysis revealed a standardized Cronbach alpha of .59 
and an average inter-item correlation of .22. There was no increase in the value of alpha when 
an item was deleted, attesting to the content validity of the all items. Therefore, we 
constructed a composite measure of conflict by deriving the (standardized) scores on the 
principal component and then linearly transforming them to scales from 0 to 1. 
Conflict: Test of hypotheses. One linear regression (regression 1) was performed 
across all the 18 tasks in order to test H6.2 and H7.2 (the moderating effects of outcome and 
probability ranges on the relation between tradeoff size and conflict, respectively), and H6.3 
and H7.3 (the effect of progress through the choice tasks on the moderating effects of 
outcome and probability ranges, respectively). Conflict was the dependent variable and the 
independent variables were range condition, tradeoff size, reference gamble, and progress 
through the choice tasks. The analysis included: Two contrasts between the three range 
conditions, one between the S-range and O-range conditions, and other between the S-range 
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and P-range conditions; two polynomial contrasts (linear and quadratic) between the small, 
intermediate, and large tradeoffs; a contrast between the large-amount condition and the high-
probability condition; two polynomial contrasts (linear and quadratic) between the first six 
tasks, the intermediate six tasks, and the last six tasks; and 46 contrasts capturing the 
interactions between the independent variables. Regarding the progress through the choice 
tasks, the linear contrast compares the first to the last six tasks, and the quadratic contrast the 
intermediate to the first and the last six tasks.  
Four other linear regression analyses were conducted across the last six tasks. One 
analysis (regression 2) again tested H6.2 and H7.2. This analysis included all contrasts 
mentioned previously, except those associated with progress through the choice tasks. The 
other three analyses (regressions 3, 4 and 5) evaluated the specific shape of the relation 
between tradeoff size and conflict in each range condition. These analyses included all 
contrasts included in regression 1, except those associated with progress through the choice 
tasks and range conditions. 
Figure 21 shows the relation between tradeoff size and conflict by range condition 
across all the decision tasks. The results of regression 1 demonstrated an effect, although not 
significant, t(1890) = -0.68, p = .25, of the interaction of the contrast between the S-range and 
the O-range conditions with tradeoff size (linear contrast): When the outcome range 
increased, the relation between tradeoff size and conflict tended to change in a downward 
direction, providing directional support for H6.2. There was also an effect, but again not 
significant, t(1890) = 0.99 p = .16, of the interaction of the contrast between the S-range and 
the P-range conditions with tradeoff size (linear contrast): When the probability range 
increased, the relation between tradeoff size and conflict tended to change in an upward 
direction, providing directional support for H7.2.  
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Figure 21. Relation between tradeoff size and conflict by range conditions across all decision 
tasks (Experiment 4). 
 
Furthermore, in support of H6.2, there was a significant effect of the interaction of the 
contrast between the S-range and the O-range conditions with tradeoff size (linear contrast) 
and progress through the choice tasks (linear contrast), t(1890) = -2.65, p = .01: The 
moderating effect of outcome range became more pronounced with the progress through the 
choice tasks, consistent with H6.3. In support of H7.2, there was a significant effect of the 
interaction of the contrast between the S-range and the P-range conditions with tradeoff size 
(linear contrast) and progress through the choice tasks (linear contrast), t(1890) = 2.80, p = 
.01: The moderating effect of probability range became more pronounced with the progress 
through the choice tasks, consistent with H7.3. We also found a significant main effect of 
progress through the choice tasks (linear contrast), t(1890) = -4.20, p < .001: Conflict was 
greater in the first six tasks than in the last six tasks.  
Figure 22 shows how the relation between tradeoff size and conflict was moderated by 
outcome and probability range across the last six tasks. Regression 2 revealed that the 
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interaction effect of the contrast between the S-range and the O-range conditions with tradeoff 
size (linear contrast) was now significant: When the outcome range increased, the relation 
between tradeoff size and conflict changed in a downward direction, t(630) = -2.49, p = .01, 
consistent with H6.2. The interaction effect of the contrast between the S-range and the P-
range conditions with tradeoff size (linear contrast) was also now significant, t(630) = 2.49, p 
= .01: When the probability range decreased, the relation between tradeoff size and conflict 
changed in an upward direction, consistent with H7.2.  
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Figure 22. Relation between tradeoff size and conflict by range conditions across the last six 
tasks (Experiment 4). 
 
Furthermore, there was a negative relation between tradeoff size and conflict in the O-
range condition, t(213) = -1.92, p = .06 (marginally significant effect, regression 3), and a 
positive relation in the P-range condition, t(207) = 2.12, p = .03 (regression 4). In the S-range 
condition there was an inverse U-shaped relation, but the effect was not significant, t(210) = 
.68, p = .50 (regression 5). 
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Model estimation and parametric hypotheses test. In Experiment 4, seven 
parameters were estimated from the 3 (range condition) × 2 (reference gamble) × 3 (tradeoff 
size) = 18 levels of conflict observed across the last six tasks. Two of these were the auxiliary 
parameters. The other five were the estimated levels of preliminary conflict.
23
 The estimates 
are given in Appendix L. The goodness-of-fit of the estimated model was R
2 
= .59. 
When the outcome range increased, the preliminary conflict from concern about 
argumentation increased, t(11) = 1.04, p = .16, consistent with H6.1. At the same time, the 
preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice decreased, t(11) = -1.37, p = .20. 
Nevertheless, the difference in the preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice was not 
as great as the difference in the preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation t(11) = 
-1.22, p = .25. 
When the probability range decreased, the preliminary conflict from concern about 
argumentation decreased, t(11) = -1.12, p = .14, consistent with H7.1. However, at the same 
time, the preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice increased, t(11) = 3.12, p = .01. 
Furthermore, the difference in the preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice was 
greater than the difference in the preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation, t(11) 
= 2.35, p = .04. 
Complementary analysis: Manipulation check. As in Experiment 3, to validate the 
manipulation of the weight of the outcome attribute versus the weight of the probability 
attribute we analyzed the choice probabilities of the riskier option (which is superior along the 
outcome attribute). The gambles in the S-range condition were again constructed so that they 
would generate pairwise indifference between them, i.e., so that the outcome and the 
probability attribute would be equally weighted. In the O-range condition and in the P-range 
condition, the gambles were constructed so that participants would prefer the riskier gamble 
over the safer one, i.e., so that the outcome attribute would receive a greater weight than the 
probability attribute.  
As previously, to check how the manipulations affected the participants‟ choice 
patterns, we conducted a LOGIT analysis, in which we regressed choice of the riskier gamble 
on a contrast between the S-range condition and the O-range condition, and on a contrast 
between the S-range condition and the P-range condition. 
                                               
23The preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice in the P-range condition had to be set to 1 in order to 
estimate the remaining parameters. 
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Figure 23 shows the effect of each range condition on choice. The results revealed an 
effect, even though not significant, of the contrast between S-range and O-range, ²(1) = 2.58, 
p = .11, and a significant effect of the contrast between S-range and P-range, ²(1) = 24.69, p 
< .001: The choice of the riskier gamble was greater in O-range than in S-range, and greater 
in P-range than in S-range, as expected. In particular, the proportion of participants that chose 
the riskier gamble was .45 in the S-range condition, which was significantly different from the 
chance level, p = .02 (binomial test). In the O-range and P-range conditions, the proportion of 
participants that chose the riskier gamble was .58 and .69, respectively, which were also 
significantly different from the chance level (p < .001 and p < .001, binomial tests). Thus, 
increasing the outcome range or decreasing the probability range increased the choice of the 
riskier gamble, but the effect was larger when decreasing the probability range than when 
increasing the outcome range. This difference was significant, ²(1) = 3.75, p = .04.  
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Figure 23. Choice of the riskier gamble by range conditions (Experiment 4). 
 
These results show that either increasing the outcome range or decreasing the 
probability range increased the weight of the outcome attribute as it was expected by the 
range sensitivity principle (Fischer, 1995). The outcome attribute became more determinant of 
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choice than the probability attribute, and thus, potential became preferred to security, as 
revealed by a greater choice of the riskier gamble both in the outcome range and in the 
probability range conditions. Nevertheless, the effect of the probability range was stronger 
than the effect of outcome range. Furthermore, as in Experiment 3, in the standard condition 
the probability attribute was still more heavily weighted than the outcome attribute, and thus, 
security was preferred to potential, as revealed by the greater choice of the safer gamble. 
Moreover, the effects of the outcome range manipulation on choice probabilities 
corroborated the findings of Experiment 3. However, the results were less strong (and did not 
reach significance) in this Experiment. This was most likely due to two reasons. Firstly, in 
Experiment 3 we developed a stronger manipulation of outcome range than in Experiment 4. 
That is, whereas in the former case we increased the range of the outcome values by 161% in 
the standard condition and by 522% in the outcome range condition, in the latter, the increase 
was much smaller especially in what concerns the outcome range manipulation: The outcome 
values were increased by 137% in the standard condition and by 271% in the outcome range 
condition. Secondly, it is probable that the contrast between manipulations has removed some 
of the effect of the outcome range manipulation. That is, because the effect of the probability 
range itself has revealed to be stronger than the effect of the outcome range, the probability 
range manipulation reduced the impact of the outcome range manipulation. 
Discussion of Experiment 4 
The hypotheses concerning the moderating effects of outcome and probability ranges 
on the relation between tradeoff size and conflict received reliable support, as well as the ones 
concerning the effects of progress through the choice tasks on the moderating effects. The 
hypotheses concerning the effects of outcome and probability range on the sacrifice and 
argumentation mediators received only directional support. The double-mediation model 
accounted for 59% of the variation in conflict, which was clearly worse than in Experiment 3. 
A more detailed analysis revealed that this was probably due to a greater variation in the 
preliminary conflict across reference-gamble conditions, explaining why the parametric 
hypothesis tests yielded mainly directional support. 
The effects of outcome range on conflict replicated the findings of Experiment 3. The 
three hypotheses were confirmed: When the outcome range was increased the preliminary 
conflict from concern about argumentation increased and the relation between tradeoff size 
and conflict became more negative (or less positive). In addition, as in Experiment 3, when 
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the outcome range increased, the preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice decreased, 
which also contributed to the negative change in the relation between tradeoff size and 
conflict.  
The two hypotheses concerning the effects of probability range on conflict were also 
supported: Decreasing the probability range decreased the concern about argumentation and 
generated a more positive (or less negative) relation between tradeoff size and conflict. 
However, the parameter estimation of the model revealed that the positive change in the 
relation between tradeoff size and conflict was not only due to the decrease in the preliminary 
conflict from concern about argumentation (as we predicted), but also, and mostly, to the 
increase in the preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice (the effect of probability 
range on the sacrifice mediator was stronger than the effect on the argumentation mediator). 
These results suggest that when decreasing the probability range attention shifts away 
from argumentation and toward sacrifice. As expected, when the probability range is 
decreased, it becomes easier to argue in favor of the riskier gamble seeing that there is no 
longer a strong argument in favor of security (the probability differences are small relatively 
to the outcome differences). But even so, it seems that probability is still a concern. And for 
this reason attention shifts toward sacrifice. In other words, participants become concerned 
about the probability that they must forego when choosing the riskier gamble.  
Furthermore, the two hypotheses that addressed the effects of progress through the 
choice tasks were also confirmed: Both moderating effects of outcome and probability ranges 
became stronger in the last six tasks.  
Finally, consistent with Experiment 3, our results showed a main effect of progress 
through the choice tasks on conflict. Conflict again decreased as the participants proceeded 
through the choice tasks, which supports the interpretation that as people become more 
familiar with the tasks, they become more confident in their decisions, and thus, the level of 
conflict decreases. 
To summarize, in Experiments 3 and 4 we focused on choices involving gains and 
investigated the effect of differential attribute weight on conflict arousal. In Experiment 5 we 
extend the investigation of the effect of differential attribute weight to choices involving 
losses.  
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Experiment 5: 
Losses and Outcome Weight –  
Increasing Outcome Range and Decreasing Probability Range 
In Experiments 3 and 4 we addressed the effects of differential attribute weight on 
conflict arousal in choices involving gains. The results demonstrated that both increasing the 
outcome range and decreasing the probability range increased the weight of the outcome 
attribute. More importantly, they supported the predictions that the two outcome weight 
manipulations differentially moderated the relation between tradeoff size and conflict: The 
relation became more negative (or less positive) when increasing the outcome range but more 
positive (or less negative) when decreasing the probability range. In addition, both moderating 
effects became stronger as participants proceeded in the experimental situation. In Experiment 
5, we examine the effects of differential attribute weight on conflict arousal in losses, and the 
same experimental results are expected. There is, however, one key difference. In gains, 
increasing the outcome weight means increasing the preference for potential, which 
countervails the common preference for the safer gamble, and thus, increases the choice of the 
riskier gamble. In losses, it means increasing the preference for security, which countervails 
the common preference for the riskier gamble, and thus, increases the choice of the safer 
gamble.  
Preferences and Outcome Weight in Losses 
A well-established difference between gains and losses involves the preference pattern 
of the decision makers. As first demonstrated by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and further 
investigated by many researchers, people are generally risk averse for gains and risk seeking 
for losses, as entailed by the S-shaped utility function of prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). That is, there is more risk aversion for gains than for losses, and more risk 
seeking for losses than for gains.  
As we already discussed, to be risk averse, in choices between two positive gambles, 
means that people prefer to (try) win something, even if the amount is small, rather than to 
take a (greater) risk and win nothing. This implies that, in gains, probability of winning tends 
to be more important than amount to win. Therefore, security (a more probable gain) is 
preferred over potential, and thus, gamble y (€7.00, 61%) is preferred to gamble z (€15.00, 
36%), i.e., the safer gamble is preferred over the riskier one. To be risk seeking, in choices 
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between two negative gambles, means that people prefer to take a (greater) risk because they 
do not want to lose. This implies that, in losses, probability of loosing tends to be more 
important than the amount to lose. Therefore, people prefer potential (a lowest probability of 
incurring a loss) over security, and thus, gamble z’ (€-15.00, 36%) is preferred to gamble y’ 
(€-7.00, 61%), i.e., the riskier gamble is preferred over the safer gamble. 
 In sum, it can be assumed that people tend to focus on the probability attribute both in 
gains and losses. However, while in gains this focus implies that security is preferred over 
potential, which leads to a greater choice of the safer gamble, in losses, it implies that 
potential is preferred over security, which leads to a greater choice of the riskier gamble. 
 As supported by the previous Experiments, even though probability tends to be the 
most important attribute, the outcome attribute can be more heavily weighted and more 
determinant of choice. As in Experiment 4, in the present Experiment, we expect to increase 
the outcome weight by manipulating the outcome and the probability ranges. The main 
difference is that, in gains, increasing the outcome weight increases the choice of the riskier 
option, whereas in losses, it should increase the choice of the safer gamble. That is, both in 
choices involving gains and in choices involving losses, increasing the weight of the outcome 
attribute countervails the prior importance of the probability attribute because the outcome 
differences become larger relatively to the probability differences, which provides a strong 
argument in favor of the opposite choice. Nevertheless, while in gains we are providing an 
argument for potential (larger gain), counteracting the common preference for security (more 
probable gain), which leads to an increase of the choice of the riskier gamble; in losses, we 
are providing an argument for security (lower loss), counteracting the common preference for 
potential (less probable loss), which in consequence leads to an increase of the choice of the 
safer option, or conversely, to a decrease of the choice of the riskier gamble. 
 Furthermore, in losses, as in gains, differential attribute weight should not only affect 
the decision maker‟s preferences but also the arousal of conflict, as we discuss next.  
Conflict and Outcome Weight in Losses 
In general, the double-mediation model predicts an inverse U-shaped relation between 
tradeoff size and conflict. It would be reasonable to assume that just as in gains (as a result of 
the common preference for the safer option), in losses, the common preference for the riskier 
option would provide an argument in favor of the riskier gamble, decreasing the concern 
about argumentation. Nevertheless, we expect exactly the contrary, i.e., we expect that the 
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concern about argumentation will increase rather than decrease. That is, although people can 
ultimately prefer the riskier gamble, choices involving negative outcomes will always be more 
difficult to perform because it is contradictory to argue in favor of a negative gamble. This 
implies that the preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation will increase 
relatively to the preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice. Moreover, because the 
conflict from preliminary impression is the drive to devote attention to this concern during 
subsequent deliberation, and because only the conflict from deliberation is affected by 
tradeoff size, the negative mediating effect of the concern about argumentation will be 
accentuated relatively to the positive mediating effect of concern about sacrifice. Thus, a 
negative relation between tradeoff size and conflict should arise.  
In sum, we expect an overall negative relation between tradeoff size and conflict when 
decisions involve losses. Nonetheless, it is also expected that differential attribute weight will 
affect the shape of the relation. We investigate the impact of an increased outcome range and 
a decreased probability range on conflict arousal. These effects are expected to be identical to 
those for gains, and thus, the same hypotheses will be tested in this Experiment.  
In what concerns the effect of the outcome range manipulation we expect that:  
H6.1. When the outcome range increases, the preliminary conflict from concern about 
argumentation will increase. 
H6.2. When the outcome range increases, the relation between tradeoff size and conflict will 
change in a downward direction.  
Increasing the outcome range, i.e., the magnitude of the outcome differences between 
the gambles, means that larger outcomes become larger and smaller ones become smaller 
(either gains or losses). The tradeoff rate is manipulated so that the differences in outcome 
(the amount of gain or loss) become larger relatively to the probability differences (which are 
maintained because the probability range is preserved). In gains this strengths the argument 
for potential (larger gain) while maintaining the argument for security (more probable gain). 
In losses, it strengths the argument for security (a smaller loss) while maintaining the 
argument for potential (less probable loss). In either case, the decision maker is left with two 
arguments to choose, i.e., with no reason to prefer one gamble over the other, and arguing 
unilaterally in favor of one of the gambles becomes more difficult. Thus, the preliminary 
conflict from concern about argumentation will increase and the relation between tradeoff size 
and conflict will become more negative (or less positive).  
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In what concerns the effect of the probability range manipulation we expect that: 
H7.1. When the probability range decreases, the preliminary conflict from concern about 
argumentation will decrease. 
H7.2. When probability range decreases, the relation between tradeoff size and conflict will 
change in an upward direction.  
Decreasing the probability range, i.e., the magnitude of the probability differences 
between the gambles, means that higher probabilities become lower and lower ones become 
higher (either in gains or in losses). The tradeoff rate is manipulated so that the differences in 
probability (of winning or losing) become smaller relatively to the differences in outcome 
(which are maintained because the outcome range is preserved). In gains, this weakens the 
strength of the argument for security (more probable gain) while maintaining the strength of 
the argument for potential (larger gain). In losses, it weakens the strength of the argument for 
potential (less probable loss) while maintaining the strength of the argument for security (a 
smaller loss). In either case, the decision maker is left with an argument to choose (the 
argument in favor of potential in the case of gains and the argument in favor of security in the 
case of losses), and thus, arguing unilaterally in favor of one of the gambles (in favor of the 
riskier gamble in gains or the safer gamble in losses) becomes easier. Therefore, the 
preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation will decrease and the relation between 
tradeoff size and conflict will become more positive (or less negative). 
In what concerns the effect of progress through the choice tasks on the moderating 
effects of outcome and probability ranges, we expect that preliminary impression will be 
formed progressively as participants proceed in the experimental situation because sensitivity 
to ranges will be acquired during the Experiment. Thus, the moderating effects will become 
more pronounced in the latter than in the earlier tasks:  
H6.3. The moderating effect of outcome range on the relation between tradeoff size and 
conflict will become stronger with progress through the choice tasks. 
H7.3. The moderating effect of probability range on the relation between tradeoff size and 
conflict will become stronger with progress through the choice tasks. 
Method of Experiment 5 
Participants. A total of 120 psychology students from ISPA-IU participated in the 
study and received a voucher of €7.50 for their participation. 
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Materials and stimuli. The data were again collected through a computerized 
questionnaire developed in Turbo Pascal, similar to the one of Experiment 4. The difference 
between the two Experiments is the outcome sign. Thus, each one of the 18 decisions tasks 
consisted in a dyadic choice between gambles implying a tradeoff between probability of 
losing and amount to lose (instead of gambles implying a tradeoff between probability of 
winning and amount to win).  
The stimuli were gambles yielding an outcome x with probability p or a zero outcome 
with probability 1-p and were obtained by reversing the sign of the outcomes of the stimuli of 
Experiment 4. Accordingly, three sets of stimuli, comprising three range conditions, were 
developed: S-range (standard range), O-range (outcome range increased) and P-range 
(probability range decreased). In the S-range condition, participants should be pairwise 
indifferent between the gambles. In the O-range and P-range conditions, participants should 
prefer the safer gamble over the riskier one. Lower probabilities (i.e., the riskier gambles) had 
lower (more negative) expected values in all the three conditions. In the S-range condition, 
this compensates for the common preference for the riskier gamble in losses; in the O-range 
condition, is the result of the increased outcome range; and in the P-range condition, is the 
result of the decreased probability range. 
Design, procedure and measures. The design, procedure, and measures were the 
same as in Experiment 4. 
Results of Experiment 5 
More information on the results of Experience 5 is presented in Appendix M. 
Conflict: Variable construction. Conflict was obtained by a principal component 
analysis conducted on the standard five conflict measures. One component, the conflict factor, 
was extracted. This component, presented an eigenvalue of 1.94, explained 38.80% of the 
total variance, and loaded positively on the five measures: Decision time (.34), decision 
difficulty (.75), decision uncertainty (.72), preference equality (.72), and attribute-weight 
equality (.48). The internal consistency reliability analysis on the conflict measure revealed a 
standardized Cronbach alpha of .58, which did not increase when an item was deleted, 
attesting to the content validity of the all items. The average inter-item correlation was .22. 
Therefore, we constructed the conflict factor by deriving the (standardized) scores on the 
principal component and then by linearly transforming them to scales from 0 to 1.  
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Conflict: Test of hypotheses. One linear regression analysis (regression 1) was 
performed across all the 18 decision tasks in order to test H6.2 and H7.2 (the moderating 
effects of outcome and probability ranges on the relation between tradeoff size and conflict, 
respectively), and H6.3 and H7.3 (the effect of progress through the choice tasks on the 
moderating effects of outcome and probability ranges, respectively). Conflict was the 
dependent variable and the independent variables were range condition, tradeoff size, 
reference gamble, and progress through the choice task. The analysis included: Two contrasts 
between the three range conditions, one between the S-range and O-range conditions and 
another between the S-range and P-range conditions; two polynomial contrasts (linear and 
quadratic) between the small, intermediate, and large tradeoffs; a contrast between the large-
amount condition and the high-probability condition; two polynomial contrasts (linear and 
quadratic) between the first six tasks, the intermediate six tasks, and the last six tasks; and 46 
contrasts capturing the interactions between the independent variables.  
The results of regression 1 showed a significant main effect of tradeoff size (linear 
contrast), t(2106) = -2.87, p < .01, as expected: There was an overall negative relation 
between tradeoff size and conflict in losses, as can be seen in Figure 24. The main effect of 
progress through the choice tasks (linear contrast) was also significant, t(2106) = -2.22, p = 
.03: Conflict decreased as the participants proceeded in the experimental situation. 
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Figure 24. Overall relation between tradeoff size and conflict in losses. 
 
Figure 25 shows the relation between tradeoff size and conflict by range condition 
across all the 18 decision tasks. Regarding the moderating effect of outcome range, predicted 
by H6.2, the results of regression 1 revealed a very weak and non significant effect of the 
interaction of the contrast between S-range and O-range with tradeoff size (linear contrast), 
t(2106) = -0.04, p = .49: When the outcome range increased the relation between tradeoff size 
and conflict did not change, not supporting H6.2. The interaction effect of the contrast 
between S-range and P-range with tradeoff size (linear contrast), t(2106) = 0.60, p = .27, was 
also not significant, but it provided directional support for H7.2: When the probability range 
increased, the relation between tradeoff size and conflict tended to change in an upward 
direction in the P-range condition (see Figure 25).  
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Figure 25. Relation between tradeoff size and conflict by range conditions across all decision 
tasks (Experiment 5). 
  
Regression 1 also demonstrated that the interaction effect of the contrast between the 
S-range and O-range conditions, tradeoff size (linear contrast), and progress through choice 
tasks (linear contrast), was not significant, t(2106) = -0.62, p = .27, providing only directional 
support for H6.3. The interaction effect of the contrast between the S-range and P-range 
conditions, tradeoff size (linear contrast), and progress through choice tasks (linear contrast), 
was also not significant, t(2106) = 0.81, p = .21, providing only directional support for H7.3.   
In order to evaluate the specific shape of the relation between tradeoff size and conflict 
in each range condition across all 18 decision tasks, another three linear regression analyses 
were conducted (regressions 2, 3 and 4). The independent variables were all the contrasts 
included previously, except those concerning the range conditions. There was a significant 
negative relation in the S-range condition, t(702) = -2.14, p = .03 (regression 2), and a 
marginally significant negative relation in the O-range condition, t(702) = -1.68, p = .09 
(regression 3). In the P-range condition the relation was negative, but the effect was not 
significant t(702) = -1.16, p = .25 (regression 4). 
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Although progress through the choice tasks had no significant effect on the moderating 
effects of outcome and probability range, a regression analysis was performed across the last 
six tasks in order to again test H6.2 and H7.2 (regression 5). This analysis included all the 
contrasts of regression 1, except those associated with progress through the choice tasks. The 
experimental results were in general not affected. Only the interaction effect of the contrast 
between the S-range and P-range conditions with tradeoff size (linear contrast) became 
slightly stronger in support of H7.2, even though not yet significant, t(702) = 1.02, p = .15: As 
can be seen in Figure 26, when the probability range increased, the relation between tradeoff 
size and conflict tended to changed in an upward direction. 
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Figure 26. Relation between tradeoff size and conflict by range conditions across the last six 
decision tasks (Experiment 5). 
Model estimation and parametric hypotheses test. Although given the above 
results, we expected no significant effects of the range conditions on the levels of preliminary 
conflict; we proceeded with the model estimation and the parametric hypothesis test. In 
Experiment 5, thirteen parameters were estimated from the 3 (range condition) × 2 (reference 
gamble) × 3 (tradeoff size) = 18 levels of conflict observed across the last six tasks. One was 
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the auxiliary parameter and the other twelve were the estimated levels of preliminary 
conflict.
24
 The estimates are given in Appendix M. The goodness-of-fit of the estimated 
model was R
2 
= .85.  
As expected neither the outcome range manipulation nor the probability range 
manipulation produced reliable changes on preliminary conflict. Nevertheless, it can be 
observed that when the outcome range increased, the preliminary conflict from concern about 
argumentation tended to decrease, t(5) = -0.46, p = .33, which is inconsistent with H6.1. The 
preliminary conflict from the concern about sacrifice was not affected by the increased 
outcome range, t(5) = 0.51, p = .63. 
When the probability range decreased, the preliminary conflict from concern about 
argumentation also tended to decrease, t(5) = -0.58, p = .29, providing directional support for 
H7.1. However, at the same time, when the probability range decreased, the preliminary 
conflict from concern about sacrifice tended to increase, t(5) = 1.07, p = .33. In addition, the 
difference in the preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice was about as great as the 
difference in the preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation, t(5) = .80, p = .46. 
Complementary analysis: Manipulation check. Again to validate the manipulation 
of the weight of the outcome attribute versus the weight of the probability attribute, we 
analyzed the choice probabilities of the riskier option (which is superior along the outcome 
attribute). As previously, the gambles in S-range condition were developed so that they would 
generate pairwise indifference, i.e., so that the outcome and the probability attributes would 
be equally weighted. In O-range and P-range conditions, the gambles were constructed so that 
participants would prefer the safer gamble over the riskier one, i.e., so that the outcome 
attribute would receive a greater weight than the probability attribute.  
As in Experiments 3 and 4, to check how the manipulations affected the participant‟s 
choice patterns, we conducted a LOGIT analysis, in which we regressed choice of the riskier 
gamble on a contrast between the S-range condition and the O-range condition and on a 
contrast between the S-range condition and the P-range conditions.  
The effect of each range condition on choice is depicted in Figure 27. As this Figure 
shows, the choice of the riskier gamble decreased when increasing the outcome range and 
when decreasing the probability range. Nevertheless, the effect of the contrast between S-
range and P-range was (marginally) significant, ²(1) = 2.71, p = .10, but the effect of the 
                                               
24 The arbitrary scaling constant had been set to 1 in order to estimate the remaining parameters. 
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contrast between S-range and O-range was not, ²(1) = 0.01, p = .93. The proportion of 
participants that chose the riskier gamble was .50 in the S-range condition, .48 in the O-range 
condition, and .45 in the S-range condition. These proportions were significantly different 
from the chance level in the P-range condition, p = .01, but not in the S-range condition nor in 
the O-range condition, p = .85 and p = .22, respectively (binomial tests). Furthermore, the 
effect of increasing the outcome weight on choice was larger when decreasing the probability 
range than when increasing the outcome range, but the difference was not significant, ²(1) = 
0.81, p = .37.  
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Figure 27. Choice of the riskier gamble by range conditions (Experiment 5). 
  
In accordance to the range sensitivity principle (Fischer, 1995), the results of 
Experiment 5 demonstrated that both the outcome and the probability range manipulations 
increased the weight of the outcome attribute also in choices involving losses, as revealed by 
the increase of the choice of the safer option in these conditions. In the standard range 
condition, the safer and the riskier gamble were equally chosen, meaning that both attributes 
were equally weighted, and thus, equally determinant of choice. In the outcome range 
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condition and in the probability range condition the safer gamble was chosen more often than 
the riskier one, meaning that the outcome attribute was more heavily weighted, and thus, more 
determinant of choice than the probability attribute. Moreover, the effect of the (decreased) 
probability range on the choice of the safer gamble was stronger than the effect of the 
(increased) outcome range, which is consistent with the results for gains.  
However, the effects of outcome and probability ranges were weaker than expected in 
that, in all three conditions, the choice probabilities were closer to the chance level in losses 
than in gains.  
Discussion of Experiment 5 
The results of Experiment 5 demonstrated that, although increasing the outcome range 
or decreasing the probability range increased the outcome weight in decisions involving 
losses, none of the manipulations produced significant effects on the preliminary conflict, and 
consequently, on the relation between tradeoff size and conflict, not even when participants 
became more familiar with the experimental situation. Nonetheless, we obtained directional 
support for the effects of probability range and progress through the choice tasks.  
The two hypotheses that addressed the effects of outcome range were therefore not 
confirmed. Increasing the outcome range did not increase the preliminary conflict from 
concern about argumentation, nor did it change the relation between tradeoff size and conflict. 
In addition, the parameter estimation of the model revealed a slight tendency to a decrease, 
rather than to an increase, of the preliminary conflict from argumentation when the outcome 
range increased, nevertheless, this was a very weak and unreliable result. The sacrifice 
mediator was also not affected by the increased outcome range.  
Furthermore, the hypotheses that concerned the effects of probability range received 
only directional support: When the probability range decreased, the concern about 
argumentation decreased (but not significantly) and the relation between tradeoff size and 
conflict tended to be more positive (or less negative). The parameter estimation of the model 
also revealed that the positive change in the relation between tradeoff size and conflict was 
due to a decrease in the preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation, as predicted, 
but also to an increase in the preliminary from concern about sacrifice. These effects were 
equally strong. In losses, the sacrifice and the argumentation mediators were equally affected 
by the probability range manipulation, however, in gains, the effect on the sacrifice mediator 
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was stronger than the effect on the argumentation mediator. This was likely due to the fact 
that, in losses, the effects were much weaker and less reliable. 
In agreement with the results of the previous Experiments, the results on the effect of 
the probability range on conflict arousal seem to support our proposal that decreasing the 
probability range involves a process of shift of attention between the two sources of conflict, 
in which attention shifts away from argumentation toward sacrifice. People become less 
concerned with finding a strong argument to choose given that argumentation favors the 
choice of the safer gamble (the smaller loss), but more concerned about contra-argumentation 
because they are still worried about probability (people do not want to lose).  
The hypotheses concerning the effects of progress through the choice tasks also 
received only directional support: The progress through the choice tasks affected the strength 
of the moderating effects of the outcome and probability ranges (but not significantly), 
especially in what concerns the moderating effect of probability range, which became closer 
to significance when it was tested across the last six tasks. Moreover, the level of overall 
conflict was also affected by the progress through the choice tasks, and this effect was 
reliable: The participants experienced a greater conflict in the first six tasks than in the last six 
tasks. These results are consistent with our previous interpretation that, as participants 
proceed in the experimental situation, they become more familiar with the experimental 
situation, and, by becoming more familiar with the tasks, the confidence in their decisions 
increases, which decreases the level of conflict. 
Finally, our results also demonstrated an overall negative relation between tradeoff 
size and conflict as expected. As we argued in the introduction of this Experiment, there is 
always some contradiction in arguing in favor of one negative gamble (it is difficult to find a 
positive argument in favor of a negative gamble). Thus, when choices involve losses, conflict 
is always complicated to resolve, even though this difficulty can, to some extent, be alleviated 
by the choice context. In accordance, the relation between tradeoff size and conflict was 
significantly negative in the standard range condition and in the outcome range condition. In 
the probability range condition, there was also a tendency to a negative relation, but the 
results were not reliable. This is not surprising given that, the expected and observed effect in 
this condition (although again not reliable) was to generate a more positive (or less negative) 
relation between tradeoff size and conflict.  
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In Experiment 5 we investigated how two outcome weight manipulations affected the 
decisional conflict in choices involving losses. In the next section we summarize and discuss 
the findings of Experiments 3, 4, and 5. 
Summary of Experiments 3, 4 and 5 
The main aim of Chapter 3 was to examine the effects of differential attribute weight 
on decisional conflict in gains (Experiments 3 and 4) and in losses (Experiment 5). 
Specifically, the goal was to study the impact of an increased outcome range manipulation 
(Experiments 3, 4, and 5) and of a decreased probability range manipulation (Experiments 4 
and 5) on the process of conflict arousal. 
Our results support the double-mediation model in the domain of risky choice. 
Differential attribute weight has an impact on the decisional conflict by affecting the 
preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation and about sacrifice, and thus, 
moderating the relation between tradeoff size and conflict. Furthermore, we have confirmed 
that, although the effect of outcome and probability ranges on attribute weighting is identical, 
i.e., both manipulations increase the weight of the outcome attribute, the moderating effect on 
the relation between tradeoff size and conflict is not.   
In addition, the effects of the outcome and probability ranges on the argumentation 
and sacrifice mediators support the conclusion that the psychological process underlying 
differential attribute weighting is a shift of attention (between the two conflict sources), 
although depending on the specific manipulation being considered, attention shifts away from 
sacrifice toward argumentation (outcome range manipulation), or, toward sacrifice and away 
from argumentation (probability range manipulation). This shift of attention leads to a more 
negative (or less positive) relation between tradeoff size and conflict when the outcome range 
is increased but to a more positive (or less negative) relation when the probability range is 
decreased. 
We can also conclude that sensitivity to ranges is indeed acquired during the 
Experiment, and that because experience is necessary so that a preliminary impression can be 
formed, the effect of the manipulations become stronger in the latter tasks, i.e., as participants 
proceed in the experimental situation.  
Furthermore, we have demonstrated that participants experienced a lower conflict 
level when only one chance device was used than when multiple chance devices were used 
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(Experiment 3), and a lower conflict level in the latter than in the earlier six tasks 
(Experiments 3, 4, and 5). Also in the study concerning the peanuts effect (which we 
addressed in the discussion of Experiment 3), a linear regression performed across all the 
decision tasks (with range condition, tradeoff size, progress through the choice tasks, and 
reference gamble as independent variables) revealed that conflict significantly decreased as 
participants proceeded in the experimental situation, t(1704) = -3.78, p < .001 (see Appendix 
I). This results support our interpretation that when people became more familiar with the 
choice tasks, they became more confident in their decisions, and thus, the level of conflict 
decreases.  
On the whole, the findings are consistent across gains (Experiments 3 and 4) and 
losses (Experiment 5). Nevertheless, the effects of the manipulations on attribute weighting 
and on conflict arousal were much weaker and much less reliable in losses than in gains. 
Experiment 5 was designed in the exact same way of Experiments 3 and 4. In fact, in 
Experiment 5, the variance explained by the conflict factor and the reliability of the conflict 
measure were about the same as in Experiments 3 and 4. Furthermore, the variation in conflict 
accounted by the double-mediation model was larger in Experiment 5 than in Experiments 3 
and 4.  
The difference between the Experiments was the sign of the outcomes. Our results 
demonstrate that choices are more inconsistent in losses that in gains, as revealed by choice 
probabilities closer to chance level in losses (Experiment 5) than in gains (Experiments 3 and 
4), which is in agreement with previous research (e.g., Hershey & Schoemaker, 1980; 
Hogarth & Einhorn, 1990; Kühberger et al., 1999; Scholten & Read, 2010a). This was 
probably why the manipulations of outcome weight produced a weak impact on attribute 
weighting and no significant impact on conflict arousal in losses, while in gains they did. 
Because choices are more inconsistent, participants‟ reactions to manipulations in losses are 
less discriminated, or less differentiated, than their reaction to manipulations in gains. As a 
consequence, manipulations must be more pronounced in losses than in gains: The monetary 
differences as well as the probability differences between the gambles have to be larger in 
losses, so that people can increase their confidence in the decisions, which strengthens the 
effects of the manipulations on attribute weighting and on conflict arousal.  
The manipulations of outcome weight involved a manipulation of the tradeoff rate, in 
that the magnitude of the outcome differences was increased relatively to the magnitude of the 
probability differences. Therefore, it is fair to say that in chapter 3 we examined how the 
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relation between tradeoff size and conflict was moderated by tradeoff rate. In our studies, we 
assumed that the manipulation of tradeoff rate had no influence on tradeoff size, nonetheless, 
it can be argued that it did influence the tradeoff size, and thus, that the rational underlying the 
effect of the range manipulations on conflict (on the relation between tradeoff size and 
conflict) can differ from what was hypothesized, as discussed below. 
In general, the double-mediation model predicts an inverse U-shaped relation between 
tradeoff size and conflict, which can change of shape under the effect of moderating factors, 
such as outcome range or probability range. Nevertheless, it could be argued that increasing 
the outcome differences also increased the tradeoff size, even though the probability 
differences were kept constant: The small, intermediate, and large tradeoffs all became larger 
as a result of the increased outcome range. Therefore, the outcome range manipulation did not 
in fact produce a change in the relation between tradeoff size and conflict by affecting the two 
mediators, but rather, a movement to the right side of the inverse U-shaped curve, and thus, a 
downward change in the relation. Likewise, it could be argued that decreasing the outcome 
differences also decreased the tradeoff size, even though the outcome differences were kept 
constant: The small, intermediate, and large tradeoffs all became smaller as a result of the 
decreased probability range. Therefore, the probability range manipulation did not in fact 
produce a change in the relation between tradeoff size and conflict by affecting the two 
mediators, but rather, a movement to the left side of the inverse U-shaped curve, and thus, an 
upward change in the relation. 
At the outset it seems a plausible alternative to our findings, nevertheless, it fails on 
closer scrutiny because it does not explain the effects of an increased outcome range and of a 
decreased probability range on attribute weighting. That is, it does not explain why both 
manipulations would increase the weight of the outcome attribute relatively to the probability 
attribute, as it should do according to the range-sensitivity principle and as it did in our 
Experiments. In fact, range sensitivity works through the effect of range manipulations on 
tradeoff rate, not through their effect on tradeoff size. 
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CHAPTER 4: GENERAL DISCUSSION  
The main purpose of this research was to apply the double-mediation model (Scholten 
& Sherman, 2006) to risky choice, investigating the process of conflict generation in single-
outcome gambles. The double-mediation model provided an accurate description of how 
conflict was related to the tradeoff size (to the size of the tradeoffs between the attributes of 
the options, i.e., gambles), how this relation was mediated by the two conflict sources 
sacrifice and argumentation, and how it was moderated by third variables in the choice 
context. The third variables were both situational (outcome sign, elicitation preference 
method, and differential attribute weight) and individual (decision maker‟s thinking style). 
Until now, the double-mediation model had only been applied to the domain of 
riskless choice, specifically, to choices between consumer goods involving tradeoffs between 
their attributes. We have extended its application to the risky choice domain, specifically to 
decisions between gambles involving elementary tradeoffs between probability and outcome. 
Our studies allow the conclusion that when conflict is examined as a function of tradeoff size, 
the process of conflict generation follows the same psychological mechanisms and the 
double-mediation model captures a common dimension of conflict in riskless and risky 
choice.  
Nonetheless, other dimensions of conflict that are specific to risky choice can be 
revealed by different experimental arrangements, for instance, the conflict between the 
anticipated disappointment and the anticipated elation, i.e., the conflict between a person‟s 
feeling that the choice outcome will turn out to be worse (anticipated disappointment) or 
better (anticipated elation) than the expectation (see Bell, 1985, and Loomes & Sugden, 
1986). Another example is the conflict between people‟s motivation to evaluate risk (security 
or potential) and the aspiration level, as proposed by the security-potential/aspiration theory 
(Lopes, 1987, 1995; Schneider & Lopes, 1986; Schneider, 1992). In other words, it is the 
conflict between, on the one hand, a person‟s tendency to assign a greater weight to the worst 
(security) or to the best (potential) outcome, and, on the other hand, the level of the lowest 
outcome that a person considers acceptable. Even so, the double-mediation model uncovers a 
process of conflict generation that is new in the analysis of risky choice, and that applies 
equally well to riskless choice. 
In this dissertation we have investigated conflict arousal in choices involving positive 
outcomes (gains) and involving negative outcomes (losses). In chapter 2, we examined how 
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third variables in the choice context affected the decisional conflict in situations where gains 
were contrasted with losses. In chapter 3, we examined how distinct range manipulations of 
outcome weight affected the decisional conflict in gains and in losses, i.e., we investigated the 
effects of context manipulations within each outcome sign condition.  
Conflict arousal was significantly affected when gains were contrasted with losses. 
Yet, the same did not occur when the manipulations were examined within gains and losses. 
In the latter case, the manipulations have demonstrated not to be strong enough to produce 
reliable effects in losses as they did in gains. As it was discussed in the previous section, 
choices are more inconsistent in losses than in gains, making the manipulations within losses 
weaker than in gains. In other words, reactions in losses are less discriminated than reactions 
in gains.  
One could argue that choice inconsistency should also be greater for losses than for 
gains in Experiments 1 and 2. An analysis of the choice probabilities revealed that neither in 
Experiment 1, nor in Experiment 2, choice probabilities were closer to chance level in losses 
than in gains, which is not surprising because of the direct contrast between gains and 
losses.
25
 Another form to assess choice inconsistency, which was used in Experiment 1, is to 
evaluate the consistency between the decisions made in two separate occasions, in the present 
case, between the decisions made in the two parts of the Experiment. A LOGIT analysis, in 
which we regressed decision inconsistency on a contrast between gains and losses, revealed 
that choices were indeed more inconsistent in losses than gains, ²(1) = 9.75, p < .01.26  
Scholten and Read (2010a) argued that a greater choice inconsistency in losses than in 
gains is due to preference heterogeneity (i.e., people have different preferences, and as a 
consequence, choice probabilities come closer to chance level), and to preference uncertainty 
(i.e., conflict). In their study, preference uncertainty was assessed by decision time: They 
found longer decision times for losses than for gains. Nevertheless, as Scholten and Read 
(2010a, p. 32) noted, they “left the question of why there is a greater preference uncertainty in 
losses.”  
Our investigation on decisional conflict notably demonstrates that people experience a 
greater conflict when deciding between losses than between gains. The results were obtained 
                                               
25In Experiment 1, the choice probability of the riskier gamble was .53 in gains and .47 in losses. In Experiment 
2, the choice probability of the riskier gamble was .49 in gains and .43 in losses. 
26More information about the results concerning the analyses performed in the general discussion section is 
presented in Appendix N. 
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by using a composite measure of conflict, rather than, by using decision time alone. In order 
to check if our results hold when only the decision time measure is considered, we run two 
linear regressions analyses (decision time was the dependent variable and outcome sign the 
independent one): Decision times were indeed longer in losses and in gains, t(3454) = 4.44, p 
< .001 (Experiment 1), and, t(2734) = 5.25, p < .001 (Experiment 2).  
Moreover, the present research not only confirms that the level of conflict is higher in 
losses than in gains, as also provides an answer to Scholten and Read‟s (2010a) question. By 
applying the double-mediation model we were able to demonstrate that conflict is greater in 
losses essentially because it is contradictory to argue in favor of a negative gamble. In fact, in 
losses, because conflict is high due to the difficulty in argumentation, people become focused 
on looking for a positive argument to choose, and thus, their attention shifts toward 
argumentation and away from sacrifice. 
Just as there is no formal definition of conflict, there is no standard procedure for 
measuring it. Rather, there are several measures that can be used as conflict indicators. 
Because conflict is a unidimensional concept and there is no criterion (or reason) that leads us 
to opt for a particular measure, a global measure of conflict (assessed by several measures) 
was used in this research, as we previously referred. This means that we focused on the 
common tendencies of each measure, or in other words, on its communalities. Factor loadings 
provide some information about the „relative importance‟ of each measure as a conflict 
manifestation: The higher the loading of a measure, the greater the importance of that measure 
as a conflict indicator, and conversely, the lower the loading, the smaller the importance of 
that measure as a conflict indicator. 
Although the lower the factor loading, greater is the uniqueness of a measure, every 
measure has uniqueness by itself, i.e., has its own particularities, and thus, the examination of 
the specific role of each measure on the decision making process would be an avenue for 
future research. Although much more research is needed, Pleskac and Busemeyer (2010) 
recently went into this direction by developing a theory, the two-stage dynamic signal 
detection theory (2DSD), that accounts for the effects of three measures (choice, choice time, 
and choice confidence) in the judgment process. Pleskac and Busemeyer (2010) found that 
choice and choice time reflect the amount (quantity) and value (quality) of the evidence 
(information that favors one of the options) gathered until the choice is made, whereas, choice 
confidence also reflects the amount of evidence gathered after the choice is made and the way 
in which all the evidence is assembled into a rating of confidence. 
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The application of the double-mediation model to risky choice also discloses 
information about the decision making process. As it was originally proposed by the decision 
field theory (Busemeyer & Diederich, 2002; Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Diederich, 
1997), it seems that making a choice implies passing through two stages: The initial 
preliminary impression and the subsequent deliberation phase.  
Furthermore, the double-mediation model, although grounded on decision field theory, 
encompasses several aspects that were not considered by this theory, and for this reason, adds 
some new information to this description of the choice process. First, conflict has a 
mobilizing or a paralyzing effect on the decision process, depending on the stage where the 
decision makers are. In the preliminary impression phase, conflict has a mobilizing effect, i.e., 
the preliminary conflict is the drive for focused deliberation (the greater the preliminary 
conflict aroused by a concern, the stronger the drive to devote attention to that concern during 
subsequent deliberation). In contrast, in subsequent deliberation, conflict has a paralyzing 
effect, which causes vacillation between the options. Second, in the deliberation phase, the 
decision maker compares the options along their attributes and becomes involved in a process 
of pro- and contra-argumentation (causing vacillation between the options), which stops, and 
thus a decision is made, when pro-argumentation wins out over contra-argumentation. 
Conflict is resolved through argumentation, rather than through sacrifice. 
Pro-argumentation is therefore a key feature in the double-mediation model. Pro-
argumentation has also a fundamental role in the reason based choice theory (Shafir et al., 
1993; Simonson 1989), which suggests that decisions are based on the reasons for selecting 
one option instead of the other. Thus, the reason based choice theory also provides a relevant 
contribute to the comprehension of the decisional conflict.  
By considering that a decision involves making tradeoffs between the attributes, the 
double-mediation model assumes that the decision making process is attribute-based. That is, 
decision makers evaluate the options by comparing them on each attribute (one after the 
other), and then select the one that was most favored by these comparisons. Although there 
are some exceptions (Restle, 1961; Tversky, 1969, and more recently, Brandstätter, 
Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2006; González-Vallejo, 2002), nearly all models in risky choice (and 
in decision making in general), including the decision field theory, assume an alternative-
based decision process, rather than an attribute-based one. In an alternative-based processing, 
the decision maker evaluates each option on all attributes (i.e., the options are separately 
evaluated), assigns an overall value to each option, and then selects the one with highest 
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value. This way, the decision field theory and the double-mediation model presuppose distinct 
decision processes, and for this reason, it seems more reasonable to consider them as 
complementary theories, instead of thinking about moving toward integration. 
The view that choices involve tradeoffs between the attributes, and thus, an attribute-
based processing, is not unique to the risky choice domain. Recently, it has also been applied 
to the domain of intertemporal choice, i.e., to choices involving delayed outcomes rather than 
immediate ones as in risky or in riskless choice. An example is the choice between gaining 
€80 now or €100 in six months. Scholten and Read (2006, 2010b) developed the tradeoff 
model, an innovative model in the domain of intertemporal choice, which posits that people 
choose by making attribute-based tradeoffs instead of alternative-based discounts.
27
 As risky 
choices entail tradeoffs between probability and outcome, intertemporal choices entail 
tradeoffs between time and outcome, and thus, people chose by directly weighting the 
differences in time against the differences in outcome (e.g., money). For instance, as Scholten 
and Read (2010b, p. 938) asserted, “people make intertemporal choices by weighing how 
much more they will receive or pay if they wait longer against how much longer the wait will 
be.”   
Although the tradeoff model, as the double-mediation model, is anchored in the 
concept of tradeoffs, involving an attribute-based decision process; it is a model about choice 
and not about conflict. Future investigations ought to address the process of conflict 
generation in intertemporal choice. As Read and Roelofsma (2003, p. 140) stated, 
intertemporal choices “involve intertemporal tradeoffs, which are often difficult when we 
must choose between a smaller-sooner payoff or penalty, and a larger-later one.” Examining 
how conflict is aroused in intertemporal choices, and if it reflects the same psychological 
mechanisms of risky and riskless choice, would extend the application of double-mediation 
model to the domain of intertemporal choice, but more importantly, it would add an important 
insight into the three fundamental/basic domains of behavioral decision making and economic 
psychology (riskless choice, risky choice, and intertemporal choice).  
The present research has extended the application of the double-mediation model to 
risky choice, as well as to the study of individual differences in decisional conflict. We 
                                               
27Models of intertemporal choice (whether normative or descriptive) assume that people discount future 
consequences (outcomes), that they evaluate the options independently by assigning a discounted value (of the 
delayed outcome) to each option, and that they compare these (discounted) values in order to choose the option 
with the highest value (e.g., Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992; Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991; Scholten & Read, 2006, 
2010b). 
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focused on how the individual differences in the decision maker‟s thinking style affected 
conflict arousal in risky choice. Future research could broaden the scope of investigation to 
the study of individual motivational differences, such as the individual differences in the self 
regulatory focus (regulatory focus theory, Higgins, 1997, 1998) and the individual differences 
in tendency to achieve security or potential (security-potential/aspiration theory, Lopes, 1987, 
1995; Schneider & Lopes, 1986; Schneider, 1992). 
According to the security-potential/aspiration theory (Lopes, 1987, 1995; Schneider & 
Lopes, 1986; Schneider, 1992), people differ in their tendency to prefer security (avoid bad 
outcomes) or potential (to attain good outcomes). As it was already discussed, this theory 
predicts that security-minded people generally prefer the safer option over the riskier one, 
especially in gains, because in losses conflict between the tendency to prefer security and the 
aspiration level may arise, and thus, both the safer and the riskier option can be chosen. 
Conversely, potential-minded people generally prefer the riskier option over the safer one, 
especially in losses, because in gains conflict between the tendency to prefer potential and the 
aspiration level may arise, and thus, both the riskier and the safer option can be chosen. 
Between these two groups, are the cautiously-hopeful people, which combine some degrees of 
caution and hope, and thus, might prefer either the safer or the riskier option, depending on 
the choice set under consideration (Lopes & Oden, 1999). The security-potential/aspiration 
theory is a theory of choice that contemplates the role of conflict in the decision process (the 
conflict between security/potential and aspiration level, or the conflict security and potential). 
Nevertheless, it gives no information on how conflict is resolved or on how it relates to 
tradeoff size. The application of the double-mediation model may well provide a valuable 
contribution in this matter.  
The regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997, 1998) posits that there are two 
motivational systems that guide the way in which people experience pleasure (success) or 
pain (failure): The prevention and the promotion one. When people are prevention focused, 
they are guided by safety, security, and protection needs, focusing on duties, obligations, and 
responsibilities. They are motivated to avoid mismatches between the actual and the desired 
end state, experiencing pleasure in the absence of negative outcomes (non losses) or pain in 
the presence of negative outcomes (losses). When people are promotion focused, they are 
guided by nurturance, growth, and development needs, focusing on hopes, aspirations, and 
accomplishment. They are motivated to approach matches between the actual and the desired 
end state, experiencing pleasure in the presence of positive outcomes (gains) or pain in the 
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absence of positive outcomes (non gains). Thus, a focus on prevention implies a greater 
sensitivity to negative outcomes (losses/non losses), but a focus on prevention implies a 
greater sensitivity to positive outcomes (gains/non gains). Indeed, negative outcomes are 
experienced more intensely than positive ones in a prevention focus, and the reverse happens 
in a promotion focus (Idson, Liberman, & Higgins, 2000; Liberman, Idson, & Higgins, 2005).  
At first glance, as Scholer, Zou, Fujita, Stroessner, and Higgins (2010) noted, the 
security and potential motivations may be similar to the prevention versus promotion 
motivations, nevertheless, they are different: While security seekers are oriented to avoid 
failure and the potential seekers to approach success, both prevention and promotion focused 
people are oriented toward success (the strategies however may be of approach or avoidance).  
From this follows that, security versus potential, and, prevention versus promotion 
motivations, have differential effects on risk preferences. A security motivation is more 
predictive of (risk averse) preferences when gains are involved (because in losses the theory 
predicts that both options can be chosen due to conflict), and a potential motivation is more 
predictive of (risk seeking) preferences when losses are involved (because in gains the theory 
predicts that both options can be chosen due to conflict). In contrast, a prevention focused 
motivation was demonstrated to be associated with preferences in losses, whereas promotion 
focus was not. In fact, and although the study was focused on losses, the strength of 
promotion focus did not affect risk preferences, neither in losses nor in gains (Scholer et al., 
2010). Scholer et al. (2010) found that in losses, a prevention focus leads to a greater 
preference for the riskier option when this option offers a chance of not incurring a loss 
(maintain the status quo), and to a greater preference for the safer option when both options 
offer the possibility of not incurring a loss. When none of the options offers the possibility of 
eliminating the loss, the motivational focus was unrelated to choice. 
Despite more evidence could be valuable to substantiate these findings, the question 
arises whether the effects of motivational regulatory focus and of motivational tendency to 
evaluate risk on decisional conflict also differ, and if so, what are the differences. Research is 
necessary to answer to this question. For instance, in gains, as it was discussed elsewhere, a 
security focus means that people want to avoid bad outcomes, and therefore, that they give 
more importance to the probability attribute. Thus, the argument for security is viewed as a 
particularly cogent one and the level of preliminary conflict from concern about 
argumentation decreases relatively to the level of preliminary conflict from concern about 
sacrifice. In turn, a prevention focus means that people are oriented to avoid mismatches (they 
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are sensitive to negative outcomes), so it could be argued that, because this is only in question 
in losses, in gains, both attributes would be equally important and the two conflict sources 
would arouse a similar level of preliminary conflict. Nevertheless, it could also be argued that 
a prevention focus, like a security focus, also means that people are oriented to satisfy security 
needs, and this would lead to less preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation than 
from concern about sacrifice. Investigating how these two motivational approaches affect the 
two mediators of the double-mediation model would provide an important insight to the 
understanding of decisional conflict. 
Conflict is not only an elementary feature of choice, it also has relevant implications 
for how people make decisions. Choice deferral is perhaps one of its major implications. 
Decision makers tend to select the no-choice option when they cannot identify the best option 
because it provides a way to minimize the error in situations of preference uncertainty (Dhar 
& Simonson, 2003). In accordance, several empirical findings (e.g., Dhar, 1996, 1997a; Dhar 
& Nowlis, 1999; Dhar & Simonson, 2003; Luce, 1998; Tversky & Shafir, 1992) have 
demonstrated that in situations of free choice, i.e., when a decision maker is not forced to 
select one of the available options, the experience of conflict influences the probability to 
defer choice. A greater conflict increases the tendency to not consummate choice, because 
people tend to seek additional information (more options) or even to give up the choice 
(maintain the status quo). This may have many undesirable economic consequences for 
several different areas such as marketing, business or public policy, in that, for instance, it 
may decrease a person‟s purchase, investment, or voting probability. Even the decision maker 
itself may be affected. For example, while searching for more options, the initial ones may no 
longer be available, or the search may not compensate the additional costs involved 
(monetary, temporal, physical, emotional, etc.).   
Although not in the domain of risky choice, we conducted a study to check the effects 
of a forced versus a free choice context on decisional conflict. Half of the participants were 
assigned to the forced choice condition and the other half to the free choice condition. The 
forced choice condition consisted in choosing between two consumer products involving a 
tradeoff between two attributes. In the free choice condition, a no-choice option was added. 
(The design and method were similar to those in the present research.) 
Choice deferral is a way to escape from the decisional conflict, therefore, it was 
expected that conflict would be greater in forced choice than in free choice, and that, in the 
free choice condition, the selection of the no-choice option would be greater in situations of 
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high conflict. In what concerns the relation between tradeoff size and conflict, a positive 
relation was expected when the attributes are of differential importance (see Scholten & 
Sherman, 2006). In situations of free choice, it was expected that there would be no relation 
between tradeoff size and conflict, because, as referred elsewhere, the double-mediation 
model assumes conflict aversion, and thus, it can only be applied, and the decision making 
process that it describes can be detected, when choice deferral is not possible.   
To explore how conflict was affected by the choice context (forced versus free 
choice), a linear regression analysis was performed (see Appendix N). The dependent variable 
was conflict and the independent variables were choice context (forced versus free choice), 
choice (choice of one of the products versus choice of the no-choice option), tradeoff size 
(small, intermediate, and large), and reference gamble (the tradeoff size varied in relation to 
option x, which is superior along the more important attribute or with respect to option y, 
which is superior along the less important attribute). The results demonstrated that conflict did 
not differ by choice context condition: The participants in the forced choice condition 
experienced the same amount of conflict as the participants in the free choice condition, 
t(2291) = -0.38, p = .70. Nevertheless, the choice of the no-choice option indeed coincided 
with a greater amount of conflict, t(2291) = 6.67, p < .001. Moreover, in the free choice 
context, only 6% of the participants selected the no-choice option. In what concerns the 
relation between tradeoff size and conflict, the results showed an overall positive relation 
t(2291) = 4.68, p < .001, which did not differ with choice context condition, t(2291) = 1.03, p 
= .30.   
These results suggest that having the possibility to defer choice did not work as an 
escape from conflict, and thus, that in the free choice condition, participants ignored the 
presence of the no-choice option and decisions were made as if it was a forced choice context. 
In the free choice condition, the participants were told that if they could not decide between 
the two products, they had the opportunity not to choose either, by selecting the alternative 
„none of the options‟. This probably led the participants to view the no-choice option as an 
option with no benefits, so that choosing one of the products, though having to resolve the 
decisional conflict, was preferable to selecting the no-choice option and gaining nothing. As 
the proverb says, “a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush”. More research is thus needed 
to examine the impact of different framings of the no-choice option on the probability to defer 
choice, and to further investigate how choice deferral affects the decisional conflict in riskless 
choice as well as in risky choice. 
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As a final point, we would like to emphasize that this dissertation examined conflict in 
its own right; we have analyzed the process of conflict generation and how choice context 
affects it. This analysis did not only provide a better understanding of decisional conflict 
itself, but also, of the decision making process in general. Moreover, we addressed issues that 
should not be overlooked when talking about risky choice, but which had not been 
investigated until now, making it an important contribution within the study of risky choice 
behavior. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Stimuli Construction – Experiment 1  
The gambles of the gains condition in Experiment 1 were constructed on the basis of 
estimates of prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). The intention was to create an 
experimental condition which generated pairwise indifference between the gambles. 
According to Tversky and Kahneman‟s (1992) parameterization of prospect theory, 
for a gamble i, the subjectively expected value of obtaining outcome xi with probability pi is: 
)()(),( iiii xvpwpxv  , 
where v assigns a value to outcome xi and w assigns a weight to probability pi. For positive 
outcomes, the value function is 

ii xxv )(           (B1) 
and the probability-weighting function is 
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 .        (B2) 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) estimated the parameters at ˆ  = .88 and ˆ  = .61. 
Given these estimates, we started by specifying a gamble that yielded €7.50 upon drawing one 
of 36 winning cards from a complete deck of 52 cards. We computed the value of the 
outcome, xi = 7.50, from Equation B1 and the weight of the probability, pi = 36/52, from 
Equation B2. Then, to construct 17 gambles that would be subjectively equivalent to this 
gamble, we selected 17 alternative probabilities from the interval [16/52, 36/52], computed 
their weights from Equation 2, and derived their correspondent outcome values from Equation 
3: 
)(/)50.7()52/36()( ii pwvwxv  .       (B3) 
Although according to prospect theory these gambles should generate pairwise 
indifference, we anticipated that this would generate preference for safer gambles rather than 
indifference. An indication came from a choice study in which, averaged across pairs of 
gambles, the range of outcome values was increased by 7%, but the probability of choosing 
riskier gambles was only .36 (Scholten, 2002, Experiment 2). This was probably due to the 
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common preference for the safer gamble in gains (due to risk aversion) when the probability 
of the nonzero outcome is not very low. In an attempt to move this probability toward .50, 
creating a stronger conflict between probability and outcome, we submitted the outcome 
values resulting from Equation A3 to a transformation that would increase their range but 
preserve their geometric average:  
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where n is the number of outcome values (n = 18) and q is the factor that increases their range 
(0  q < 1/n).  Specifically, we set q = .033040, which increased the range of outcome values 
by 161%. The resulting outcome values were converted back to outcomes: 
])([ *1* ii xvvx
 ,         (B5) 
where  
/11 )( ii xxv 

. 
The outcomes were rounded to the nearest €0.50. These outcomes are presented in Table 2. 
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Appendix B: Frequency and Specification of Winning/Losing Cards – 
Experiment 1 
 
Table 13 
Winning/losing cards (Experiment 1) 
Frequency Specification A Specification B 
16 Figure Figure 
17 Hearts or a Figure of Diamonds Spades or Figure of Clubs 
18 Black Number Red Number 
19 Red Number or Ace of Spades Black Number or Ace of Hearts 
20 Even Number Even Number 
21 Ace of Clubs or Even Number Ace of Diamonds or Even Number 
23 
Black Number or Even Number of 
Hearts 
Red Number or Even Number of 
Spades 
24 Ace or Even Number Ace or Even Number 
25 Number of Diamonds or Figure Number of Clubs or Figure 
26 Black Card Red Card 
27 Red Card or Ace of Spades Black Card or Ace of Hearts 
28 Black Card or Red Ace Red Card or Black Ace 
30 Red Card or Figure of Clubs Black Card or Figure of Diamonds 
31 
Black Card or Even Number of 
Hearts 
Red Card or Even Number of Spades 
32 Odd Number or Figure Odd Number or Figure 
34 Red Card or Black Figure Black Card or Red Figure 
35 Black Card or Number of Diamonds Red Card or Number of Clubs 
36 Number Number 
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 Appendix C: Results - Experiment 1 
 
Conflict: Principal Component Analysis 
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Figure 28. Principal component analysis - scree plot (Experiment 1). 
 
Table 14 
Eigenvalues 
  Eigenvalue 
% Total 
variance 
Cumulative 
Eigenvalue 
Cumulative 
% 
1 1,7169 34,3370 1,7169 34,3370 
2 1,0360 20,7201 2,7529 55,0571 
3 0,9000 18,0004 3,6529 73,0575 
4 0,7782 15,5633 4,4310 88,6208 
5 0,5690 11,3792 5,0000 100,0000 
 
Table 15   
Factor Loadings   
Measure  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
Decision Time 0,3591 0,5878 0,7120 0,0976 -0,0949 
Decision Uncertainty 0,7302 -0,2672 -0,0420 -0,3938 -0,4884 
Decision Difficulty 0,7807 -0,1350 0,0458 -0,2329 0,5621 
Preferece Equality 0,6250 -0,1419 -0,1958 0,7387 -0,0725 
Decision Inconsistency 0,2337 0,7621 -0,5923 -0,1171 -0,0120 
Expl.Var 1,7169 1,0360 0,9000 0,7782 0,5690 
Prp.Totl 0,3434 0,2072 0,1800 0,1556 0,1138 
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Conflict: Reliability Analysis 
 
Table 16   
Reliability Analysis - Alpha de Cronbach 
Valid N 3456 
Cronbach alpha 0,4420 
Standardized alpha 0,4803 
Average inter-item corr.  0,159 
 
Table 17   
Reliability Analysis by Measure 
 Measure 
Itm-Totl 
Correl. 
Alpha if 
deleted 
Decision Time 0,1565 0,4333 
Decision Uncertainty 0,3845 0,2408 
Decision Difficulty 0,4390 0,1679 
Preferece Equality 0,3145 0,4475 
Decision Inconsistency 0,0948 0,4577 
 
Conflict: Hypotheses Test 
In the following linear regression analyses: CR denotes the contrast between 
preference elicitation method conditions (choice versus rejection); GL denotes the contrast 
between outcome sign conditions (gains versus losses); RG denotes the contrast between 
reference gamble conditions (large-amount condition versus high-probability condition); ISL 
denotes the quadratic contrast between tradeoff size conditions (intermediate versus small and 
large tradeoffs); SL denotes the linear contrast between tradeoff size conditions (small versus 
large tradeoffs); MS denotes the contrast between the interaction of preference elicitation 
method with outcome sign conditions (choice-gains-and-rejection-losses versus choice-losses-
and-rejection-gains); the other variables denote the interactions between these contrasts. 
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Table 18 
Parameter Estimates - Regression 1 
  
Conflict 
Param. 
Conflict    
t 
Conflict 
p 
Intercept 0,5058 196,4842 0,0000 
CR
 
0,0078 3,0192 0,0026 
GL
 
0,0110 4,2617 0,0000 
RG
 
-0,0002 -0,0945 0,9247 
ISL
 
0,0039 2,1286 0,0334 
SL
 
0,0058 1,8543 0,0638 
GLRG
 
-0,0028 -1,0760 0,2820 
GLISL 0,0008 0,4421 0,6584 
GLSL -0,0076 -2,4249 0,0154 
RGISL -0,0003 -0,1397 0,8889 
RGSL 0,0009 0,2867 0,7743 
GLRGISL -0,0008 -0,4423 0,6583 
GLRGSL -0,0024 -0,7566 0,4493 
CRGL -0,0080 -3,1213 0,0018 
CRRG -0,0024 -0,9186 0,3584 
CRISL 0,0013 0,7230 0,4697 
CRSL -0,0045 -1,4293 0,1530 
CRGLRG -0,0005 -0,2014 0,8404 
CRGLISL 0,0024 1,3177 0,1877 
CRGLSL -0,0011 -0,3417 0,7326 
CRRGISL 0,0000 -0,0150 0,9881 
CRRGSL 0,0023 0,7189 0,4722 
CRGLRGISL -0,0016 -0,8679 0,3855 
CRGLRGSL 0,0001 0,0275 0,9780 
 
Table 19 
Parameter Estimates - Regression 2 
  
Conflict 
Param. 
Conflict    
t 
Conflict 
p 
Intercept 0,4948 135,6249 0,0000 
CR 0,0158 4,3325 0,0000 
RG 0,0025 0,6925 0,4887 
ISL 0,0031 1,1899 0,2342 
SL 0,0135 3,0192 0,0026 
RGISL 0,0006 0,2135 0,8310 
RGSL 0,0033 0,7362 0,4617 
CRRG -0,0018 -0,5060 0,6129 
CRISL -0,0011 -0,4196 0,6748 
CRSL -0,0034 -0,7674 0,4430 
CRRGISL 0,0016 0,6018 0,5474 
CRRGSL 0,0022 0,4878 0,6257 
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Table 20 
Parameter Estimates - Regression 3 
  
Conflict 
Param. 
Conflict    
t 
Conflict 
p 
Intercept 0,5168 142,2609 0,0000 
CR -0,0003 -0,0724 0,9423 
RG -0,0030 -0,8295 0,4070 
ISL 0,0047 1,8217 0,0687 
SL -0,0018 -0,4043 0,6860 
RGISL -0,0011 -0,4124 0,6801 
RGSL -0,0015 -0,3330 0,7392 
CRRG -0,0029 -0,7937 0,4275 
CRISL 0,0037 1,4462 0,1483 
CRSL -0,0056 -1,2550 0,2096 
CRRGISL -0,0016 -0,6257 0,5316 
CRRGSL 0,0024 0,5290 0,5969 
 
Table 21 
Parameter Estimates - Regression 4 
  
Conflict 
Param. 
Conflict    
t 
Conflict 
p 
Intercept 0,4980 134,8645 0,0000 
GL 0,0190 5,1467 0,0000 
RG 0,0021 0,5745 0,5657 
ISL 0,0026 0,9798 0,3273 
SL 0,0104 2,2890 0,0222 
GLRG -0,0023 -0,6096 0,5422 
GLISL -0,0016 -0,6104 0,5417 
GLSL -0,0066 -1,4522 0,1466 
RGISL -0,0002 -0,0869 0,9307 
RGSL -0,0014 -0,3013 0,7632 
GLRGISL 0,0008 0,2967 0,7667 
GLRGSL -0,0025 -0,5467 0,5847 
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Table 22 
Parameter Estimates - Regression 5 
  
Conflict 
Param. 
Conflict    
t 
Conflict 
p 
Intercept 0,5136 143,1550 0,0000 
GL 0,0029 0,8183 0,4133 
RG -0,0026 -0,7269 0,4674 
ISL 0,0052 2,0462 0,0409 
SL 0,0013 0,3049 0,7605 
GLRG -0,0033 -0,9166 0,3595 
GLISL 0,0032 1,2628 0,2068 
GLSL -0,0087 -1,9852 0,0473 
RGISL -0,0003 -0,1110 0,9117 
RGSL 0,0032 0,7216 0,4706 
GLRGISL -0,0024 -0,9401 0,3473 
GLRGSL -0,0023 -0,5232 0,6009 
 
Table 23 
Parameter Estimates- Regression 6 
  
Conflict 
Param. 
Conflict    
t 
Conflict 
p 
Intercept 0,5058 196,4842 0,0000 
MS 0,0080 3,1213 0,0018 
GL 0,0110 4,2617 0,0000 
RG -0,0002 -0,0945 0,9247 
ISL 0,0039 2,1286 0,0334 
SL 0,0058 1,8543 0,0638 
GLRG -0,0028 -1,0760 0,2820 
GLISL 0,0008 0,4421 0,6584 
GLSL -0,0076 -2,4249 0,0154 
RGISL -0,0003 -0,1397 0,8889 
RGSL 0,0009 0,2867 0,7743 
GLRGISL -0,0008 -0,4423 0,6583 
GLRGSL -0,0024 -0,7566 0,4493 
MSGL -0,0078 -3,0192 0,0026 
MSRG 0,0005 0,2014 0,8404 
MSISL -0,0024 -1,3177 0,1877 
MSSL 0,0011 0,3417 0,7326 
MSGLRG 0,0024 0,9186 0,3584 
MSGLISL -0,0013 -0,7230 0,4697 
MSRGSL 0,0045 1,4293 0,1530 
MSRGISL 0,0016 0,8679 0,3855 
MSRGSL -0,0001 -0,0275 0,9780 
MSGLRGISL 0,0000 0,0150 0,9881 
MSGLRGSL -0,0023 -0,7189 0,4722 
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Parametric Hypotheses Test 
In Experiment 1 the auxiliary parameters, the arbitrary scaling constant and the drive-
capacity parameter were estimated at ˆ  = 0.72 and ˆ  = 1.31 (respectively). The preliminary 
conflict from concern about argumentation was estimated at 0Aˆ  = 0.32 in the gains condition 
and at 0Aˆ  = 0.59 in the losses condition. The preliminary conflict from concern about 
sacrifice was estimated at 0Sˆ  = 0.88 in the gains condition and at 0Sˆ  = 0.51 in the losses 
condition. Furthermore, the preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation was 
estimated at 0Aˆ  = 0.37 in the choice condition and 0Aˆ  = 0.54 in the rejection condition. The 
preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice was estimated at 0Sˆ  = 0.80 in the choice 
condition and 0Sˆ  = 0.59 in the rejection condition. 
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Appendix D: Construction of the Rational-Experiential Inventory  
(Portuguese Version) 
To measure the style of thinking of the participants we adapted the rational-
experiential inventory, REI (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). We started by translating the REI to 
Portuguese. The questionnaire consisted of two scales and a total of 40 items: Items 1 to 20 
evaluated rationality and items 21 to 40 evaluated experientiality. Moreover, as Pacini and 
Epstein (1999) suggested, each scale can be sub-divided into the engagement and ability 
subscales.  Accordingly, items 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 15, 18, and 20 measured rational 
engagement, items 2, 4, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, and 19 measured rational ability, items 21, 
25, 26, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, and 38 measured experiential engagement, and items 22, 23, 24, 
27, 28, 29, 35, 37, 39, and 40 measured experiential ability. Moreover, items 3, 6, 10, 13, 14, 
15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31, 35, 38, and 39 were positively worded, 
whereas items 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 18, 22, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, and 40 were 
negatively worded.
28
 The answering scale was a 5 point rating scale:  (1) strongly disagree; 
(2) disagree; (3) nor agree or disagree; (4) agree; (5) strongly agree.  
The questionnaire was preceded by a cover page instructing the participants that the 
questionnaire was composed by a set of affirmations, that the task was to mark with a cross 
(X) the option with which they most identify, that there were no right or wrong answers, and 
that it was anonymous and the answers confidential. To avoid possible order effects, 5 other 
versions of the questionnaire were developed. Specifically, to counterbalance the order of 
presentation of the items, we constructed 2 other versions in which we altered the order of the 
items but maintained the order of the scales. To counterbalance the order of presentation of 
the scales, we developed another 3 versions in which we maintained the order of the items but 
inverted the order of the scales. The questionnaires were pre-tested on 66 psychology students 
from ISPA-IU (each version of the questionnaire was applied to 11 participants). The rational 
and experiential ratings were coded from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) in the 
positive items and from 5 (strongly disagree) to 1 (strongly agree) in the negative items. 
Rationality and experientiality were obtained by summing the ratings on all the respective 
items. Both rationality and experientiality increase as the score increases.  
                                               
28A total of 21 items were positively worded and 19 were negatively worded as in the version of Pacini and 
Epstein (1999). 
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In order to confirm the items distribution in two independent scales, we performed a 
principal component analysis with varimax rotation on the 40 items. Two components were 
extracted. The first component had an eigenvalue of 8.40 and explained 21.00% of the total 
variance. The second component had an eigenvalue of 5.26 and explained 13.16% of the total 
variance. Together they accounted for 34.17% of the total variance. Component 1 
corresponded to the experientiality scale and component 2 to the rationality scale. Table 14 
presents the items and respective loadings on each scale.  Accordingly, the first 20 items (with 
exception of items and 13, 15 and 17) presented a positive larger weight (higher loadings) on 
the second component, and the last 20 items (with exception of item 37) presented a positive 
and larger weight (higher loading) on the first component. Overall, the results were similar to 
those obtained by Pacini and Epstein (1999) in that relatively strong and weak items in their 
study (with high and low saturation on the target scales) tended to be relatively strong and 
weak items in our study as well. Note that the last items of each scale tended to be the 
weakest items (with lower loadings), which is consistent with Pacini and Epstein (1999) 
seeing that they ordered the items of each scale according to their weight (the lower the item 
number in each scale, the stronger the item).  
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Table 24 
Factor Structure of the Portuguese Rationality-Experientiality Inventory 
Item No. Rationality Scale E R 
5 I don't like to have to do a lot of thinking. -0,05 0,77 
3 I enjoy intellectual challenges. 0,04 0,75 
9 Reasoning things out carefully is not one of my strong points. 0,07 0,73 
2 I'm not that good at figuring out complicated problems. 0,25 0,71 
6 I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking. 0,20 0,70 
11 Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction. 0,09 0,69 
4 I am not very good at solving problems that require careful logical analysis. -0,01 0,63 
1 I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something. -0,11 0,63 
10 I prefer complex problems to simple problems. 0,10 0,59 
8 I am not a very analytical thinker. -0,01 0,55 
7 Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable activity. 0,10 0,53 
16 I have no problem thinking things through carefully. 0,01 0,48 
12 I don't reason well under pressure. 0,27 0,43 
18 Knowing the answer without having to understand the reasoning behind it is good enough for me.  0,05 0,33 
20 Learning new ways to think would be very appealing to me 0,02 0,20 
19 I usually have clear, explainable reasons for my decisions 0,00 0,18 
14 I have a logical mind. 0,03 0,15 
13 I am much better at figuring things out logically than most people. 0,30 0,14 
15 I enjoy thinking in abstract terms 0,11 0,10 
17 Using logic usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life. 0,26 0,05 
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Item No. Experientiality Scale E R 
23 Using my gut feelings usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life. 0,81 -0,03 
24 I believe in trusting my hunches. 0,79 0,12 
25 Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems. 0,77 -0,03 
29 If I were to rely on my gut feelings, I would often make mistakes. 0,76 0,12 
21 I like to rely on my intuitive impressions. 0,73 0,09 
35 I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest gut feelings to find an answer.  0,73 0,19 
30 I don't like situations in which I have to rely on intuition. 0,70 0,11 
22 I don't have a very good sense of intuition. 0,68 0,20 
31 I think there are times when one should rely on one's intuition. 0,61 0,23 
26 I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action. 0,60 0,01 
28 When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings. 0,60 -0,21 
39 I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong, even if I can't explain how I know. 0,60 -0,11 
27 I trust my initial feelings about people 0,53 -0,22 
38 I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions. 0,51 -0,09 
36 I would not want to depend on anyone who described himself or herself as intuitive. 0,45 0,05 
33 I don't think it is a good idea to rely on one's intuition for important decisions. 0,42 0,07 
40 I suspect my hunches are inaccurate as often as they are accurate. 0,42 0,11 
32 I think it is foolish to make important decisions based on feelings. 0,34 0,20 
37 My snap judgments are probably not as good as most people's.  0,30 0,31 
34 I generally don't depend on my feelings to help me make decisions. 0,27 0,11 
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Another two principal component analyses (one for each scale) were conducted. The 
purpose of these analyses was to examine the composition of each scale and respective 
subscales, and to reduce the questionnaire in order to prevent its length would jeopardize the 
cooperativeness of the participants (seeing that they complained that it was very repetitive). In 
the rationality scale, one component was extracted. This component presented an eigenvalue 
of 5.69, explained 28.43% of the total variance, and loaded positively on all items. The factor 
loadings ranged from .10 to .76. By analyzing the line plot of factor loadings depicted in 
Figure 29, two distinct groups of items can be identified: One with loadings higher than .4 and 
other with loadings lower than .4. Therefore, we determined .4 as a cutoff value and the items 
with loadings below this value were removed from the scale: Items 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, and 
20.  
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Figure 29. Factor loadings of the rationality scale. 
 
In the experientiality scale, one component was also extracted, which presented an 
eigenvalue of 7.08 and explained 35.40% of the total variance. This component presented 
positive loadings on all items. The factor loadings ranged from .26 to .77. The analysis of the 
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line plot of factor loadings, depicted in Figure 30, does not allow a clear identification of the 
items to be removed as in the rationality scale. Nonetheless, to maintain the same number of 
items in both scales, we removed the 7 items with the lowest loadings from the experientiality 
scale: Items 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, and 40. 
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Figure 30. Factor loadings of the experiential scale. 
 
 Pacini and Epstein (1999) suggested that each scale could be divided into two 
subscales, ability and engagement; nevertheless, our results did not support this structure, 
neither on the rationality scale nor on the experientiality scale. A rotated two factor solution 
was conducted for each scale, but the results still did not support the subscales division.  
In order to test the internal consistency of the scales, two reliability analyses (one on 
each scale) were conducted. The analysis of the rationality scale revealed a standardized 
Cronbach alpha of .84, which increased to .88 when excluding the 7 items with the lowest 
loadings. The analysis of the experientiality scale revealed a standardized Cronbach alpha of 
.89, which increased to .90 when excluding the 7 items with the lowest loadings. These results 
indicate a good internal consistency of the scales and support the reduction of the 
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questionnaire to the 26 strongest items. Furthermore, these results are similar to the ones 
obtained by Pacini and Epstein (1999): Alpha of .90 for the rationality scale, and alpha of .87 
for the experientiality scale. 
On the basis of the above results, we constructed a reduced (Portuguese) version of 
REI (Appendix D), not considering the engagement and ability subscales and excluding the 
items 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, and 20 from the rationality scale, and the items 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 
38, and 40 from the experientiality scale.  
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Appendix E: Rational-Experiential Inventory  
(Reduced Portuguese Version) 
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For each statement, mark with a cross (X) the option with which you most identify, according to the following scale: (1) Strongly Disagree; (2) 
Disagree; (3) Nor Agree or Disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly Agree.  
 
1. I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something.     1 2 3 4 5 
2. I'm not that good at figuring out complicated problems.       1 2 3 4 5 
3. I enjoy intellectual challenges.          1 2 3 4 5 
4. I am not very good at solving problems that require careful logical analysis.    1 2 3 4 5 
5. I don't like to have to do a lot of thinking.        1 2 3 4 5 
6. I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking.       1 2 3 4 5 
7. Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable activity.       1 2 3 4 5 
8. I am not a very analytical thinker.            1 2 3 4 5 
9. Reasoning things out carefully is not one of my strong points.      1 2 3 4 5 
10. I prefer complex problems to simple problems.        1 2 3 4 5 
11. Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction.    1 2 3 4 5 
12. I don't reason well under pressure.         1 2 3 4 5 
13. I have no problem thinking things through carefully.       1 2 3 4 5 
14. I like to rely on my intuitive impressions.        1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly  
Agree 
Strongly  
Disagree 
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For each statement, mark with a cross (X) the option with which you most identify, according to the following scale: (1) Strongly Disagree; (2) 
Disagree; (3) Nor Agree or Disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly Agree.  
 
15. I don't have a very good sense of intuition.        1 2 3 4 5 
16. Using my gut feelings usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life.   1 2 3 4 5 
17. I believe in trusting my hunches.         1 2 3 4 5 
18. Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems.       1 2 3 4 5 
19. I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action.      1 2 3 4 5 
20. I trust my initial feelings about people.         1 2 3 4 5 
21. When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings.     1 2 3 4 5 
22. If I were to rely on my gut feelings, I would often make mistakes.     1 2 3 4 5 
23. I don't like situations in which I have to rely on intuition.      1 2 3 4 5 
24. I think there are times when one should rely on one's intuition.      1 2 3 4 5 
25. I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest gut feelings to find an answer.   1 2 3 4 5 
26. I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong, even if I can't explain how I know.   1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Strongly  
Agree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
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Appendix F: Results - Experiment 2 
 
Conflict: Principal Component Analysis 
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Figure 31. Principal component analysis conducted on the five conflict measures - scree plot. 
 
Table 25 
Eigenvalues 
  Eigenvalue 
% Total 
variance 
Cumulative 
Eigenvalue 
Cumulative 
% 
1 1,9805 39,6095 1,9805 39,6095 
2 0,9222 18,4431 2,9026 58,0526 
3 0,8927 17,8544 3,7954 75,9070 
4 0,6541 13,0825 4,4495 88,9895 
5 0,5505 11,0105 5,0000 100,0000 
 
Table 26   
Factor Loadings   
 Measure Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
Decision Time -0,3834 0,9156 -0,1190 -0,0168 0,0136 
Decision Uncertainty -0,7168 -0,1046 0,4042 -0,2694 0,4892 
Decision Difficulty -0,6967 -0,0536 0,5013 0,0974 -0,5009 
Preferece Equality -0,6805 -0,1677 -0,3476 0,6026 0,1579 
Attribute-Weight Equality -0,6093 -0,2046 -0,5856 -0,4568 -0,1876 
Expl.Var 1,9805 0,9222 0,8927 0,6541 0,5505 
Prp.Totl 0,3961 0,1844 0,1785 0,1308 0,1101 
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Conflict: Reliability Analysis 
 
Table 27   
Reliability Analysis - Alpha de Cronbach 
Valid N 2736 
Cronbach alpha 0,4786 
Standardized alpha 0,6057 
Average inter-item corr.  0,2378 
 
Table 28   
Reliability Analysis by Measure 
Measure  
Itm-Totl 
Correl. 
Alpha if 
deleted 
Decision Time 0,1810 0,4671 
Decision Uncertainty 0,4494 0,2458 
Decision Difficulty 0,4477 0,2468 
Preferece Equality 0,3597 0,4812 
Attribute-Weight Equality 0,2861 0,4846 
 
Rationality Scale: Reliability Analyses 
 
Table 29   
Reliability Analysis - Alpha de Cronbach (13 Items) 
Valid N 2736 
Cronbach alpha 0,7671 
Standardized alpha 0,7655 
Average inter-item corr.  0,2115 
 
Table 30   
Reliability Analysis by Measure - 13 Items 
  
Itm-Totl 
Correl. 
Alpha if 
deleted 
Item1 0,4890 0,7411 
Item2 0,2372 0,7660 
Item3 0,5804 0,7302 
Item4 0,2704 0,7632 
Item5 0,6288 0,7242 
Item6 0,4631 0,7454 
Item7 0,3979 0,7518 
Item8 0,4343 0,7481 
Item9 0,4975 0,7415 
Item10 0,5401 0,7370 
Item11 0,2528 0,7652 
Item12 -0,0371 0,7994 
Item13 0,3673 0,7549 
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Table 31   
Reliability Analysis - Alpha de Cronbach (12 Items) 
Valid N 2736 
Cronbach alpha 0,7994 
Standardized alpha 0,7892 
Average inter-item corr.  0,2487 
 
Table 32   
Reliability Analysis by Measure - 12 Items 
  
Itm-Totl 
Correl. 
Alpha if 
deleted 
Item1 0,5442 0,7743 
Item2 0,1801 0,8060 
Item3 0,6309 0,7644 
Item4 0,2145 0,8033 
Item5 0,6835 0,7584 
Item6 0,4723 0,7823 
Item7 0,4173 0,7874 
Item8 0,4383 0,7854 
Item9 0,5025 0,7793 
Item10 0,5663 0,7731 
Item11 0,2008 0,8055 
Item13 0,3911 0,7896 
 
Experientiality Scale: Reliability Analyses 
 
Table 33   
Reliability Analysis - Alpha de Cronbach (13 Items) 
Valid N 2736 
Cronbach alpha 0,7861 
Standardized alpha 0,7944 
Average inter-item corr.  0,2338 
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Table 34   
Reliability Analysis by Measure - 13 Items 
  
Itm-Totl 
Correl. 
Alpha if 
deleted 
Item14 0,6082 0,7543 
Item15 0,3944 0,7741 
Item16 0,4218 0,7715 
Item17 0,4855 0,7665 
Item18 0,4961 0,7646 
Item19 0,4524 0,7688 
Item20 0,1922 0,7973 
Item21 0,3217 0,7820 
Item22 0,5112 0,7629 
Item23 0,4068 0,7732 
Item24 0,4347 0,7714 
Item25 0,3707 0,7761 
Item26 0,3824 0,7751 
 
Table 35   
Reliability Analysis - Alpha de Cronbach (12 Items) 
Valid N 2736 
Cronbach alpha 0,7973 
Standardized alpha 0,8020 
Average inter-item corr.  0,2562 
 
Table 36   
Reliability Analysis by Measure - 12 Items 
  
Itm-Totl 
Correl. 
Alpha if 
deleted 
Item14 0,6090 0,7666 
Item15 0,3111 0,7954 
Item16 0,4683 0,7801 
Item17 0,4998 0,7779 
Item18 0,5379 0,7733 
Item19 0,4849 0,7787 
Item21 0,2685 0,8016 
Item22 0,5413 0,7727 
Item23 0,3971 0,7878 
Item24 0,4569 0,7822 
Item25 0,3745 0,7890 
Item26 0,3977 0,7868 
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REI: Principal component analysis 
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Figure 32. Principal component analysis conducted on the 24 REI items - scree plot. 
 
Table 37 
Eigenvalues 
  Eigenvalue 
% Total 
variance 
Cumulative 
Eigenvalue 
Cumulative 
% 
1 5,0518 21,0490 5,0518 21,0490 
2 3,5213 14,6719 8,5730 35,7210 
3 2,2212 9,2549 10,7942 44,9758 
4 1,4117 5,8821 12,2059 50,8579 
5 1,1639 4,8494 13,3698 55,7074 
 
Conflict: Hypotheses Test 
In the following linear regression analyses: GL denotes the contrast between outcome 
sign conditions (gains versus losses); RG denotes the contrast between reference gamble 
conditions (large-amount condition versus high-probability condition); ISL denotes the 
quadratic contrast between tradeoff size conditions (intermediate versus small and large 
tradeoffs); SL denotes the linear contrast between tradeoff size conditions (small versus large 
tradeoffs); RE1 denotes the first contrast between thinking style conditions (low-rationality-
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and-low-experientiality versus high-rationality-and-or-high-experientiality); RE2 denotes the 
second contrast between thinking style conditions (low-rationality-and-high-experientiality 
versus high-rationality); RE3 denotes the third contrast between thinking style conditions 
(high-rationality-and-low-experientiality versus high-rationality-and-high-experientiality); 
and the other variables denote the interactions between these contrasts. 
 
Table 38 
Parameter Estimates- Regression 1 
  
Conflict 
Param. 
Conflict    
t 
Conflict 
p 
Intercept 0,5166 159,9690 0,0000 
RE1 0,0096 5,1374 0,0000 
RE2 0,0064 2,4350 0,0150 
RE3 0,0043 0,9334 0,3507 
GL 0,0233 7,2170 0,0000 
RG 0,0032 0,9783 0,3280 
ISL 0,0037 1,6105 0,1074 
SL 0,0083 2,1009 0,0357 
RGISL 0,0007 0,3066 0,7592 
RGSL -0,0025 -0,6244 0,5324 
GLRG 0,0013 0,4174 0,6764 
GLISL 0,0025 1,0729 0,2834 
GLSL -0,0072 -1,8319 0,0671 
GLRGISL -0,0003 -0,1178 0,9063 
GLRGSL 0,0020 0,5029 0,6151 
RE1GL -0,0019 -1,0064 0,3143 
RE1RG -0,0009 -0,4725 0,6366 
RE1ISL 0,0003 0,2205 0,8255 
RE1SL -0,0030 -1,3058 0,1917 
RE1RGISL -0,0001 -0,0992 0,9210 
RE1RGSL -0,0001 -0,0300 0,9760 
RE1GLRG -0,0030 -1,6079 0,1080 
RE1GLISL 0,0003 0,2164 0,8287 
RE1GLSL 0,0015 0,6446 0,5193 
RE1GLRGISL -0,0011 -0,8183 0,4133 
RE1GLRGSL -0,0003 -0,1466 0,8835 
RE2GL 0,0028 1,0515 0,2931 
RE2RG -0,0007 -0,2692 0,7878 
RE2ISL 0,0008 0,4443 0,6568 
RE2SL 0,0002 0,0540 0,9569 
RE2RGISL 0,0014 0,7739 0,4391 
RE2RGSL 0,0053 1,6412 0,1009 
RE2GLRG -0,0007 -0,2689 0,7880 
RE2GLISL 0,0003 0,1569 0,8753 
RE2GLSL -0,0036 -1,1159 0,2646 
RE2GLRGISL -0,0020 -1,0883 0,2766 
RE2GLRGSL 0,0006 0,1733 0,8624 
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Conflict 
Param. 
Conflict    
t 
Conflict 
p 
RE3GL -0,0029 -0,6306 0,5283 
RE3RG 0,0040 0,8692 0,3848 
RE3ISL -0,0040 -1,2502 0,2114 
RE3SL -0,0029 -0,5112 0,6092 
RE3RGISL -0,0011 -0,3493 0,7269 
RE3RGSL -0,0065 -1,1703 0,2420 
RE3GLRG 0,0020 0,4270 0,6694 
RE3GLISL -0,0001 -0,0430 0,9657 
RE3GLSL 0,0000 0,0027 0,9978 
RE3GLRGISL 0,0012 0,3855 0,6999 
RE3GLRGSL 0,0005 0,0973 0,9225 
 
Table 39 
Parameter Estimates - Regression 2 
  
Conflict 
Param. 
Conflict    
t 
Conflict 
p 
Intercept 0,4933 106,6286 0,0000 
RE1 0,0115 4,2887 0,0000 
RE2 0,0036 0,9657 0,3344 
RE3 0,0071 1,0918 0,2751 
RG 0,0018 0,3915 0,6955 
ISL 0,0012 0,3753 0,7075 
SL 0,0156 2,7452 0,0061 
RGISL 0,0010 0,2962 0,7671 
RGSL -0,0045 -0,7869 0,4315 
RE1RG 0,0021 0,7926 0,4282 
RE1ISL 0,0000 0,0028 0,9977 
RE1SL -0,0045 -1,3615 0,1736 
RE1RGISL 0,0009 0,5020 0,6158 
RE1RGSL 0,0003 0,0814 0,9352 
RE2RG 0,0000 -0,0002 0,9998 
RE2ISL 0,0005 0,2006 0,8410 
RE2SL 0,0038 0,8167 0,4143 
RE2RGISL 0,0035 1,2999 0,1939 
RE2RGSL 0,0047 1,0247 0,3057 
RE3RG 0,0020 0,3087 0,7576 
RE3ISL -0,0039 -0,8426 0,3996 
RE3SL -0,0029 -0,3588 0,7198 
RE3RGISL -0,0024 -0,5129 0,6081 
RE3RGSL -0,0071 -0,8849 0,3764 
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Table 40 
Parameter Estimates - Regression 3 
  
Conflict 
Param. 
Conflict    
t 
Conflict 
p 
Intercept 0,5399 119,7929 0,0000 
RE1 0,0077 2,9600 0,0031 
RE2 0,0092 2,4982 0,0126 
RE3 0,0014 0,2170 0,8283 
RG 0,0045 1,0001 0,3175 
ISL 0,0061 1,9228 0,0547 
SL 0,0011 0,1928 0,8472 
RGISL 0,0004 0,1353 0,8924 
RGSL -0,0005 -0,0871 0,9306 
RE1RG -0,0039 -1,4907 0,1363 
RE1ISL 0,0006 0,3131 0,7543 
RE1SL -0,0015 -0,4738 0,6357 
RE1RGISL -0,0012 -0,6574 0,5111 
RE1RGSL -0,0004 -0,1266 0,8993 
RE2RG -0,0014 -0,3856 0,6999 
RE2ISL 0,0011 0,4308 0,6667 
RE2SL -0,0034 -0,7608 0,4469 
RE2RGISL -0,0006 -0,2253 0,8218 
RE2RGSL 0,0059 1,3002 0,1938 
RE3RG 0,0059 0,9287 0,3532 
RE3ISL -0,0042 -0,9266 0,3543 
RE3SL -0,0028 -0,3644 0,7156 
RE3RGISL 0,0001 0,0259 0,9793 
RE3RGSL -0,0060 -0,7688 0,4421 
 
Parametric Hypotheses Test 
In Experiment 2 the auxiliary parameters, the arbitrary scaling constant and the drive-
capacity parameter, were estimated at ˆ  = 1.40 and ˆ  = 4.76, respectively.  
The preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation was estimated at 0Aˆ  = 
0.47 in the gains condition and at 0Aˆ  = 0.57 in the losses condition. The preliminary conflict 
from concern about sacrifice was estimated at 0Sˆ  = 0.53 in the gains condition and at 0Sˆ  
= 
0.57 in the losses condition. These estimates allow us to test H1.2.1. 
In what concerns the analyses of the levels of preliminary conflict from concern about 
sacrifice and argumentation as a function thinking style, the preliminary conflict from concern 
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about sacrifice was estimated at 0Sˆ  
= 0.74 and the preliminary conflict from concern about 
argumentation at 0Aˆ  
= 0.69. 
Moreover, when rationality was high, the preliminary conflict from concern about 
argumentation and from concern about sacrifice was estimated at 00
ˆˆ SA 
 
= 0.54 when 
experientiality was low and at 00
ˆˆ SA 
 
= 0.53 when experientiality was high (main effect of 
experientiality). When analyzing the interaction effect between experientiality and source of 
conflict, the preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice when high experientiality and 
from concern about argumentation when low experientiality was .54 and the preliminary 
conflict from concern about sacrifice when low experientiality and from concern about 
argumentation when high experientiality was .52. Both the main and the interaction effect 
allow us to test H3. 
When both rationality and experientiality were low the preliminary conflict from 
concern about argumentation was estimated at 0Aˆ  
= 0.29 and the preliminary conflict from 
concern about sacrifice at
 0
Sˆ
 
= 0.29. When either or both rationality and experientiality were 
high, the preliminary conflict from concern about argumentation was estimated at 0Aˆ  
= 0.25 
and the preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice at 0Sˆ  
= 0.27. These estimates allow 
us to test H4.1. 
Finally, when rationality was high, the preliminary conflict from concern about 
argumentation and the preliminary conflict from sacrifice were estimated at 0Aˆ  
= 0.25 and 0Sˆ  
= 0.28, respectively. When rationality was low but experientiality was high the preliminary 
conflict from concern about argumentation and the preliminary conflict from sacrifice were 
estimated at 0Aˆ  
= 0.29 and 0Sˆ  
= 0.2, respectively. These estimates allow us to test H5.1 and 
H5.2. 
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Appendix G: Stimuli Construction - Experiment 3 
The gambles of the O-range condition in Experiment 3 were constructed on the basis 
of estimates of prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) as previously. The intention 
was to create an experimental condition, the O-range condition, in which the outcome range 
was increased, so that it would generate a greater preference for the riskier gamble than for 
the safer one. 
The procedure was similar to the one described in Appendix A, except that in order to 
increase the preference for the riskier gamble, we set q = .044226 (Equation B4), which 
increased the range of outcome values by 522%. 
The resulting outcome values were converted back to outcomes trough Equation B5 
and were rounded to the nearest €0.50. These outcomes are presented in Table 6. 
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Appendix H: Results - Experiment 3 
 
Conflict: Variable Construction/ Principal Component Analysis 
 
1 2 3 4 5
Number of Eigenvalues
0,0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1,0
1,2
1,4
1,6
1,8
2,0
2,2
V
a
lu
e
 
Figure 33. Principal component analysis - scree plot (Experiment 3). 
 
Table 42 
Eigenvalues 
  Eigenvalue 
% Total 
variance 
Cumulative 
Eigenvalue 
Cumulative 
% 
1 1,8901 37,80154 1,890077 37,8015 
2 0,9957 19,91329 2,885741 57,7148 
3 0,9146 18,29153 3,800318 76,0064 
4 0,6557 13,11366 4,456001 89,1200 
5 0,5440 10,87998 5,000000 100,0000 
 
 
Table 43   
Factor Loadings   
Measure  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
Decision Time 0,4494 -0,0703 0,8741 0,0471 0,1640 
Decision Uncertainty 0,6886 -0,3851 -0,3488 -0,0988 0,4960 
Decision Difficulty 0,7088 -0,4546 -0,0356 -0,1524 -0,5162 
Preferece Equality 0,6633 0,3845 -0,1617 0,6176 -0,0675 
Attribute-Weight Equality 0,5211 0,6985 -0,0385 -0,4889 -0,0088 
Expl.Var 1,8901 0,9957 0,9146 0,6557 0,5440 
Prp.Totl 0,3780 0,1991 0,1829 0,1311 0,1088 
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Reliability Analysis 
 
Table 44   
Reliability Analysis - Alpha de Cronbach 
Valid N 2592 
Cronbach alpha 0,4736 
Standardized alpha 0,5792 
Average inter-item corr.  0,2185 
 
Table 45   
Reliability Analysis by Measure 
Measure  
Itm-Totl 
Correl. 
Alpha if 
deleted 
Decision Time 0,2083 0,4476 
Decision Uncertainty 0,4165 0,2759 
Decision Difficulty 0,4786 0,1946 
Preferece Equality 0,3293 0,4814 
Attribute-Weight Equality 0,1958 0,4890 
 
Conflict: Hypotheses Test 
In the following linear regression analyses: P denotes the contrast concerning the 
effect of progress through choice tasks (first six tasks versus last six tasks); CD denotes the 
contrasts between chance device condition (single device versus multiple device); SO denotes 
the contrast between range conditions (S-range versus O-range); RG denotes the contrast 
between reference gamble conditions (large-amount condition versus high-
probabilitycondition); ISL denotes the quadratic contrast between tradeoff size conditions 
(intermediate versus small and large tradeoffs); SL denotes the linear contrast between 
tradeoff size conditions (small versus large tradeoffs); and the other variables denote the 
interactions between these contrasts. 
 
Table 46 
Parameter Estimates- Regression 1 
  
Conflict 
Param. 
Conflict    
t 
Conflict 
p 
Intercept 0,5734 172,9692 0,00 
P -0,0227 -6,8351 0,00 
CD 0,0144 4,3529 0,00 
SO -0,0081 -2,4496 0,01 
RG 0,0018 0,5478 0,58 
ISL 0,0065 2,7588 0,01 
SL 0,0050 1,2314 0,22 
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Conflict 
Param. 
Conflict    
t 
Conflict 
p 
CDSO -0,0005 -0,1590 0,87 
CDRG 0,0000 -0,0039 1,00 
CDISL 0,0015 0,6276 0,53 
CDSL -0,0046 -1,1276 0,26 
SORG -0,0020 -0,5986 0,55 
SOISL 0,0017 0,7121 0,48 
SOSL -0,0166 -4,0859 0,00 
RGISL -0,0014 -0,5943 0,55 
RGSL -0,0048 -1,1742 0,24 
CDSORG -0,0025 -0,7614 0,45 
CDSOISL -0,0015 -0,6393 0,52 
CDSOSL 0,0061 1,4956 0,13 
CDRGISL -0,0025 -1,0503 0,29 
CDRGSL 0,0033 0,8160 0,41 
SORGISL -0,0022 -0,9186 0,36 
SORGSL 0,0024 0,5803 0,56 
CDSORGISL 0,0019 0,7946 0,43 
CDSORGSL 0,0002 0,0531 0,96 
PCD -0,0037 -1,1301 0,26 
PSO -0,0039 -1,1834 0,24 
PRG -0,0037 -1,1198 0,26 
PISL 0,0019 0,8118 0,42 
PSL -0,0052 -1,2873 0,20 
PCDSO 0,0062 1,8793 0,06 
PCDRG -0,0002 -0,0470 0,96 
PCDISL 0,0013 0,5430 0,59 
PCDSL -0,0003 -0,0692 0,94 
PSORG -0,0025 -0,7446 0,46 
PSOISL 0,0027 1,1530 0,25 
PSOSL -0,0150 -3,6918 0,00 
PRGISL -0,0011 -0,4636 0,64 
PRGSL -0,0012 -0,2915 0,77 
PCDSORG 0,0057 1,7186 0,09 
PCDSOISL 0,0024 1,0272 0,30 
PCDSOSL 0,0006 0,1404 0,89 
PCDRGISL -0,0001 -0,0468 0,96 
PCDRGSL 0,0004 0,0923 0,93 
PSORGISL 0,0019 0,8002 0,42 
PSORGSL 0,0033 0,8144 0,42 
PCDSORGISL -0,0025 -1,0601 0,29 
PCDSORGSL -0,0032 -0,7986 0,42 
 
 
 
 
201 
 
 
Table 47 
Parameter Estimates- Regression 2 
  
Conflict 
Param. 
Conflict    
t 
Conflict 
p 
Intercept 0,5507 113,8455 0,0000 
CD 0,0107 2,2085 0,0274 
SO -0,0120 -2,4895 0,0129 
RG -0,0019 -0,3920 0,6952 
ISL 0,0084 2,4540 0,0143 
SL -0,0002 -0,0382 0,9696 
CDSO 0,0057 1,1788 0,2387 
CDRG -0,0002 -0,0349 0,9722 
CDISL 0,0027 0,8046 0,4212 
CDSL -0,0049 -0,8178 0,4136 
SORG -0,0045 -0,9204 0,3575 
SOISL 0,0044 1,2819 0,2001 
SOSL -0,0316 -5,3144 0,0000 
RGISL -0,0025 -0,7270 0,4673 
RGSL -0,0060 -1,0015 0,3168 
CDSORG 0,0032 0,6559 0,5120 
CDSOISL 0,0009 0,2666 0,7898 
CDSOSL 0,0066 1,1178 0,2639 
CDRGISL -0,0026 -0,7540 0,4510 
CDRGSL 0,0037 0,6206 0,5350 
SORGISL -0,0003 -0,0814 0,9352 
SORGSL 0,0057 0,9530 0,3408 
CDSORGISL -0,0006 -0,1825 0,8552 
CDSORGSL -0,0030 -0,5094 0,6106 
 
 
Table 48 
Parameter Estimates - Regression 3 
  
Conflict 
Param. 
Conflict    
t 
Conflict 
p 
Intercept 0,5628 86,0552 0,0000 
D 0,0050 0,7617 0,4465 
RG 0,0026 0,3909 0,6960 
ISL 0,0040 0,8720 0,3835 
SL 0,0314 3,8811 0,0001 
DRG -0,0033 -0,5110 0,6095 
DISL 0,0018 0,4002 0,6891 
DSL -0,0115 -1,4238 0,1550 
RGISL -0,0022 -0,4804 0,6311 
RGSL -0,0116 -1,4376 0,1510 
DRGISL -0,0019 -0,4252 0,6708 
DRGSL 0,0067 0,8312 0,4062 
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Table 49 
Parameter Estimates- Regression 4 
  
Conflict 
Param. 
Conflict    
t 
Conflict 
p 
Intercept 0,5387 75,3583 0,0000 
CD 0,0164 2,2923 0,0222 
RG -0,0063 -0,8881 0,3748 
ISL 0,0127 2,5145 0,0122 
SL -0,0318 -3,6419 0,0003 
CDRG 0,0030 0,4203 0,6744 
CDISL 0,0036 0,7210 0,4712 
CDSL 0,0018 0,2041 0,8383 
RGISL -0,0028 -0,5441 0,5866 
RGSL -0,0003 -0,0330 0,9737 
CDRGISL -0,0032 -0,6303 0,5287 
CDRGSL 0,0007 0,0757 0,9397 
 
Parametric Hypotheses Test 
In Experiment 3 the arbitrary scaling constant and the drive-capacity parameter were 
estimated at ˆ  = 1.03 and ˆ  = 1.59, respectively. The preliminary conflict aroused by 
concern about argumentation was estimated at 0Aˆ  
= 0.44 in the S-range condition and at 0Aˆ  
= 
1.00 in the O-range condition. The preliminary conflict from concern about sacrifice was set 
to 1 in the S-range condition and estimated at 0Sˆ  
= 0.39 in the O-range condition.  
Manipulation Check  
In the following analyses SO denotes the contrast between range conditions (S-range 
versus O-range). 
 
Table 50 
Likelihood Type 3 Test 
  
Degr. Of 
Freedom 
Log- 
Likelihood 
Chi- 
Square 
p 
SO 1 -1773,2057 169,0012 0,0000 
 
Table 51 
Parameter Estimates 
  Estimate Wald Stat. p 
Intercept 0,2890 49,4640 0,0000 
SO 0,5247 163,0019 0,0000 
Scale 1,0000     
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Appendix I: Results - Peanuts Effect Study 
In the following analyses: SPE denotes the contrast between range conditions (S-range 
versus PE-range); RG denotes the contrast between reference gamble conditions (large-
amount condition versus high-probability condition); ISL denotes the quadratic contrast 
between tradeoff size conditions (intermediate versus small and large tradeoffs); SL denotes 
the linear contrast between tradeoff size conditions (small versus large tradeoffs); P denotes 
the contrast concerning the effect of progress through choice tasks (first six tasks versus last 
six tasks); and the other variables denote the interactions between these contrasts. 
 
Manipulation Check by Range Condition 
 
Table 52 
Likelihood Type 3 Test 
  
Degr. Of 
Freedom 
Log- 
Likelihood 
Chi- 
Square 
p 
SPE 1 -1193,3054 9,5395 0,0020 
 
Table 53 
Parameter Estimates 
  Estimate Wald Stat. p 
Intercept -0,1446 8,9314 0,0028 
SPE 0,1492 9,5126 0,0020 
Scale 1,0000     
 
Manipulation Check by Reference Gamble Condition 
 
Table 54 
Likelihood Type 3 Test: S-Range 
  
Degr. Of 
Freedom 
Log- 
Likelihood 
Chi- 
Square 
p 
RG 1 -589,6588 1,3674 0,2423 
 
Table 55 
Parameter Estimates: S-Range 
  Estimate Wald Stat. p 
Intercept -0,2942 18,2707 0,0000 
RG -0,0805 1,3663 0,2425 
Scale 1,0000     
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Table 56 
Likelihood Type 3 Test: PE-Range 
  
Degr. Of 
Freedom 
Log- 
Likelihood 
Chi- 
Square 
p 
RG 1 -598,8768 0,7825 0,3764 
 
Table 57 
Parameter Estimates: PE-Range 
  Estimate Wald Stat. p 
Intercept 0,0046 0,0046 0,9457 
RG 0,0602 0,7822 0,3765 
Scale 1,0000     
 
Regression Analysis 
 
Table 58 
Parameter Estimates- Regression (Last 6 Tasks) 
  
Conflict 
Param. 
Conflict    
t 
Conflict 
p 
Intercept 0,5091 79,0791 0,0000 
SPE 0,0060 0,9348 0,3502 
RG 0,0041 0,6443 0,5196 
ISL 0,0035 0,7626 0,4459 
SL 0,0157 2,0235 0,0433 
SPERG -0,0015 -0,2259 0,8214 
SPEISL -0,0022 -0,4743 0,6354 
SPESL -0,0046 -0,5942 0,5525 
RGISL -0,0066 -1,4219 0,1554 
RGSL -0,0017 -0,2234 0,8232 
SPERGISL -0,0028 -0,6003 0,5485 
SPERGSL 0,0128 1,6548 0,0983 
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Table 59 
Parameter Estimates- Regression (All 12 Tasks) 
  
Conflict 
Param. 
Conflict    
t 
Conflict 
p 
Intercept 0,5259 118,6828 0,0000 
P -0,0168 -3,7837 0,0002 
SPE 0,0022 0,5004 0,6168 
RG 0,0084 1,8994 0,0577 
ISL 0,0063 2,0124 0,0443 
SL 0,0128 2,3639 0,0182 
PSPE 0,0038 0,8577 0,3912 
PRG -0,0043 -0,9632 0,3356 
PISL -0,0028 -0,8889 0,3742 
PSL 0,0029 0,5342 0,5933 
SPERG 0,0018 0,4150 0,6782 
SPEISL 0,0001 0,0180 0,9856 
SPESL -0,0040 -0,7361 0,4618 
RGISL -0,0033 -1,0494 0,2942 
RGSL -0,0040 -0,7310 0,4649 
PSPERG -0,0033 -0,7432 0,4575 
PSPEISL -0,0022 -0,7168 0,4736 
PSPESL -0,0006 -0,1150 0,9085 
PRGISL -0,0033 -1,0454 0,2960 
PRGSL 0,0022 0,4110 0,6812 
SPERGISL -0,0039 -1,2560 0,2093 
SPERGSL 0,0043 0,7941 0,4272 
PSPERGISL 0,0012 0,3716 0,7102 
PSPERGSL 0,0085 1,5759 0,1152 
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Appendix J: Stimuli Construction - Experiment 4 
The gambles of the three range conditions in Experiment 4 were again constructed on 
the basis of estimates of prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). The purpose was to 
generate pairwise indifference between the gambles in the S-range condition and a greater 
preference for riskier gambles in the O-range condition (i.e., by increasing the outcome range) 
and in the P-range condition (i.e., by decreasing the probability range). 
The probability-weighting function from prospect theory (Equation B2) cannot be 
explicitly solved for probabilities, and thus, it cannot be used for constructing the gambles of 
the P-range condition. For this reason, instead of using this function, we used an alternative 
probability-weighting function (e.g., Goldstein & Einhorn, 1987; Lattimore, Baker, & Witte, 
1992; Tversky & Fox, 1995):  




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ii
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i
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p
pw

 .                     (C1)  
Minimizing the departure from the probability-weighting function in Equation B2, the 
parameters were estimated at ˆ  = .73 and ˆ  = .54. 
The procedure was the same as before, we started by specifying a gamble that yielded 
€7.50 upon drawing one of 36 winning cards from a complete deck of 52 cards. The value of 
the outcome €7.50 was computed from Equation B1 and the weight of the probability 36/52 
from Equation C1. Then, to construct 17 gambles that would be subjectively equivalent to this 
gamble, 17 other probabilities were chosen from the interval [11/52, 36/52) and (36/52, 
44/52], which correspond to the probabilities of the S-range and of the O-range conditions, 
respectively. The probabilities weights were computed from Equation C1 and the 
corresponding outcome values from Equation B3. 
In order to obtain the probabilities of the P-range condition, the probability weights 
were transformed so that their range would be decreased but their geometric mean preserved:  
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where n is the number of probability weights (n = 18) and q is the factor that decreases their 
range (q ≥ 0).  
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 We set q = .0536, decreasing the probability range by 50%, and the resulting 
probability weights were then converted back to probabilities: 
])([ *1* ii pwwp
 ,                                 (C3)   
where 
 /1
1
]/)1([1
1
)(
ii
i
pp
pw

 . 
The obtained probabilities were rounded to the nearest 1/52. 
To obtain the outcomes of the three range conditions, the procedure was similar to the 
previous: The outcome values, already computed from Equation B3, were transformed by 
Equation B4. Specifically, we set q = .0290 for the S-range and P-range conditions, increasing 
the range of the outcome values by 137%, and q = .0362 for the O-range condition, increasing 
the range of outcome values by 271%. The resulting outcome values were converted back to 
outcomes through Equation B5 and rounded to the nearest €0.50. 
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Appendix K: Frequency and Specification of Winning Cards – 
 Experiment 4 
 
Table 60 
Winning cards 
Frequency Specification A Specification B 
11 Number of Hearts or Black Ace Number of Spades or Red Ace 
12 Figure of Diamonds, Spades or Clubs Figure of Clubs, Hearts or Diamonds 
14 Card of Hearts or Ace of Spades Card of Spades or Ace of Hearts 
16 Figure Figure 
17 Hearts or a Figure of Diamonds  Spades or Figure of Clubs 
18 Black Number Red Number 
19 Red Number or Ace of Spades Black Number or Ace of Hearts 
20 Even Number Even Number 
21 Ace of Clubs or Even Number Ace of Diamonds or Even Number 
22 Number of Spades or Card of Hearts Number of Hearts or Card of Spades 
23 
Black Number or Even Number of 
Hearts  
Red Number or Even Number of 
Spades  
24 Ace or Even Number Ace or Even Number 
25 Number of Diamonds or Figure Number of Clubs or Figure 
26 Black Card Red Card 
27 Red Card or Ace of Spades Black Card or Ace of Hearts 
29 
Number of Diamonds, Spades or 
Clubs or Red Ace 
Number of Clubs, Hearts or Diamonds 
or  Black Ace 
30  Red Card or Figure of Clubs  Black Card or Figure of Diamonds 
31 Black Card or Even Number of Hearts Red Card or Even Number of Spades  
32 Odd Number or Figure Odd Number or Figure 
33 
Card of Diamonds, Black Ace or 
Black Number 
Card of Clubs, Red Ace or Red Number 
34 Red Card or Black Figure Black Card or Red Figure 
35 Black Card or Number of Diamonds  Red Card or Number of Clubs  
36 Number Number 
38 Black Ace or Number Red Ace or Number 
40 Figure of Hearts or Number Figure of Spades or Number 
42 Black King, Ace or Number Red King, Ace or Number 
44 Black Number or Red Card Red Number or Black Card 
 
209 
 
 
Appendix L: Results - Experiment 4  
 
Conflict: Principal Component Analysis 
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Figure 34. Principal component analysis - scree plot (Experiment 4). 
 
Table 61 
Eigenvalues 
  Eigenvalue 
% Total 
variance 
Cumulative 
Eigenvalue 
Cumulative 
% 
1 1,9188 38,3760 1,9188 38,3760 
2 1,0335 20,6705 2,9523 59,0465 
3 0,9329 18,6579 3,8852 77,7044 
4 0,5910 11,8200 4,4762 89,5244 
5 0,5238 10,4756 5,0000 100,0000 
 
Table 62   
Factor Loadings   
Measure  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
Decision Time -0,3913 0,2272 0,8757 0,1671 0,0237 
Decision Uncertainty -0,6164 -0,5655 -0,1610 0,5210 0,0534 
Decision Difficulty -0,6482 -0,5180 0,1425 -0,5092 -0,1787 
Preferece Equality -0,7357 0,3457 -0,2187 -0,1560 0,5167 
Attribute-Weight Equality -0,6513 0,5237 -0,2685 0,0895 -0,4705 
Expl.Var 1,9188 1,0335 0,9329 0,5910 0,5238 
Prp.Totl 0,3838 0,2067 0,1866 0,1182 0,1048 
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Conflict: Reliability Analysis 
 
Table 62   
Reliability Analysis - Alpha de Cronbach 
Valid N 1944 
Cronbach alpha 0,4378 
Standardized alpha 0,5860 
Average inter-item corr.  0,2245 
 
Table 63   
Reliability Analysis by Measure 
Measure  
Itm-Totl 
Correl. 
Alpha if 
deleted 
Decision Time 0,153765 0,429286 
Decision Uncertainty 0,369628 0,248992 
Decision Difficulty 0,430133 0,171511 
Preferece Equality 0,340312 0,438214 
Attribute-Weight Equality 0,237324 0,444608 
 
Conflict: Hypotheses Test 
In the following analyses: PL denotes the linear contrast concerning the effect of 
progress through choice tasks (first six tasks versus last six tasks); PQ denotes the quadratic 
contrast concerning the effect of progress through choice tasks (intermediate versus first and 
last six tasks); SO denotes the contrast between range conditions (S-range versus O-range); 
SP denotes the contrast between range conditions (S-range versus P-range); RG denotes the 
contrast between reference gamble conditions (large-amount condition versus high-
probability condition); ISL denotes the quadratic contrast between tradeoff size conditions 
(intermediate versus small and large tradeoffs); SL denotes the linear contrast between 
tradeoff size conditions (small versus large tradeoffs); and the other variables denote the 
interactions between these contrasts. 
 
TABLE 64 
Parameter Estimates- Regression 1 
  
Conflict 
Param. 
Conflict    
t 
Conflict 
p 
Intercept 0,6034 148,0182 0,0000 
PL -0,0210 -4,2040 0,0000 
PQ 0,0017 0,5875 0,5569 
SO 0,0002 0,0263 0,9790 
SP 0,0057 0,9815 0,3265 
RG 0,0043 1,0540 0,2920 
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Conflict 
Param. 
Conflict    
t 
Conflict 
p 
ISL 0,0045 1,5632 0,1182 
SL 0,0020 0,3922 0,6950 
SORG 0,0029 0,4992 0,6177 
SPRG -0,0098 -1,7025 0,0888 
SOISL 0,0029 0,7240 0,4691 
SOSL -0,0048 -0,6825 0,4950 
SPISL -0,0050 -1,2149 0,2246 
SPSL 0,0070 0,9888 0,3229 
RGISL -0,0008 -0,2903 0,7716 
RGSL -0,0058 -1,1577 0,2471 
SORGISL -0,0009 -0,2144 0,8302 
SORGSL 0,0024 0,3381 0,7353 
SPRGISL 0,0009 0,2306 0,8176 
SPRGSL 0,0031 0,4435 0,6574 
PLSO -0,0117 -1,6605 0,0970 
PLSP 0,0066 0,9330 0,3509 
PLRG 0,0079 1,5739 0,1157 
PLISL 0,0000 0,0003 0,9998 
PLSL -0,0039 -0,6408 0,5217 
PLSORG -0,0068 -0,9629 0,3357 
PLSPRG 0,0052 0,7309 0,4649 
PLSOISL -0,0031 -0,6250 0,5320 
PLSOSL -0,0229 -2,6473 0,0082 
PLSPISL 0,0014 0,2760 0,7826 
PLSPSL 0,0238 2,7951 0,0052 
PLRGISL 0,0031 0,8620 0,3888 
PLRGSL -0,0066 -1,0901 0,2758 
PLSORGISL -0,0069 -1,3903 0,1646 
PLSORGSL 0,0060 0,6923 0,4888 
PLSPRGISL 0,0048 0,9596 0,3374 
PLSPRGSL -0,0078 -0,9109 0,3625 
PQSO 0,0013 0,3258 0,7446 
PQSP -0,0035 -0,8682 0,3854 
PQRG 0,0039 1,3619 0,1734 
PQISL -0,0029 -1,4547 0,1459 
PQSL -0,0026 -0,7206 0,4712 
PQSORG 0,0024 0,6004 0,5483 
PQSPRG -0,0098 -2,4002 0,0165 
PQSOISL -0,0042 -1,4483 0,1477 
PQSOSL 0,0038 0,7605 0,4470 
PQSPISL -0,0012 -0,4182 0,6759 
PQSPSL -0,0004 -0,0744 0,9407 
PQRGISL -0,0034 -1,6680 0,0955 
PQRGSL 0,0002 0,0636 0,9493 
PQSORGISL 0,0012 0,4318 0,6660 
PQSORGSL -0,0100 -2,0080 0,0448 
PQSPRGISL 0,0039 1,3753 0,1692 
PQSPRGSL 0,0045 0,8856 0,3760 
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Table 65 
Parameter Estimates- Regression 2 
  
Conflict 
Param. 
Conflict    
t 
Conflict 
p 
Intercept 0,5807 80,6010 0,0000 
SO -0,0129 -1,2705 0,2044 
SP 0,0158 1,5433 0,1233 
RG 0,0082 1,1410 0,2543 
ISL 0,0075 1,4781 0,1399 
SL 0,0006 0,0706 0,9437 
SORG -0,0064 -0,6271 0,5308 
SPRG 0,0051 0,5024 0,6156 
SOISL 0,0040 0,5663 0,5714 
SOSL -0,0315 -2,4938 0,0129 
SPISL -0,0024 -0,3278 0,7432 
SPSL 0,0312 2,4888 0,0131 
RGISL 0,0056 1,1111 0,2670 
RGSL -0,0126 -1,4166 0,1571 
SORGISL -0,0090 -1,2821 0,2003 
SORGSL 0,0184 1,4538 0,1465 
SPRGISL 0,0019 0,2570 0,7973 
SPRGSL -0,0091 -0,7274 0,4673 
 
Table 66 
Parameter Estimates- Regression 3 
  
Conflict 
Param. 
Conflict    
t 
Conflict 
p 
Intercept 0,5779 47,1969 0,0000 
RG 0,0095 0,7719 0,4411 
ISL 0,0058 0,6835 0,4950 
SL 0,0010 0,0629 0,9499 
RGISL 0,0128 1,5010 0,1349 
RGSL -0,0219 -1,4379 0,1520 
 
Table 67 
Parameter Estimates- Regression 4 
  
Conflict 
Param. 
Conflict    
t 
Conflict 
p 
Intercept 0,567840 44,29 0,00 
RG 0,001853 0,14 0,89 
ISL 0,011451 1,29 0,20 
SL -0,030905 -1,92 0,06 
RGISL -0,003445 -0,39 0,70 
RGSL 0,005756 0,36 0,72 
 
 
213 
 
 
Table 68 
Parameter Estimates- Regression 5 
  
Conflict 
Param. 
Conflict    
t 
Conflict 
p 
Intercept 0,5965 48,3104 0,0000 
RG 0,0134 1,0820 0,2805 
ISL 0,0051 0,5776 0,5642 
SL 0,0318 2,1229 0,0349 
RGISL 0,0075 0,8475 0,3977 
RGSL -0,0217 -1,4501 0,1485 
 
Parametric Hypotheses Test 
In Experiment 4, the arbitrary scaling constant and the drive-capacity parameter were 
estimated at ˆ  = 0.98 and ˆ  = 1.70, respectively. The preliminary conflict from concern 
about argumentation was estimated at 0Aˆ  
= 0.62 in the S-range condition, at 0Aˆ  
= 0.96 in the 
O-range condition, and at 0Aˆ  
= 0.50 in the P-range condition. The preliminary conflict from 
concern about sacrifice was estimated at 0Sˆ  
= 0.64 in the S-range condition, at 0Sˆ  
= 0.45 in 
the O-range condition, and had been set to 1 in the P-range condition. 
Manipulation Check 
In the following analyses: SO denotes the contrast between the S-range condition and 
the O-range condition, and SP denotes the contrast between the S-range condition and the P-
range condition. 
 
Table 69 
Likelihood Type 3 Test 
 
Degr. Of 
Freedom 
Log- 
Likelihood 
Chi- 
Square 
p 
SO 1 -1311,6488 2,5755 0,1085 
SP 1 -1322,7059 24,6897 0,0000 
 
Table 70 
Parameter Estimates 
 
Estimate 
Wald 
Stat. 
p 
Intercept 0,2382 26,5208 0,0000 
SO 0,1046 2,5679 0,1091 
SP 0,3256 24,2854 0,0000 
Scale 1,0000     
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Appendix M: Results - Experiment 5  
Conflict: Principal Component Analysis 
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Figure 35. Principal component analysis - scree plot (Experiment 5). 
 
Table 71 
Eigenvalues 
  Eigenvalue 
% Total 
variance 
Cumulative 
Eigenvalue 
Cumulative 
% 
1 1,9401 38,8013 1,9401 38,8013 
2 1,0427 20,8534 2,9827 59,6546 
3 0,9213 18,4268 3,9041 78,0815 
4 0,5880 11,7596 4,4921 89,8411 
5 0,5079 10,1589 5,0000 100,0000 
 
Table 72   
Factor Loadings   
  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
Decision Time 0,3379 -0,4339 -0,8318 -0,0748 -0,0055 
Decision Uncertainty 0,7232 -0,3463 0,3088 -0,1109 0,4994 
Decision Difficulty 0,7461 -0,2727 0,2976 -0,1554 -0,5063 
Preferece Equality 0,7161 0,3411 -0,1036 0,6000 -0,0059 
Attribute-Weight Equality 0,4831 0,7374 -0,1865 -0,4311 0,0468 
Expl.Var 1,9401 1,0427 0,9213 0,5880 0,5079 
Prp.Totl 0,3880 0,2085 0,1843 0,1176 0,1016 
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Conflict: Reliability Analysis 
 
Table 73   
Reliability Analysis - Alpha de Cronbach 
Valid N 2160 
Cronbach alpha 0,4762 
Standardized alpha 0,5805 
Average inter-item corr.  0,2218 
 
Table 74   
Reliability Analysis by Measure 
Measure  
Itm-Totl 
Correl. 
Alpha if 
deleted 
Decision Time 0,1652 0,4718 
Decision Uncertainty 0,4834 0,1946 
Decision Difficulty 0,4826 0,1974 
Preferece Equality 0,3777 0,4873 
Attribute-Weight Equality 0,1543 0,4989 
 
Conflict: Hypotheses Test 
In the following analyses: PL denotes the linear contrast concerning the effect of 
progress through choice tasks (first six tasks versus last six tasks); PQ denotes the quadratic 
contrast concerning the effect of progress through choice tasks (intermediate versus first and 
last six tasks); SO denotes the contrast between range conditions (S-range versus O-range); 
SP denotes the contrast between range conditions (S-range versus P-range); RG denotes the 
contrast between reference gamble conditions (large-amount condition versus high-
probability condition); ISL denotes the quadratic contrast between tradeoff size conditions 
(intermediate versus small and large tradeoffs); SL denotes the linear contrast between 
tradeoff size conditions (small versus large tradeoffs); and the other variables denote the 
interactions between these contrasts. 
 
Table 75 
Parameter Estimates- Regression 1 
  
Conflict 
Param. 
Conflict    
t 
Conflict 
p 
Intercept 0,5540 137,1612 0,0000 
PL -0,0110 -2,2230 0,0263 
PQ -0,0007 -0,2448 0,8066 
SO -0,0055 -0,9634 0,3354 
SP 0,0065 1,1375 0,2555 
RG 0,0008 0,2055 0,8372 
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Conflict 
Param. 
Conflict    
t 
Conflict 
p 
ISL 0,0043 1,5168 0,1295 
SL -0,0142 -2,8708 0,0041 
SORG -0,0062 -1,0800 0,2803 
SPRG -0,0011 -0,1979 0,8431 
SOISL 0,0006 0,1485 0,8820 
SOSL -0,0002 -0,0351 0,9720 
SPISL -0,0027 -0,6715 0,5020 
SPSL 0,0042 0,5992 0,5491 
RGISL -0,0028 -0,9661 0,3341 
RGSL -0,0079 -1,5893 0,1121 
SORGISL -0,0047 -1,1581 0,2469 
SORGSL -0,0080 -1,1501 0,2502 
SPRGISL -0,0008 -0,2043 0,8381 
SPRGSL -0,0046 -0,6517 0,5147 
PLSO -0,0119 -1,7116 0,0871 
PLSP 0,0102 1,4512 0,1469 
PLRG 0,0038 0,7779 0,4367 
PLISL 0,0024 0,6935 0,4881 
PLSL 0,0021 0,3459 0,7295 
PLSORG -0,0084 -1,2106 0,2262 
PLSPRG 0,0043 0,6084 0,5430 
PLSOISL 0,0040 0,8103 0,4178 
PLSOSL -0,0053 -0,6213 0,5344 
PLSPISL 0,0006 0,1190 0,9053 
PLSPSL 0,0070 0,8143 0,4156 
PLRGISL -0,0012 -0,3488 0,7273 
PLRGSL -0,0025 -0,4210 0,6738 
PLSORGISL 0,0002 0,0344 0,9726 
PLSORGSL 0,0152 1,7884 0,0738 
PLSPRGISL -0,0020 -0,3995 0,6896 
PLSPRGSL -0,0024 -0,2825 0,7776 
PQSO -0,0009 -0,2249 0,8221 
PQSP 0,0000 -0,0047 0,9963 
PQRG 0,0009 0,3100 0,7566 
PQISL -0,0007 -0,3715 0,7103 
PQSL 0,0017 0,4920 0,6228 
PQSORG 0,0014 0,3491 0,7271 
PQSPRG -0,0040 -0,9938 0,3204 
PQSOISL -0,0022 -0,7862 0,4318 
PQSOSL -0,0024 -0,4739 0,6356 
PQSPISL 0,0004 0,1526 0,8787 
PQSPSL -0,0009 -0,1874 0,8513 
PQRGISL 0,0016 0,7866 0,4316 
PQRGSL -0,0033 -0,9501 0,3421 
PQSORGISL -0,0026 -0,8987 0,3689 
PQSORGSL 0,0018 0,3623 0,7172 
PQSPRGISL -0,0016 -0,5537 0,5799 
PQSPRGSL -0,0050 -1,0012 0,3169 
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Table 76 
Parameter Estimates- Regression 2 
  
Conflict 
Param. 
Conflict    
t 
Conflict 
p 
Intercept 0,5530 79,9027 0,0000 
PL -0,0093 -1,0918 0,2753 
PQ 0,0002 0,0475 0,9621 
RG 0,0081 1,1746 0,2405 
ISL 0,0064 1,3174 0,1881 
SL -0,0181 -2,1388 0,0328 
RGISL 0,0027 0,5617 0,5745 
RGSL 0,0047 0,5583 0,5768 
PLRG 0,0080 0,9432 0,3459 
PLISL -0,0022 -0,3646 0,7155 
PLSL 0,0004 0,0381 0,9696 
PLRGISL 0,0006 0,1009 0,9197 
PLRGSL -0,0153 -1,4608 0,1445 
PQRG 0,0035 0,7085 0,4789 
PQISL 0,0011 0,3073 0,7587 
PQSL 0,0050 0,8435 0,3992 
PQRGISL 0,0057 1,6447 0,1005 
PQRGSL -0,0002 -0,0308 0,9754 
 
Table 77 
Parameter Estimates- Regression 3 
  
Conflict 
Param. 
Conflict    
t 
Conflict 
p 
Intercept 0,5485 77,9699 0,0000 
PL -0,0229 -2,6857 0,0074 
PQ -0,0016 -0,3210 0,7483 
RG -0,0053 -0,7590 0,4481 
ISL 0,0049 0,9904 0,3223 
SL -0,0144 -1,6787 0,0937 
RGISL -0,0074 -1,4941 0,1356 
RGSL -0,0159 -1,8481 0,0650 
PLRG -0,0046 -0,5369 0,5915 
PLISL 0,0064 1,0598 0,2896 
PLSL -0,0032 -0,3068 0,7591 
PLRGISL -0,0011 -0,1733 0,8625 
PLRGSL 0,0126 1,2179 0,2237 
PQRG 0,0023 0,4584 0,6468 
PQISL -0,0030 -0,8480 0,3967 
PQSL -0,0006 -0,1035 0,9176 
PQRGISL -0,0010 -0,2788 0,7805 
PQRGSL -0,0015 -0,2466 0,8053 
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Table 78 
Parameter Estimates- Regression 4 
  
Conflict 
Param. 
Conflict    
t 
Conflict 
p 
Intercept 0,5605 79,7194 0,0000 
PL -0,0008 -0,0932 0,9258 
PQ -0,0007 -0,1456 0,8842 
RG -0,0003 -0,0426 0,9660 
ISL 0,0016 0,3264 0,7442 
SL -0,0100 -1,1624 0,2455 
RGISL -0,0036 -0,7210 0,4711 
RGSL -0,0124 -1,4418 0,1498 
PLRG 0,0081 0,9351 0,3501 
PLISL 0,0030 0,4888 0,6251 
PLSL 0,0090 0,8583 0,3910 
PLRGISL -0,0032 -0,5197 0,6034 
PLRGSL -0,0050 -0,4703 0,6383 
PQRG -0,0031 -0,6307 0,5285 
PQISL -0,0003 -0,0918 0,9269 
PQSL 0,0008 0,1309 0,8959 
PQRGISL 0,0000 0,0058 0,9954 
PQRGSL -0,0083 -1,3607 0,1740 
 
Table 79 
Parameter Estimates- Regression 5 
  
Conflict 
Param. 
Conflict    
t 
Conflict 
p 
Intercept 0,5437 78,3902 0,0000 
SO -0,0165 -1,6807 0,0933 
SP 0,0167 1,7177 0,0863 
RG 0,0038 0,5468 0,5847 
ISL 0,0075 1,5348 0,1253 
SL -0,0138 -1,6262 0,1044 
SORG -0,0160 -1,6305 0,1034 
SPRG 0,0071 0,7340 0,4632 
SOISL 0,0069 0,9821 0,3264 
SOSL -0,0031 -0,2631 0,7926 
SPISL -0,0025 -0,3679 0,7130 
SPSL 0,0121 1,0214 0,3074 
RGISL -0,0056 -1,1371 0,2559 
RGSL -0,0071 -0,8308 0,4064 
SORGISL -0,0019 -0,2782 0,7809 
SORGSL 0,0053 0,4441 0,6571 
SPRGISL -0,0013 -0,1814 0,8561 
SPRGSL -0,0020 -0,1701 0,8650 
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Parametric Hypotheses Test 
In Experiment 5 the drive-capacity parameter was estimated at ˆ  = 2.20 and the 
arbitrary scaling constant had been set to 1 in order to estimate the remaining parameters. The 
preliminary conflict aroused by concern about argumentation was estimated at 0Aˆ  
= 0.69 in 
the S-range condition, at 0Aˆ  
= 0.66 in the O-range condition, and at 0Aˆ  
= 0.65 in the P-range 
condition. The preliminary conflict aroused by concern about sacrifice was estimated at 0Sˆ  
= 
0.50 in the S-range condition, at 0Sˆ  
= 0.52 in the O-range condition, and 0Sˆ  
= 0.55 in the P-
range condition. 
Manipulation Check 
In the following analyses: SO denotes the contrast between S-range and O-range 
condition, and SP denotes the contrast between S-range and P-range. 
 
Table 80 
Likelihood Type 3 Test 
 
Degr. Of 
Freedom 
Log- 
Likelihood 
Chi- 
Square 
p 
SO 1 -1493,1579 0,0079 0,9292 
SP 1 -1494,5071 2,7064 0,0999 
 
Table 81 
Parameter Estimates 
 
Estimate Wald Stat. p 
Intercept -0,0891 4,2709 0,0388 
SO -0,0054 0,0079 0,9292 
SP -0,1004 2,7019 0,1002 
Scale 1,0000     
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Appendix N: Results - General Discussion 
In the following analyses: GL denotes the contrast between outcome sign conditions 
(gains versus losses); C denotes the contrast between the two choice contexts (forced versus 
free choice); RG denotes the contrast between reference gamble conditions (large-amount 
condition versus high-probability condition); ISL denotes the quadratic contrast between 
tradeoff size conditions (intermediate versus small and large tradeoffs); SL denotes the linear 
contrast between tradeoff size conditions (small versus large tradeoffs); CH denotes the 
contrast between choices (choice of the no-choice option versus choice of one of the 
products); and the other variables denote the interactions between these contrasts. 
 
Choice Inconsistency Versus Outcome Sign (LOGIT Analysis)  
Table 82 
Likelihood Type 3 Test - Experiment 1 
  
Degr. Of 
Freedom 
Log- 
Likelihood 
Chi- 
Square 
p 
GL 1 -2255,8089 9,7459 0,0018 
 
Table 83 
Parameter Estimates - Experiment 1 
  Estimate 
Wald 
Stat. 
p 
Intercept -0,5823 268,5964 0,0000 
GL 0,1108 9,7274 0,0018 
Scale 1,0000     
 
Decision Time Versus Outcome Sign (Regression Analysis) 
Table 84 
Parameter Estimates - Experiment 1 
  
Decision Time 
Param. 
Decision Time   
t 
Decision Time 
p 
Intercept 3,5040 212,8825 0,0000 
GL 0,0731 4,4420 0,0000 
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Table 85 
Parameter Estimates - Experiment 2 
  
Decision Time 
Param. 
Decision Time   
t 
Decision Time 
p 
Intercept 3,4391 195,6142 0,0000 
GL 0,0924 5,2555 0,0000 
 
Forced Versus Free Choice (Linear Regression Analysis) 
Table 86 
Parameter Estimates- Regression 1 
  
Conflict 
Param. 
Conflict    
t 
Conflict 
p 
Intercept 0,3800 96,1590 0,0000 
C -0,0015 -0,3848 0,7004 
RG 0,0063 1,6248 0,1043 
ISL 0,0021 0,7651 0,4443 
SL 0,0223 4,6759 0,0000 
CRG -0,0021 -0,5320 0,5948 
CISL 0,0014 0,4987 0,6180 
CSL 0,0049 1,0290 0,3036 
RGISL 0,0017 0,6014 0,5476 
RGSL -0,0100 -2,0917 0,0366 
CRGISL -0,0001 -0,0307 0,9755 
CRGSL -0,0038 -0,7978 0,4251 
CH 0,1497 6,6725 0,0000 
 
 
 
